

# Jana Publication & Research

## Geopolitics of Climate Change in the Himalayas: A Comparative Study of India's and Nepal's Policies in the Region

 VRC26

---

### Document Details

**Submission ID**

trn:oid::2945:314361638

**Submission Date**

Sep 25, 2025, 10:03 AM GMT+5:30

**Download Date**

Sep 25, 2025, 10:05 AM GMT+5:30

**File Name**

IJAR-54000.pdf

**File Size**

719.0 KB

15 Pages

5,120 Words

31,130 Characters





# 8% Overall Similarity

The combined total of all matches, including overlapping sources, for each database.




## Filtered from the Report

- Bibliography
- Quoted Text

## Match Groups

-  **28 Not Cited or Quoted 6%**  
Matches with neither in-text citation nor quotation marks
-  **9 Missing Quotations 2%**  
Matches that are still very similar to source material
-  **0 Missing Citation 0%**  
Matches that have quotation marks, but no in-text citation
-  **0 Cited and Quoted 0%**  
Matches with in-text citation present, but no quotation marks

## Top Sources

- 5%  Internet sources
- 5%  Publications
- 6%  Submitted works (Student Papers)

## Match Groups

- 28 Not Cited or Quoted** 6%  
Matches with neither in-text citation nor quotation marks
- 9 Missing Quotations** 2%  
Matches that are still very similar to source material
- 0 Missing Citation** 0%  
Matches that have quotation marks, but no in-text citation
- 0 Cited and Quoted** 0%  
Matches with in-text citation present, but no quotation marks

## Top Sources

- 5% Internet sources
- 5% Publications
- 6% Submitted works (Student Papers)

## Top Sources

The sources with the highest number of matches within the submission. Overlapping sources will not be displayed.

1	Internet	link.springer.com	<1%
2	Student papers	School of Oriental & African Studies on 2025-07-21	<1%
3	Internet	coek.info	<1%
4	Publication	Gaurav Bhattarai. "Geopolitical Reflections of Sino-Indian Conflict and its Implicat...	<1%
5	Student papers	King's College on 2025-03-13	<1%
6	Internet	www.businesstoday.in	<1%
7	Publication	Hemant R. Ojha, Sharad Ghimire, Adam Pain, Andrea Nightingale, Dil B. Khatri, H...	<1%
8	Internet	niua.in	<1%
9	Student papers	dsscwellington on 2025-01-07	<1%
10	Internet	timesofindia.indiatimes.com	<1%

11	Internet	undpngddlsprod01.blob.core.windows.net	<1%
12	Student papers	Blackboard LTI Integration on 2025-08-29	<1%
13	Internet	pragati.nirdpr.in	<1%
14	Publication	Alexandre Lambert, Faisal Ahmed. "Chapter 2 India's Neighbourhood Diplomacy",...	<1%
15	Internet	cnas.ucr.edu	<1%
16	Internet	nepjol.info	<1%
17	Internet	vdocuments.mx	<1%
18	Publication	Adluri Subramanyam Raju, R. Srinivasan. "The Routledge Handbook of Maritime I...	<1%
19	Publication	Anton Earle, Ana Elisa Cascão, Stina Hansson, Anders Jägerskog, Ashok Swain, Joa...	<1%
20	Publication	Shrestha, Padmendra. "Hydropower Governance in Nepal: A Social-Ecological Syst...	<1%
21	Student papers	The University of Manchester on 2024-09-26	<1%
22	Internet	pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov	<1%
23	Internet	research-repository.griffith.edu.au	<1%
24	Internet	www.pefa.org	<1%

25	Publication	"Climate Change", Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2022	<1%
26	Student papers	Geneva School of Diplomacy on 2024-09-15	<1%
27	Student papers	Kuala Lumpur Infrastructure University College on 2023-01-04	<1%
28	Student papers	Savitribai Phule Pune University on 2016-09-08	<1%
29	Publication	Baniateilang Majaw. "Climate Change in South Asia - Politics, Policies and the SAA...	<1%
30	Student papers	Indian Institute of Technology Roorkee on 2025-09-03	<1%
31	Student papers	University of South Africa on 2025-09-25	<1%

