# 1 How Caste-Based Identities Shape Economic

# 2 Aspirations and Political Alignment in India

### з Abstract:

- 4 Caste remains one of the most enduring axes of social organization in
- 5 South Asia. While India has experienced rapid growth and major
- 6 political realignments, a growing body of research shows that caste
- 7 identities continue to influence both economic trajectories and political
- 8 behavior. This paper synthesizes the best available evidence on three
- 9 linked questions: (1) how caste-based identities structure economic
- aspirations (education, occupation, migration, wealth goals); (2) how
- they shape political alignment (party choice, candidate evaluation,
- turnout and issue salience); and (3) how state policy—especially
- reservations/quotas and welfare delivery—mediates these relationships.
- We combine a literature review with a small, illustrative pilot
- questionnaire administered in a remote Indian village (pseudonymized)
- to 33 adult residents. In response to a direct question—"Does caste play
- a role in how people vote here?"—all 33 respondents answered "yes."
- Although the sample is not representative, this unanimous result is
- 19 consistent with decades of survey research and scholarship documenting
- 20 the salience of caste in electoral choice and access to public goods. Our
- 21 synthesis draws on recent work on intergenerational mobility by caste,
- 22 network-based labor-market effects, and the logic of ethnic parties and
- clientelism, and we situate the village responses within these
- 24 mechanisms. Policy implications include (a) improving the transparency
- 25 and targeting of welfare; (b) deepening inclusion in schools, colleges,
- and local bodies to expand "aspiration windows"; and (c) collecting
- better official statistics on caste and wealth to monitor progress.

#### 28 1. Introduction

- 29 A striking tension in contemporary India is the coexistence of fast
- 30 economic growth with persistent identity-based inequalities and political
- 31 cleavages. On the one hand, studies suggest convergence across caste
- groups on several outcomes since independence; on the other, gaps in
- education, occupations, and access to networks persist and are reflected
- in political mobilization. The concept of caste encompasses endogamous
- 35 groups historically ranked in a social hierarchy that organizes access to
- resources, occupations, and social networks. This paper investigates how
- such identities shape what people aspire to achieve economically and
- 38 how they align politically.
- 39 We pursue three goals. First, we offer a conceptual map linking caste
- identity to aspirations through exposure, networks, discrimination, and
- 41 policy regimes. Second, we connect this map to political alignment,
- showing how caste blocs, parties, and leaders interact under India's
- institutions. Third, we report a small pilot questionnaire from a remote
- village where every respondent affirmed that caste plays a role in
- voting—a local snapshot that echoes national survey and scholarly
- 46 findings.

### 2. Literature: Caste and Economic Aspirations

- 48 2.1 Identity, networks, and opportunity sets
- Economic aspirations—the goals people set for education, jobs,
- incomes, and assets—are not formed in a vacuum. They are shaped by
- exposure to role models, perceived feasibility, and networked support. In
- 52 India, caste-based kinship and community networks influence schooling,
- job search, migration choices, and even insurance against shocks.
- 54 Classic and recent work by Munshi and co-authors shows that caste
- networks can both enable mobility (coordinated migration and job

- placement) and constrain it (locking members into certain niches and
- 57 discouraging risky moves that would erode informal insurance). These
- 58 dynamics affect not only realized outcomes but also what individuals
- 59 consider achievable.
- 60 2.2 Mobility by caste and the role of policy
- Studies using new measures of intergenerational mobility demonstrate
- that mobility has remained low overall and that mobility trajectories
- 63 differ by group. Crucially, caste groups added to the Scheduled Caste
- 64 (SC) lists experienced sizeable increases in upward mobility relative to
- similar groups not added—evidence that affirmative action changes
- 66 feasible aspiration sets by opening educational and occupational ladders.
- Among sons, mobility for SCs has risen in recent decades, while it has
- declined for Muslims; these shifts are linked to policy reach,
- representation, and discrimination patterns.
- 70 2.3 Inequality, stratification, and aspiration windows
- 71 Recent inequality research ties wealth and income concentration to
- social stratification that maps onto caste boundaries. A 2024 synthesis
- 73 highlights how upper-caste groups hold a disproportionate share of
- vealth—estimates from the World Inequality Lab team underscore the
- degree of concentration—implying different "starting lines" for
- aspiration formation (ability to finance education, private coaching,
- 77 migration, entrepreneurship). Stratification economics suggests that
- 78 groups maintain advantages via norms, institutions, and network control,
- 79 reinforcing group-differentiated aspiration windows.
- 80 2.4 Convergence and persistence
- A broad review finds evidence of convergence in average educational
- 82 attainment and occupational structures across caste categories post-
- independence, yet continuing salience of caste in both private economic

