

# Tracing the Roots of Jammu Massacre and Its Impacts on the Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir

## Introduction

The river of politics was on the rise,  
With Indians and Pakistanis hunting  
Indians trapped the big fish,  
Hurting Pakistan deep enough  
Pakistan could get Chitral only<sup>1</sup>,  
That too after betting with their life!

Shad Kashmiri<sup>2</sup>

Shad Kashmiri, who was a cartoonist for Khidmat and the mouthpiece of the National Conference, developed a poem in late 1947 that depicted the political disagreements regarding Kashmir's destiny during the subcontinent's partition. The poem's reference to the "big fish" relates to the Valley of Kashmir, which became the primary focus of India's and Pakistan's policy over Jammu and Kashmir (now onward J&K), in the year 1947. The poem draws attention to the paradox that the experiences of individuals from different parts of the state are mainly left out of the broader story of the Kashmir Partition. The acts of violence that afflicted Jammu province is often overlooked by official and nationalist narratives that highlight India and Pakistan's territorial conflicts over the Kashmir Valley. This violence has often been neglected in Indian nationalist histories of 1947, which focus more on the state's political history than the people's lived experiences.<sup>3</sup>

The August, 1947 was a defining event in the history of subcontinent, marked by massive displacement of around eighteen million people and a death toll estimated between 200,000 and

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<sup>1</sup> Chitral was a small independent state bordering the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir and it recognized the suzerainty of the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir. However, as an independent state, Chitral chose to accede to Pakistan in 1947, following the Partition of the subcontinent.

<sup>2</sup> *Khidmat*, December 19, 1947.

<sup>3</sup> Prem Shankar Jha, *Kashmir 1947: The Origins of a Dispute* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003), 31.

1 million.<sup>4</sup> The J&K state also experienced significant upheaval, including widespread violence, demographic shifts and economic disruptions. The Jammu region serves as an important case study of the massacres caused by partition and the challenges of rehabilitation. Despite its current economic significance, the post-partition development of J&K remains under-researched. This study aims to address gaps in understanding the violence, its causes along with its consequences and impacts on J&K. It also shifts the focus from general accounts to a more localized perspective on partition history, contributing to the underexplored post-partition experiences in Jammu region. The research aims to address the imbalance in academic attention, which has often overlooked the Jammu massacre and to provide valuable insights. The article seeks to address these silenced aspects of Partition history, particularly the communal violence in Jammu and challenge prevailing official narratives. It emphasizes the overlooked experiences and tragic consequences of the Partition on J&K, advocating for a re-examination of the region's historical injustices.

## Historical Context

At the time of Indian Partition 1947, J&K being largest princely state was divided into three provinces: Frontier Province (Ladakh, Gilgit-Baltistan), Kashmir Province (Srinagar, Anantnag, Muzaffarabad, Baramulla) and the Province of Jammu (Jammu, Mirpur, Udhampur, Reasi, Poonch and Kathua). These culturally distinct regions were unified in post-1846 period, under the Treaty of Amritsar, transferring Kashmir and neighboring territories to Gulab Singh Dogra for Rs. 7,500,000 Nanakshahi (Sikh Currency).<sup>5</sup> Dogra rule was marked by bigotry, sectarianism and despotism; the Jammu region was regarded as their homeland, while Kashmir Valley was treated as purchased property. The administration, rooted in Hindu customs, marginalized Muslims, altering place names and denying basic freedoms like speech, press and political association. As a result, a significant political movement began in 1930s.<sup>6</sup> Initially, the Young Men's Muslim Association (1909) of Chaudhary Ghulam Abbas (now onward Ghulam Abbas) was the only mouthpiece of Muslims of state. Later on, Reading Room Party (established

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<sup>4</sup>Yasmin Khan, *The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan* (London: Yale University Press, 2017), 129.

<sup>5</sup> C. U. Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and Neighboring Countries* (Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1929), 21.