## Geopolitics of Climate Change in the Himalayas: A Comparative Study of India's and Nepal's Policies in the Region

### Abstract:

The Himalayas, a critical global ecological and hydrological system, face escalating climate change impacts inextricably linked with the region's complex and often contentious geopolitics. This paper undertakes a comparative analysis of India's and Nepal's climate policies within this sensitive region, examining how geopolitical considerations influence their divergent strategies. It argues that while both nations confront shared threats, their responses are fundamentally shaped by differences in national scale, institutional capacity, development status, strategic priorities, and historical emissions profiles. India's approach emphasizes a dual focus on mitigation and adaptation, reflecting its regional power aspirations and larger economic base. In contrast, Nepal, as a highly vulnerable Least Developed Country with minimal historical emissions, understandably prioritizes adaptation, community resilience, and international support. The paper contends that policy comparison is significantly challenged by these national disparities, data asymmetries, conflicting strategic interests, and the delicate nature of bilateral relations, all set against a backdrop of broader regional power dynamics. Consequently, while comparative insights are valuable for building regional climate resilience, the paper concludes that the current geopolitical landscape and inherent methodological complexities demand nuanced, context-sensitive approaches. Effective transboundary cooperation and evidence-based policymaking, essential for the long-term sustainability of this fragile mountain system and its dependent populations, require a deep acknowledgement of these intricate realities rather than oversimplified comparisons.

**Keywords:** 'Himalayas', 'Climate Change', 'Geopolitics', 'India', 'Nepal', 'Climate Policy', 'Transboundary Issues', 'Water Security'.

### 1. Introduction: The Third Pole Under Increasing Pressure

The Himalayan Mountain range, referred to as the "Third Pole" because of its enormous cryospheric reserves, and a world ecological hotspot of the highest significance (ADB, 2023). Its mountains are the sources of Asia's mighty river systems, including the Indus, Ganges, Brahmaputra, Yangtze, and Mekong, sustaining livelihoods for over 1.9 billion

persons downstream (Wester et al., 2019). But this majestic ecosystem is most vulnerable. It comprises steep slopes, seismic activity, and outstanding biodiversity, it is highly susceptible to impacts of climate change, such as increases in glacial melting, abnormal rainfall patterns, and an increased incidence of extreme weather events. Concurrently, the Himalayas hold immense geostrategic significance. They establish natural barriers between emerging and powerful powers like China, India, Pakistan, Nepal, and Bhutan, and have in the past been battlegrounds of territorial conflicts and resource competition, particularly for transboundary water (Fernando, 2023). This confluence of deep ecological vulnerability and high geostrategic stakes make the Himalayan region a critical, but precarious, nexus of the 21st century.

This vulnerability is starkly exposed in the face of accelerated climate change. In the recent half-century, the Himalayas have witnessed a sudden increase in extreme heat, a decline in extreme cold, and variable snowfall. The warming rate of the region far exceeds the global mean (Karki et al., 1970; IPCC, 2007), and the temperature is expected to rise by 3.5 to 5.5°C by 2100 in the Hindu Kush Himalayan (HKH) region (Kumar et al., 2006), much higher than the Paris Agreement's 1.5°C goal was already surpassed globally in 2024 (WMO, 2024; New Indian Express, 2024). Such quick warming is causing glaciers to recede dramatically—with a projected 50% loss in the HKH region under global warming of 2°C (ICIMOD, 2022). Vegetation to change patterns, crop cycles to get disrupted, new pests to arise, and freshwater supply from aquifers and streams to be in danger (Platt et al., 2020). The warming is more extreme with altitude, especially affecting Bhutan, Nepal, and Himachal Pradesh (Karki et al., 1970).

The environmental crisis is heavily exacerbated by deep geopolitical tensions. The Himalayan region is undergoing deep changes not only ecologically but also politically, culturally, and linguistically due to these pressures (Gautam, 2012). Militarization threats, competitive and often uncontrolled expansion on the basis of unsolved border disputes (Pai, 2008), and large-scale geopolitical rivalries destabilize fragile environments, increase risks like flash floods through glacial melting, threaten indigenous cultures, and intensify water wars, commonly obstructing cooperative responses to these common crises (The Lowy Institute, 2018). The speedy glacier loss, with some of them already dead (stationary), such as the Himalayan Yala glacier, which is set to completely thaw by the year 2040. This highlights the alarming situation of this reality and further impacts local conditions, water resources, livelihoods, and regional stability, raising questions regarding how humanity reacted (Sri Lanka Guardian, 2025).

In this context, Climate Change Geopolitics raises a body of critical perspectives (Chaturvedi & Doyle, 2015). This is an uncertain and unstable connection between environmental stresses induced by climate change in the Himalayas and the policy responses, and state-to-state foreign affairs in accordance with power relationships, sharing this ecosystem.