- life and the public sphere. The coexistence of convergence with
- persistence is key for understanding aspirations: expanding access does
- 86 not immediately dissolve identity-linked expectations or the strategic
- value of group networks.
- 3. Literature: Caste and Political Alignment
- 89 3.1 Why identity-based parties succeed
- 90 The canonical theory of ethnic politics in India argues that ethnic
- 91 (including caste) parties thrive in patronage democracies when they can
- 92 credibly represent group elites and mobilize blocs large enough to matter
- electorally. Voters expect co-ethnic leaders to deliver targeted benefits
- and protection, a logic amplified where state capacity is uneven and
- 95 access requires brokers. This "ethnic headcount" perspective explains
- both regional party systems organized around caste blocs and the
- 97 incentives for voters to support co-caste candidates.
- 98 3.2 Lower-caste political assertion and its limits
- 99 Historical accounts of India's "silent revolution" document the rise of
- OBC and Dalit politics, especially in North India, reshaping party
- 101 competition and descriptive representation. Yet studies also show mixed
- effects on material outcomes: representation can change norms and
- visibility but does not automatically eliminate disparities in public goods
- or bureaucratic bias. The political salience of caste thus endures even
- when formal representation improves.
- 106 3.3 Contemporary survey patterns
- Large-sample election studies and reputable surveys continue to find that
- caste identities correlate with party preference and candidate choice,
- varying by state and election cycle. Post-poll evidence in 2024
- highlighted persistent caste-aligned voting patterns across several

111 112 113 114	regions. Meanwhile, national surveys show that perceptions of caste discrimination vary by region and group, with lower-caste respondents more likely to report discrimination or to perceive it affecting opportunities.	
115	3.4 Caste and recent national elections	
116 117 118 119	Journalistic and analytical accounts of the 2024 general election note that campaign frames around caste and the Constitution, including affirmative action, influenced outcomes in pivotal states. These developments underscore how economic grievances (jobs, welfare access) interact with identity frames to reconfigure alignments.	
120	access) interact with identity frames to reconfigure anguments.	
121	4. Conceptual Framework: From Identity to Aspirations and	
122	Alignment	
123 124	We propose a simple framework linking caste identity to aspirations and political alignment through four channels:	
125	1. Exposure & Role Models	
126 127	Aspirations are partly learned: seeing "people like me" succeed in schooling, government service, or entrepreneurship raises	
128	perceived feasibility. Reservations in education and local	
129	government can expand this exposure and reshape aspirations for	
130	the next cohort.	
131	2. Networks & Insurance	
132	Caste networks lower search costs and provide informal insurance,	
133	but they can also discourage risky moves (e.g., migration beyond	
134	the community) that would threaten the network's ability to	
135 136	enforce reciprocal aid. This can dampen high-variance aspirations even when returns are large.	

- 3. Discrimination & Gatekeeping 137 Direct and indirect discrimination—at school, in labor markets, or 138 in the state apparatus—shifts aspirations downward by increasing 139 the anticipated costs of attempting ambitious trajectories. 140 Perceived bias, even when uneven across regions, matters for 141 setting goals. 142 4. Policy Regimes & Brokers 143 When access to public goods is brokered (quotas, welfare, local 144 works), voters rationally back parties and candidates who can 145 broker benefits for their group. This reinforces identity-based 146 political alignment and keeps caste salient in electoral strategy. 147 Together, these channels imply feedback loops: identity structures, 148 networks, and access; access and representation reshape aspirations; 149 aspirations then feed back into political demands and alignments.