<sup>6</sup>Muhammad Yusuf Saraf, *Kashmiris Fight for Freedom* (Lahore, Feroz Sons Ltd., 2005), 71.

in 1920s at Fateh Kadal) grew in size and become popular. Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah (now onward Sh. Abdullah), a young Muslim graduate of Ali Garh Muslim University, was elected its Secretary (1930) who united Muslims from its forum.<sup>7</sup> The proper political organization, the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, was founded in 1932. Its first president was Sh. Abdullah,<sup>8</sup> its vice president was Sheikh Abdul Majeed and its general secretary was Ghulam Abbas.<sup>9</sup> Each of these contributed significantly to this new political movement. Jawaharlal Nehru's meeting with Sh. Abdullah in 1937 was a turning point and the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference was renamed as the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference (now onward NC) in 1939<sup>10</sup>, allowing non-Muslims to join the organization.<sup>11</sup> This resulted in disagreements between Sh. Abdullah and Ghulam Abbas and the latter left the party. After leaving the NC, Ghulam Abbas resurrected the Muslim Conference (now onward MC) in 1941.<sup>12</sup> These events marked a significant turning point in the state's history. The transformation led to a closer association between the NC and the Indian National Congress (now onward Congress), exposing it to the political fluctuations of the subcontinent, a development that had been anticipated and opposed by Ghulam Abbas.<sup>13</sup> This decision can be viewed as one of the key factors contributing to the ongoing Kashmir dispute.

The Congress had taken an aggressive stance toward Kashmir, acknowledging the geopolitical importance of the territory. Mr. Webb, the British Resident Officer in Kashmir, observed in 1946 that Nehru had already developed his Kashmir policy.<sup>14</sup> In his fortnightly report of July 31, 1946, Mr. Webb mentions about Nehru's visit to Kashmir which was not successful. Sh. Abdullah was in jail and agitations and disturbances led to chaos and disruption in the capital. State used strict measures to tackle the situation and Nehru had to leave Srinagar.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>Najma Zahoor, "Political Activities in Jammu and Kashmir (1846-1946)", *International Journal of Trend in Scientific Research and Development*, vol. 4. no. 4 (2020): 1572-1576.

<sup>8</sup> Arsheed Ahmad Ganie and M. Deivam, "The Era of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah in Jammu and Kashmir Politics," *Asia Pacific Journal of Research*, vol. 1, no. 37 (2016): 115-120.

<sup>9</sup>Zahoor, "Political Activities in Jammu and Kashmir (1846-1946)", 1574.

<sup>10</sup>Syed Taffazull Hussain, *Sheikh Abdullah-A Biography: The Crucial Period 1905-1939* (Indiana: Wordclay Publishers, 2009), 317.

<sup>11</sup>Sheikh Abdullah, *Flames of the Chinara* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1993), 34.

<sup>12</sup>Zahoor, "Political Activities in Jammu and Kashmir (1846-1946)", 1574.

<sup>13</sup>Hussain, *Sheikh Abdullah-A Biography*, 310-331.

<sup>14</sup>Alastair Lamb, *Birth of a Tragedy: Kashmir 1947* (Hertingfordbury: Roxford Books, 1994), 71.

<sup>15</sup>W. F. Webb, "Fortnightly Report from the Resident Officer of Kashmir to L. C. L. Griffin, Secretary to H. E. the Crown Representative", *Political Department*, no. F.6-C/46, New Delhi, July 31, 1946 (Islamabad: National Documentation Wing, Microfilm Holdings).

Nehru's interest in Kashmir stemmed from its strategic significance, bordering the USSR, China, Afghanistan and Pakistan and securing India's vulnerable northwest. Its accession as a Muslim-majority region aligned with his vision of secular nationalism, countering communal divisions in India.<sup>16</sup> Nehru urged Mountbatten that Kashmir's future was with India's Constituent Assembly, warning of serious consequences if pushed toward Pakistan.<sup>17</sup> Nehru attempted to persuade Maharaja Hari Singh to join India, given Kashmir's strategic importance. In 1947, Hindu Maharajas and Congress president Kripalani visited Kashmir.<sup>18</sup> The Hindu Maharajas of subcontinent and Kripalani sought to influence Maharaja Hari Singh's accession to India. Fortnightly report of January 15, 1946, written by British Resident Officer at Srinagar indicating about the visit of Nawab of Bhopal and his meeting with Maharaja Hari Singh and Pandit Kak, the Prime Minister of J&K in Jammu.<sup>19</sup> Fearing his alignment with Pakistan, Nehru sent Gandhi instead due to the Maharaja Hari Singh's hostility.<sup>20</sup> The fortnightly report of April 15, 1947 sent by W.F. Webb, the British Resident Officer to the Political Department New Delhi, mentioned about the visit of Gandhi. He wrote that Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad requested him to visit Kashmir while hearing about his visit of Punjab.<sup>21</sup> Gandhi's visit, though presented as apolitical, was politically timed, with meetings involving Patel, Mountbatten and Nehru revealing its political intent. Gandhi urged the Maharaja Hari Singh to avoid declaring independence.<sup>22</sup>