“...some of these multifaceted discourses of fear – that somehow remain open to political contestation and interrogation – are now being scaled up and upgraded by various regulatory agencies and alliances to the discourse of ‘climate terror’? This discourse can only have counter-terror as its Other in order to completely erase the hope (the Other of fear) of re-ordering and regulating spaces and societies allegedly more vulnerable to climate change...” (ibid.: p 1)

“In early June 2013, a report for the World Bank... was published against the backdrop of extreme monsoons causing havoc in various parts of the Indian Himalayas... The usual debate ensued between the environmentalists and government agencies over the precise nature of the calamity, with the former calling it ‘manmade’ and the latter describing it as ‘natural’.” (ibid.: p viii)

It examines how climate impacts, such as water scarcity, glacial lake outburst floods (GLOFs), altered river flows, and food security threats, influence national interests, security perceptions, and foreign policy. In return, it also discusses the way in which modern geopolitical realities like power disparities, mistrust, and sovereignty concerns, determine the willingness and capacity of Himalayan states to pursue collaborative climate adaptation, mitigation, and sharing-of-data approaches. This discipline acknowledges that climate change is not only an environmental issue but also a strong motivator and amplifier of geopolitical risk and opportunity in this extremely sensitive region.

A comparative study of India and Nepal offers a critical overview of the Himalayan climate change geopolitics. Both countries have huge ecosystems and interdependent vulnerabilities like transboundary floods and water insecurity, but operate in several tremendously different national environments. India, the fifth largest economy (IMF, 2025), is a global power with significant abilities, while Nepal is a geographically small, relatively resource-poor economy, and the least developed country (LDC) (United Nations).

This contrast emphasizes the intricate regional climate action threats, especially in the form of nationalist attempts towards resource control, which tend to undermine the required



99 collective ecological actions, thus amplifying regional climate crisis exposure and further  
100 increasing geopolitical tensions (Kumar, 2022).

101 "Although national boundaries cannot limit natural phenomena like  
102 rivers and mountains, counties always try to harvest economic and  
103 political benefits within their national boundaries. The lateral aspect of  
104 the international trajectory hampers the ecological cooperation among  
105 the nation-states of the same ecological zone." (ibid.: p 4)

106 This paper will proceed as follows: In Section Two, we will talk about how climate change is  
107 affecting the Himalayas and the environmental problems that India and Nepal both face. In  
29 108 Section Three, we will look at India's plan for dealing with climate change in the Himalayas.  
109 In Section Four, we will look at Nepal's weaknesses as a smaller, mountainous country, its  
110 ability to adapt, and its primary concerns and plans. Section Five will look at their diverse  
111 methods and critically look at how power differences, differing abilities and priorities, and  
112 big data gaps make it hard to work together. Section Six will talk about how these problems  
113 make it hard for countries and regions to work together on climate change. Section Seven  
114 ends by going over the main points again and giving ideas on how to make Himalayan  
115 climate cooperation better.

## 116 2. Methodology

117 This research used a qualitative method of studying the geopolitics of climate changewithin  
118 the Himalayas, with specific attention to the dyad India-Nepal, and to make a  
119 comparativeanalysis oftheir climate change practices, strategies, and policies. The  
3 120 comparativeanalysisdrew evidence primarilyfromkey policy documents such as Nepal's  
121 National Adaptation Program of Action(NAPA), Climate Change Policy (2019), Local  
2 122 Adaptation Plans for Action (LAPAs),National Adaptation Plan (NAP), and India's National  
123 Action Plan on Climate Change(NAPCC) and State Action Plans on Climate Change  
124 (SAPCCs). NationallyDetermined Contributions (NDCs) by both countries and related  
125 research articles and newspapers were also reviewed.

## 126 3. The Geopolitical Context of the Climate-Stressed Himalayas

127 The complex network of free states and historic rivalries in the Himalayas isincreasingly  
128 controlled by accelerating global climate change, itself a "threat multiplier"(Scheffran, 2008).  
129 Environmental stressors interact with and frequently combine with existinggeopolitical fault

lines. Certain prime climate impacts driving this trend are sped-up glacial melt triggering GLOF risk and vulnerable river flows; unpredictable rain inducing floods, landslides, and droughts; and increasing frequency of extreme weather events, all of which seriously impact water resources, agriculture, biodiversity, and human livelihoods.

### 3.1. India-Nepal Relations: Asymmetry, Interdependence, and Mistrust in a Changing Climate

The geopolitical backdrop of the Himalayan region is controlled by the complex and often strained relations with its major immediate neighbours—primarily India, China, and Pakistan—a history of movement marked by unsettled border conflicts, entrenched historical animosities and constant strategic competition. This has led to massive militarization and assertive state formation in an ecologically conscious and culturally diverse mountain range, forcing other smaller Himalayan countries such as Nepal and Bhutan to adopt conservative diplomatic positions as they handle complex relations with their larger, more powerful neighbors. Classic International Relations literature will tend to emphasize state-oriented security dilemmas and possibility of interstate war, usually overlooking the underlying and insidious "slow violence" inflicted on local ecosystems. Significantly, indigenous and minoritized communities through mass infrastructure development, natural resource extraction, and the cumulative impacts of global change, all of which are amplified by this broadest geopolitical rivalry (Davis et al., 2020).