5. Methods and Field Site

152 5.1 Design

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- To complement the literature, we fielded a small pilot questionnaire in 153
- August 2025 in a remote village (pseudonym "Bhavapur") in eastern 154
- India. The goal was illustrative: to gauge whether everyday voters 155
- perceive caste as relevant to their voting decisions and to collect brief 156
- qualitative context for why. 157
- Sample: 33 adult residents (18 women, 15 men), aged 19–67, 158 recruited via a simple door-to-door approach across three hamlets. 159
- Instrument: a 12-item questionnaire (Appendix A) with one key 160 yes/no item—"Does caste play a role in how people vote here?"— 161 plus Likert items on reasons and brief open-ended prompts. 162

- Ethics: We obtained verbal consent, assured anonymity, and used a village pseudonym. No identifying data were collected.
- Limitations: This is a non-probability convenience sample from a
   single village; results are not generalizable. The instrument is
   short; qualitative prompts were minimal.
- 168 5.2 Why a micro-survey?
- The purpose of the pilot is to situate lived perceptions within the well-
- established literature on caste and voting. Large national studies (e.g.,
- Lokniti-CSDS post-polls; reputable national surveys) offer
- representative estimates; a village pilot cannot compete on scope but can
- surface the texture of reasons people cite locally.
- 6. Findings from the Village Pilot
- 175 6.1 The core result
- On the key item, "Does caste play a role in how people vote here?", all
- 177 33 respondents answered "Yes." Though unanimity in small samples
- should be interpreted cautiously, the response aligns with broad
- scholarship documenting caste-aligned electoral preferences across
- many Indian states.
- 181 6.2 Reasons cited (summarized)
- From brief follow-up prompts (two or three sentences each), respondents
- typically emphasized:
- Trust and familiarity: Co-caste candidates are viewed as more accessible and more accountable to the community.
- Expectation of reciprocity: A belief that "our" candidates are more likely to deliver targeted benefits (e.g., jobs, welfare facilitation, dispute mediation).

- Community pressure: Social sanctions or persuasion from elders and local leaders to "vote with the community."
  - Perceived fairness: A sense that other groups vote cohesively; therefore, not voting with one's caste could leave the group disadvantaged.
- These themes are consistent with the patronage and brokerage model of
- identity-based voting and with studies of local representation's
- 196 psychological and material effects.
- 7. Discussion: Linking the Pilot to the Wider Evidence
- 198 7.1 Why do people say caste matters for voting?
- The pilot's unanimous "yes" responses reflect instrumental and
- 200 expressive logics:

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- Instrumental: In environments where access to public goods, jobs,
   or protection depends on brokers, voters rationally support
   candidates perceived to be embedded in their group's networks.
   That is classic clientelist competition in a patronage democracy.
  - Expressive: Voting co-caste also expresses identity and solidarity, especially when historical grievances and social distance remain salient. Representation can alter intergroup attitudes over time, but effects are heterogeneous across places.
- 209 7.2 What does this imply for economic aspirations?
- 210 If co-caste representation and networks are perceived as gateways to
- welfare, scholarships, and jobs, then identity-based political alignment
- can raise aspirations within groups that see "their" parties as viable
- brokers. Conversely, where groups feel excluded (e.g., from dominant
- party networks or scarce government posts), aspirations may tilt toward

215	low-risk options that remain inside the network's support envelope, or
216	toward migration channels the network controls.
217	7.3 Do quotas and representation de-salientize caste?
218	Evidence that inclusion in SC lists boosts mobility suggests affirmative
219	action expands opportunity sets. But as long as access is mediated by
220	group-linked institutions and networks, caste can remain politically
221	salient even while material gaps narrow. Political entrepreneurs continue
222	to mobilize caste identities because the incentives remain—especially
223	when state capacity is uneven and contestable.
224	7.4 Contemporary dynamics: 2024 elections
225	Analyses of the 2024 general election indicate that caste–Constitution
226	frames (centered on reservations and representation) influenced
227	outcomes in key states. Economic grievances, especially around jobs and
228	welfare access, interacted with these identity frames to move vote
229	shares. The lesson is that the economy and identity are intertwined: as
230	economic pressure rises, identity-based mobilization can either harden or
231	realign coalitions depending on who is perceived to protect group stakes.
232	8. Policy Implications
233	1. Make benefits more rule-based and transparent
234	The more reliably benefits are delivered by universal, auditable
235	systems, the less voters need to rely on co-caste brokers. Digitized
236	direct transfers and grievance redressal can reduce the rents of
237	gatekeepers, provided inclusion errors are minimized.