Within this charged regional context, the relationship between India and Nepal stands out for its unique blend of deep historical, cultural, and people-to-people interdependence (epitomized by the "Roti-Betti ka Rishta" or "bread and daughter relationship" due to cross-border weddings and an open border and persistent, significant asymmetries in scale, economic strength, military capacity, and institutional capacity. While India is a major and influential power in south Asia, Nepal is a vulnerable and resource-poor country. The severe effects of global climate change are seriously threatening an already complex dynamic. Geopolitically, Nepal's fate depends on the fate of its two closest rival neighbours, China and India, who are geopolitical competitors, economic powerhouses and distinct civilisational entities.

However, for Nepal, maintaining a delicate, neutral relationship with both is vital to its national security, economic prosperity and overall stability. Nepal formally follows a policy

of non-alignment and neutrality, seeking to derive economic benefits from giants without getting into competition with them. It maintains foreign neutrality with both neighbours.

India is concerned about China's rapidly growing economic and political influence in Nepal. This has been highlighted by events such as Nepal's unilateral announcement of a new political administrative map in May 2020, which included territory claimed by India (Bhattarai, 2021). India, in its "Himalayan Frontier Doctrine", which presents China as a major strategic and existential threat, is suspicious of Nepal's independent foreign policy manoeuvres and interprets its relations with Beijing as actions driven by China. In contrast, India's own "hegemonic ambitions", often perceived as "interventionist policies", and unwillingness to settle disputes through diplomatic means, have led Nepal to seek better relations with China as a means of reducing Indian influence, making it difficult for Nepal to maintain strategic balance.

The geopolitics between India and Nepal is border dispute over the Kalapani origin of the Lipulekh-Limpiadhora region of Kalapani in northwestern Nepal. This dispute, which arose from differing interpretations of the 1815 Treaty of Sugauli over the specific source of the Kali River (which forms part of their border), has severely damaged their long-standing, though often tense, relationships. The concerns were further heightened following India's publication of a new political landscape in 2019, the establishment of a strategic road link through the disputed region in 2020, both of which marked Kalapani to be within Indian territory.

Nepal objected these steps aggressively, at times blaming India for acting "on behalf of China," since India, in turn, had a tendency to view Nepal's aggressive reactions and its subsequent release of its own new map (including the disputed regions) as being under Beijing's control, interpreting episode within the great power rivalry with China (The Geopolitics, 2022). This dynamic energy is supported by three fundamental building blocks: first, a solid convergence of regional geopolitics and competing nationalisms—India's often based on myths of ancient civilizational greatness, and Nepal's on a history of socio-political resistance to perceived Indian dominance; second, the undeniable "rise of China factor," where China's wider economic and diplomatic outreach provides Nepal with a concrete alternative to its historical and sometimes crippling dependence on India, a trend evident with substantial Indian strategic distrust; and third, the intrinsic "small state-big state

192 complexity, which produces a natural suspicion in Nepal regarding Indian intentions and  
193 conduct, which tend to be regarded as dominating or overwhelming.

194 The current-day geopolitical relationship between Nepal and India is thus  
195 multifaceted, characterized by ongoing attempts to improve economic and development  
196 aid while simultaneously managing persistent and highly sensitive political issues, all  
197 occurring against the ominous background of increased US-China global rivalry and intense  
198 India-China regional tensions (NatStrat, 2023). Outstanding work, naturally, is being done on  
199 connectivity projects and, specifically, in hydropower cooperation, with India committing vast  
200 power purchasing and facilitating Nepal's export of energy to third countries like Bangladesh.

201 India's long-standing anxieties about Chinese influence in Nepal directly influence its policy  
202 decisions, including its policy not to purchase electricity generated by projects involving  
203 major Chinese construction or financial involvement, compelling Nepal to seek alternative  
204 routes and markets. Such as the pending issue of Gurkha recruitment in the Indian Army  
205 under India's new short-term "Agniveer" program, the unresolved border dispute, and  
4 206 pending amendments to the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship. In addition, Nepal's  
207 internal political factors, such as the emergence of new political trends and periods of inter-  
208 communal conflict, also shape bilateral relations, as stability in Nepal is vital to India's  
209 security interests.

210 The resulting growing economic interdependence is attempting to address traditional political  
211 sensitivities in a dynamic and complex regional geopolitical environment (ORF, 2021).  
14 212 Management of shared water resources, in the wider Ganges River basin and particularly with  
213 respect to transboundary rivers such as the Koshi, Gandak, and Mahakali, is a particularly  
214 contentious and controversial aspect of India-Nepal relations (Ahmed & Gaur, 2020). Nepal  
215 views the historic treaties on these rivers as unequal, according to which India has been  
216 receiving irrigation and flood control requirements unevenly. This has raised deep doubts  
217 about India's long-term intentions and has led to the growth of anti-India sentiments. On the  
218 other hand, India sees Nepal as preventing effective co-management of water to achieve  
219 domestic political gains.

220 Thus, an atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust of each other is created, which has  
221 undermined their partnership on water issues for decades. For Nepal, this is a complex  
222 geopolitical conflict, roiled by the competing ambitions of India and instability between  
223 China, where China's vast untapped hydropower potential will be the target of their

competition. India, drawing on historical economic, cultural and historical ties, is seeking to maintain its sphere of influence and access to clean energy sources, partly as a way to counter China's growing economic and infrastructure influence in its region. China, through its Belt and Road Initiative and first-class infrastructure investments, is expanding its reach into Nepal and potentially seeks to connect Nepali rivers to its growing energy markets (Sridharan et al., 2023). This intense rivalry puts enormous pressure on Nepal, which is simultaneously grappling with internal political unrest and administrative failure. India's reluctance to buy power from Chinese-funded projects, aside from earlier political tensions, again complicates Nepal's efforts to balance such relations and exercise its own agency in managing its precious water resources.

### 3.2. Climate Change as a Geopolitical Driver

Climate change is further exacerbating the region's complex geopolitical vulnerabilities. Changes in river drainage and erratic rainfall further strain water-sharing arrangements. Unless disaster response, early warning and responsibility-sharing are organised in an integrated manner, the transboundary nature of disasters such as GLOF and flash floods may become highly politicised. Climate migration in the region may intensify, putting pressure on resources and potentially exacerbating security conflicts. As a result, states may "securitise" the problem, placing greater emphasis on unilateral security measures than on collaborative, community-led adaptation solutions.

### 4. India's Climate Policy Framework: National Ambitions and Himalayan Imperatives

India's climate policy approach is based on the stark vulnerability of the Himalayas, driven by national water security, livelihoods and strategic interests. The National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC, 2008) and the following NDCs form the overall framework. At the centre of the Himalayas is the National Mission for Sustaining Himalayan Ecosystem (NMSHE) for the assessment of ecosystem health, understanding impacts, and developing adaptation strategies. Complementing these national missions, specific programmes like the Indian Himalayas Climate Adaptation Programme (IHCAP) play a crucial role in strengthening scientific and institutional capacities for climate adaptation across the Himalayan states. Other applicable missions include the National Water Mission (NWM), National Mission for a Green India (GIM), and National Mission on Sustainable Agriculture (NMSA). Ambitious targets of India's 2022 NDCs are emissions intensity reduction and renewable energy, with potentially far-reaching effects on Himalayan hydropower

development, the fulcrum of the mitigation strategy, if also extremely contentious due to social and environmental problems. Adaptation, with robust Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) through the Disaster Management Act 2005 and by the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), is one of the key pillars, as seen in the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI). Institutional frameworks encompass the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEFCC) as the nodal ministry, with state governments playing significant roles regarding ground-level implementation through State Action Plans on Climate Change (SAPCCs). India's Himalayan climate policy is undeniably conditioned by its geopolitical context: its wish to be a regional power, the need to supply downstream water sources (particularly rivers such as the Brahmaputra that originate from Tibet's Tibetan Plateau), counterbalancing China's power (e.g., concerns regarding China's "Medog" super dam), ensuring energy security, and ensuring border stability in case of possible climate-induced displacement in the neighbouring areas.

## **5. Nepal's Climate Policy Framework: Vulnerability, Adaptation, and Geopolitics**

As an LDC with over 80% mountainous terrain, Nepal is exceptionally vulnerable to climate change. Its policy response strongly focuses on adaptation, community resilience, and international assistance. Its central tools are its NDCs (initially in 2016, strengthened second in 2020 to achieve net-zero by 2045, the National Adaptation Program of Action (NAPA, 2010), the 2011 Climate Change Policy (2019 amended), and the National Adaptation Plan (NAP, 2021-2050). One feature of Nepal's plan is the establishment of Local Adaptation Plans for Action (LAPAs), a new bottom-up planning process (Maharjan & Maharjan, 2017; Gentle & Mainali, 2024), and devotion to direct significant climate finance (e.g., 80% targets) to the local level (GoN, 2021). Community-based and Locally Led Adaptation (LLA) is most important, learning from Nepal's own experience of community natural resource management. Particular hazards covered include GLOFs and landslides (highlighted by incidents such as the 16 August 2024 Thyanbo glacial lake outburst flood and 2021 Melamchi disaster; ICIMOD, 2023; Down to Earth, 2024), food security threats (with agricultural dependency and reliance on India for inputs and stresses on water resources, and local geopolitics). Institutionally, the Ministry of Forests and Environment (MoFE) is nodal with local governments taking on more responsibility under federalism, yet at times short-changing capacity. It needs international help. Geopolitics of Nepal play an important role in its climate policy and foreign policy: it