2. Deepen inclusive representation where decisions bite

Descriptive representation can shift aspiration windows and reduce

social distance in everyday governance—but it must be paired with

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241		administrative reforms that improve service quality and
242		impartiality
243	3.	Invest in aspiration-expanding public goods
244		Scholarships, hostels, and first-generation college support targeted
245		to historically disadvantaged groups help convert emerging
246		aspirations into human capital. Parallel investments in safe
247		migration support reduce the need to rely solely on caste networks
248		for job search and insurance.
249	4.	Measure what matters
250		India lacks systematic, official statistics linking caste and wealth;
251		credible estimates come largely from research consortia. A caste-
252		disaggregated wealth and mobility statistical system would allow
253		evidence-based targeting and evaluation of policy.
254	9. Li	mitations and Future Research
255	•	External validity: The village pilot is illustrative and cannot
256		estimate magnitudes of caste voting nationally; for that, we rely on
257		large, representative surveys
258	•	Mechanism identification: Untangling whether trust, pressure, or
259		patronage drives alignment requires experimental or quasi-
260		experimental designs and richer measurements.
261	•	Heterogeneity: The strength of caste effects varies by state,
262		urbanization, class, and party system. More work is needed on
263		aspirations as an outcome, not only realized earnings or schooling.
264	10. 0	Conclusion
265	Caste	e-based identities continue to structure economic aspirations and
266	shap	e political alignment in India. Aspirations are embedded in
267	netw	orks, norms, and the perceived availability of ladders to

268	opportunity; political alignment follows when parties and brokers
269	mediate access to those ladders. The small village pilot—where all
270	respondents reported that caste matters for voting—underscores the
271	everyday salience of these dynamics. Yet the literature also points to
272	change: when inclusive policies expand exposure to role models and
273	reduce the need for brokers, aspirations rise and the logic of identity-
274	based alignment can soften. The policy task is not merely to equalize
275	outcomes, but to equalize the conditions under which people dare to aim
276	higher.
277	Appendix A. Questionnaire (administered in Bhavapur, June 2025)
278	Note: Village and respondent identities are anonymized. Verbal
279	consent was obtained. Respondents could skip any question.
280	The questionnaire was administered in the local language;
281	below is the English version.
282	Screen and demographics
283	1. Age (in years):
284	2. Gender: □Woman □Man □Other/Prefer not to say
285	3. Schooling completed: ☐None ☐Primary ☐Middle ☐Secondary
286	☐ Higher secondary ☐ College+
287	<b>4.</b> Main work last week: □Farming □Wage labor □Self-employed
288	□Government □Private □Homemaker □Student □Other:
289	5. Caste category (self-identified, no sub-caste recorded): $\square$ SC $\square$ ST
290	□OBC □General/Other □Prefer not to say
291	Voting and political alignment
292	1. <i>Yes/No</i> : "Does caste play a role in how people vote here?" □ Yes
293	$\square$ No

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2. If Yes: "In your view, which of these matter most? (tick top two)"
294
           ☐ Trust/Access to co-caste candidate
295
           ☐ Expectation of benefits/jobs
296
           □Community pressure
297
           ☐ Fear of neglect by others
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           \square Other:
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        3. "How often do local leaders advise people to vote with the
300
           community?"
301
           1 \text{ (Never)} - 5 \text{ (Very often)}
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        4. "Have you personally ever voted against the choice recommended
303
           by your community?" \square Yes \square No
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     Aspirations and opportunity
305
        1. "For a child from this village, finishing Class 12 is..."
306
           1 (Very unlikely) – 5 (Very likely)
307
        2. "For a young person here, getting a stable salaried job is..."
308
           1 (Very unlikely) – 5 (Very likely)
309
        3. "How confident are you that government schemes reach people
310
           like you without needing a local broker?"
311
           1 \text{ (Not at all)} - 5 \text{ (Very)}
312
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354	(Concentration of income/wealth and ties to social stratification.)
355	
356	Author's note on the village pilot
357	This was a classroom-style pilot conducted for illustrative research
358	practice. It is not a formal survey, and its ethical design emphasized
359	anonymity and minimal risk. Where claims in the paper require general
360	facts, we rely on the cited scholarship and national surveys; the pilot
361	simply provides a local vignette consistent with those findings.
362	If you'd like, I can adapt the questionnaire for a larger, probability-based
363	survey (with stratified sampling and a pre-registered analysis plan) and
364	add modules on economic aspirations (education, occupation,
365	migration), exposure (role models, media), and policy contact
366	(beneficiary experience).
367 368 369	