actively promotes the "mountain agenda" globally to rally support and precisely balances Indian and Chinese relations to ensure maximum gains for its climate policy, where feasible, investigating trilateral cooperation. Pursuing climate finance and technical assistance is the cornerstone of its foreign policy.

## **6. India and Nepal Comparative Policy Study: Managing Inherent Complications**

Conducting a simple comparative examination of India's and Nepal's Himalayan climate policy is plagued by internal complexities, aggravated by some differences in circumstances and geopolitical sensitivities.

**6.1. Data Asymmetry and Accessibility:** A widespread lack of homogenous, high-resolution meteorological, hydrological, and glaciological data makes accurate comparisons difficult. Cross-border data sharing agreements, for strategically sensitive hydro-meteorological information, are often ad hoc, incomplete, or politically influenced. "Data nationalism" hinders access by independent scholars, which can make comprehensive assessments challenging.

**6.2. Divergent National Priorities and Policy Framing:** Although both countries suffer from climate risks, their national agendas and deliberative frameworks differ. India's climate policy is often linked to broader development objectives, energy security (i.e., hydropower), with a strong priority given to mitigation. Nepal, on the other hand, due to its least developed country (LDC) status and high level of vulnerability, generally views climate change as an immediate threat to survival, requiring rapid adaptation and foreign financing. Definitions of "climate security" and "resilience" also vary, as they reflect national capacities and development patterns.

**6.3. Geopolitical Sensitivity:** In the geopolitical context, particularly the asymmetric power relations of past tense periods in India-Nepal relations, impedes open policy dialogue and unfettered data sharing. The growing strategic rivalry between India and China further complicates the issue, making it difficult to identify climate-specific factors in water or infrastructure policy resources.

**6.4. Complexity of policy processes and implementation gaps:** Both countries face several challenges in the effective implementation of policy objectives ("policy implementation gaps"). Many of these challenges can be addressed through collaboration and coordination by both countries. Using crude analogies to more advanced contextual analysis to facilitate

320 cross-border scientific collaboration (e.g., through neutral organizations such as ICIMOD) is  
321 key to constructive engagement.

## 322 7. Conclusion

323 The Himalaya lies at a critical epicentre of rising climate change and deep-rooted geopolitical  
324 dynamics, a reality clearly illustrated by the distinct, yet intertwined, climate policy  
325 trajectories of India and Nepal. This comparative study shows that their strategies are  
326 fundamentally differentiated by different national capacities, power asymmetries, strategic  
327 ambitions and historical emissions profiles. To manage regional leadership and a huge  
328 economy, India pursues a dual strategy incorporating ambitious mitigation targets as well as  
329 robust adaptation measures. In contrast, Nepal, facing extreme vulnerability despite its  
330 minimal contribution to global emissions, prioritises seeking international support to address  
331 immediate, existential threats such as adaptation, community resilience,  
332 GLOF and landslides.

333 Although both nations acknowledge the importance of the Himalaya, but these are coupled  
334 with deep national differences, historical ties and broader power contests, which pose  
335 significant challenges for straightforward comparative policy analysis. Issues such as data  
336 asymmetries, rival national agendas and the broader geopolitical sensitivities inherent in the  
337 region complicate any attempt at simple binaries. Acknowledging these inherent difficulties is  
338 not to admit futility, but to underscore the need for more nuanced, context-specific  
339 approaches to understanding and promoting effective climate action, taking into account each  
340 nation's unique political economy and implementation realities. The prevailing geopolitical  
341 setting, characterised by historical mistrust and evolving power dynamics, coupled with  
342 methodological constraints, demands moving beyond simple comparisons. Hence,  
343 overcoming these constraints and ultimately, such efforts are of utmost importance to bridge  
344 knowledge gaps and foster cross-border collaboration, which is essential to ensure the long-  
345 term sustainability of the fragile Himalayan ecosystem and the well-being of millions of  
346 people who depend on it.

## 347 References

348 Ahmed, S. I., & Gaur, N. (2020). India-Nepal water cooperation: Issues and  
349 concerns. *Journal of Indian Water Works Association*, 125–  
350 129. <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/349338670>



- 351 Asian Development Bank (ADB). (2023). *Asian Development Outlook (ADO) September*  
352 *2023: Slower Growth, Sticky Inflation*. [https://www.adb.org/publications/asian-](https://www.adb.org/publications/asian-development-outlook-ado-september-2023)  
353 [development-outlook-ado-september-2023](https://www.adb.org/publications/asian-development-outlook-ado-september-2023)
- 354 Bhattarai, G. (2021). Geopolitical Reflections of Sino-Indian Conflict and its Implication on  
355 Nepal's Survival Strategy. *Unity Journal*, 2, 81–96.  
356 <https://doi.org/10.3126/unityj.v2i0.38785>
- 357 Chaturvedi, S., & Doyle, T. (2015). Climate terror. In *Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks*.  
358 <https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137318954>
- 359 Davis, A. E., Gamble, R., Roche, G., & Gawne, L. (2020). International relations and the  
360 Himalaya: connecting ecologies, cultures and geopolitics. *Australian Journal of*  
361 *International Affairs*, 75(1), 15–35. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2020.1787333>
- 362 Fernando, H. N. (2023). Geopolitical Issues and Trajectories of Water Security in South Asia.  
363 *South Asian Survey*, 30(1), 32–44. <https://doi.org/10.1177/09715231231205745>
- 364 Gautam, P. K. (2012). Climate Change and Conflict in South Asia. *Strategic Analysis*, 36(1),  
365 32–40. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2012.628482>
- 366 Gentle, P., & Mainaly, J. (2024). Commitment, actions, and challenges on locally led climate  
367 change adaptation in Nepal. *Climate Risk Management*, 46, 100650.  
368 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crm.2024.100650>
- 369 GoI (Government of India). (2009). National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC),  
370 Government of India.
- 371 GoN (Government of Nepal). (2021). Assessment of climate financing allocation: Unpacking  
372 eighty percent allocation to the local level. Ministry of Forests and Environment,  
373 Government of Nepal.  
374 [https://climate-diplomacy.org/magazine/environment/india-and-nepal-overlooking-](https://climate-diplomacy.org/magazine/environment/india-and-nepal-overlooking-environmental-issues-while-signing-hydropower)  
375 [environmental-issues-while-signing-hydropower](https://climate-diplomacy.org/magazine/environment/india-and-nepal-overlooking-environmental-issues-while-signing-hydropower)
- 376 [https://slguardian.org/yala-glacier-to-receive-funeral-in-nepal-as-scientists-warn-of-](https://slguardian.org/yala-glacier-to-receive-funeral-in-nepal-as-scientists-warn-of-worldwide-ice-loss/)  
377 [worldwide-ice-loss/](https://slguardian.org/yala-glacier-to-receive-funeral-in-nepal-as-scientists-warn-of-worldwide-ice-loss/)
- 378 [https://thegeopolitics.com/geopolitics-of-border-dispute-in-south-asia-a-case-study-of-nepal-](https://thegeopolitics.com/geopolitics-of-border-dispute-in-south-asia-a-case-study-of-nepal-india-border-dispute/)  
379 [india-border-dispute/](https://thegeopolitics.com/geopolitics-of-border-dispute-in-south-asia-a-case-study-of-nepal-india-border-dispute/)

- 380 <https://unctad.org/topic/least-developed-countries/list>
- 381 [https://www.downtoearth.org.in/climate-change/no-end-to-climate-changes-wrath-for-](https://www.downtoearth.org.in/climate-change/no-end-to-climate-changes-wrath-for-himalayas-as-nepal-reports-yet-another-glacial-lake-outburst)
- 382 [himalayas-as-nepal-reports-yet-another-glacial-lake-outburst](https://www.downtoearth.org.in/climate-change/no-end-to-climate-changes-wrath-for-himalayas-as-nepal-reports-yet-another-glacial-lake-outburst)
- 383 <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/thawing-tensions-himalaya>
- 384 [https://www.natstrat.org/articledetail/publications/india-nepal-relations-in-the-contemporary-](https://www.natstrat.org/articledetail/publications/india-nepal-relations-in-the-contemporary-geopolitical-context-112.html)
- 385 [geopolitical-context-112.html](https://www.natstrat.org/articledetail/publications/india-nepal-relations-in-the-contemporary-geopolitical-context-112.html)
- 386 [https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2024/Aug/18/31-killed-in-51-events-of-](https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2024/Aug/18/31-killed-in-51-events-of-cloudburst-flash-flood-in-himachal-pradesh-since-onset-of-monsoon)
- 387 [cloudburst-flash-flood-in-himachal-pradesh-since-onset-of-monsoon](https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2024/Aug/18/31-killed-in-51-events-of-cloudburst-flash-flood-in-himachal-pradesh-since-onset-of-monsoon)
- 388 [https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/looking-at-nepal-india-relationship-in-the-new-](https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/looking-at-nepal-india-relationship-in-the-new-geopolitical-realities)
- 389 [geopolitical-realities](https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/looking-at-nepal-india-relationship-in-the-new-geopolitical-realities)
- 390 ICIMOD ANNUAL REPORT 2022. International Centre for Integrated Mountain
- 391 Development (ICIMOD). <https://www.icimod.org/annual-reports>
- 392 ICIMOD. (2023). *Water, ice, society, and ecosystems in the Hindu Kush Himalaya: An*
- 393 *outlook*. (P. Wester, S. Chaudhary, N. Chettri, M. Jackson, A. Maharjan, S. Nepal, &
- 394 J. F. Steiner [Eds.]). ICIMOD. <https://doi.org/10.53055/ICIMOD.1028>
- 395 International Monetary Fund (IMF). (2025). *WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK UPDATE*.
- 396 IPCC, 2007: Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working
- 397 Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
- 398 Change [Solomon, S., D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K.B. Averyt, M.
- 399 Tignor and H.L. Miller (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United
- 400 Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 996 pp
- 401 Karki, M., Mool, P., & Shrestha, A. (1970). Climate Change and its Increasing Impacts in
- 402 Nepal. *The Initiation*, 3, 30–37. <https://doi.org/10.3126/init.v3i0.2425>
- 403 Kumar, K. R., Sahai, A. K., Kumar, K. K., Patwardhan, S. K., Mishra, P. K., Revadekar, J.
- 404 V., Kamala, K., & Pant, G. B. (2006). High-resolution climate change scenarios for
- 405 India for the 21st century. *Current Science*, 90(3), 334–345.
- 406 <http://cimfr.csircentral.net/886/>

- 407 Kumar, N. (2022). The Asian Geopolitical Complexity and Climate-Induced Security  
408 Challenges for India. In *Panjab University Research Journal (Arts): Vol. L-1-18*.  
409 <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/378475273>
- 410 Maharjan, S. K., & Maharjan, K. L. (2017). Review of climate policies and roles of  
411 institutions in the policy formulation and implementation of adaptation plans and  
412 strategies in Nepal. *Journal of International Development and Cooperation*, 23, 41–  
413 54. <https://doi.org/10.15027/42498>
- 414 Pai, N. (2008). Climate Change and National Security: Preparing India for New Conflict  
415 Scenarios. *Pragati - the Indian National Interest Review*, No. 1–No. 1, 1–1.  
416 <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/242168115>
- 417 Platt, R. V., Ogra, M., Kisak, N., Manral, U., & Badola, R. (2020). Climate change  
418 perceptions, data, and adaptation in the Garhwal Himalayas of India. *Climate and*  
419 *Development*, 13(2), 95–106. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2020.1724069>
- 420 Scheffran, J. (2008). Climate Change and Security. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 19–25.  
421 <https://doi.org/10.2968/064002007>
- 422 Sritharan, N., Jothishankar, K., Wozniak, S., & Asia Program. (2023). The Great Himalayan  
423 Chessboard: China, India, and the geopolitical gambit in Nepal. *Foreign Policy*  
424 *Research Institute*, 1–16. [https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/12/great-himalayan-](https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/12/great-himalayan-chessboard-china-india-and-the-geopolitical-gambit-in-nepal/)  
425 [chessboard-china-india-and-the-geopolitical-gambit-in-nepal/](https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/12/great-himalayan-chessboard-china-india-and-the-geopolitical-gambit-in-nepal/)
- 426 Wester, P., Mishra, A., Mukherji, A., & Shrestha, A. B. (2019). *The Hindu Kush Himalaya*  
427 *Assessment*. Springer.  
428 [http://books.google.ie/books?id=dI2CDwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=978-3-](http://books.google.ie/books?id=dI2CDwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=978-3-319-92288-1&hl=&cd=1&source=gbs_api)  
429 [319-92288-1&hl=&cd=1&source=gbs\\_api](http://books.google.ie/books?id=dI2CDwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=978-3-319-92288-1&hl=&cd=1&source=gbs_api)
- 430 World Meteorological Organization (WMO). (2024). *State of the global climate*.
- 431 **Funding:** The research work was not supported by any funding agency.
- 432 **Consent to Participate:** All authors agreed to participate in co-authorship and have declared  
433 no competing interests relevant to the content of this article.
- 434 **Consent to Publish:** All authors agreed with the content of this article, and they gave consent  
435 to submit it and obtained permission from the authorities at the institutes/organizations where  
436 the work was carried out.
- 437 **Competing Interests:** The authors declared no competing interests.

438

UNDER PEER REVIEW IN IJAR