Kashmir's political shift followed the replacement of R.C. Kak by Mahajan, whose pro-India stance shaped the region's direction. Shahid Hamid noted that Gandhi's visit aimed to pressure the Maharaja Hari Singh for Indian accession and Kak's removal.<sup>23</sup> After Mahajan's appointment, Kashmir strengthened ties with India, with officials frequently engaging with Nehru and Patel. Communication with the Muslim League and Jinnah was minimal. Patel was directly consulted on military appointments and efforts were made to connect the state to India

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<sup>16</sup>S. Gopal, *Nehru: An Anthology* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1981), 112.

<sup>17</sup>Alastair Lamb, *Kashmir a Disputed Legacy, 1846-1990* (Hertfordshire: Roxford Books, 1991), 44.

<sup>18</sup>Joseph Korb, *Danger in Kashmir* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1954), 81.

<sup>19</sup>W. F. Webb, "Fortnightly Report from the Resident of Kashmir to C.G. Herbert, Secretary to H. E. the Crown Representative". Political Department, no. F.6-C/46. New Delhi, January 15, 1946.

<sup>20</sup>Ajit Bhattacharjea, *Kashmir: The Wounded Valley* (New Delhi: UBS Publishers Distributors, 1994), 109.

<sup>21</sup>W. F. Webb, "Fortnightly Report from the Resident Officer of Kashmir to L. C. L. Griffin, Secretary to H. E. the Crown Representative", *Political Department*, no. F.6-C/47, New Delhi, April 15, 1947 (Islamabad: National Documentation Wing, Microfilm Holdings).

<sup>22</sup>Sanaullah Bhat, *Kashmir in Flames: An Untold Story of Kashmir's Political Affairs* (Srinagar: Ali Mohammad and Sons, 1981), 92.

<sup>23</sup>Victoria Schofield, *Kashmir in Conflict: India Pakistan and the Unending War* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2003), 32.

through communication infrastructure.<sup>24</sup> Nehru prioritized releasing Sh. Abdullah, viewing him as crucial for Kashmir's alignment with India. On May 14, 1948, Indira Gandhi noted that Sh. Abdullah was confident of winning the plebiscite.<sup>25</sup> On September 27, Nehru asked Patel to urge the Maharaja Hari Singh to release Sh. Abdullah and prioritize Kashmir's accession to India.<sup>26</sup> Mr. Webb in his fortnightly report of June 15, 1946 mentions about Sh. Abdullah's trial and Nehru's urging Maharaja Hari Singh to release Sh. Abdullah. He also mentions about Nehru's telegram to Maharaja Hari Singh telling him about his visit to Srinagar which was refused by Maharaja.<sup>27</sup>

Sh. Abdullah was released on September 29, 1947 while MC leaders like Ghulam Abbas, guilty of lesser crimes, remained imprisoned.<sup>28</sup> Sh. Abdullah, out of touch with state developments, called for freedom before accession and upheld the people will at an October 2, 1947 rally in Srinagar.<sup>29</sup> In 1947, he criticized the Two-Nation theory but remained ambiguous on Kashmir's future. He supported Nehru while subtly criticizing Jinnah, spending October in Delhi and disconnected from local sentiment. The Muslim League assumed Kashmir would join Pakistan, as implied by the acronym "Pakistan."<sup>30</sup> Jinnah was confident that Kashmir would fall into his lap like a ripe fruit.<sup>31</sup> The All India Muslim League's stance on Kashmir shifted from supporting independence to advocating for Pakistan's accession. Jinnah urged the Maharaja Hari Singh to take Kashmir's demography into account, but he remained indifferent until July 11, 1947. Sh. Abdullah insisted on freedom before accession.<sup>32</sup> The Muslim League's indifference to Kashmir was a mistake, as it failed to match Nehru's engagement with Sh. Abdullah, who opposed Pakistan's feudalism and sought "Naya Kashmir" manifesto.<sup>33</sup> The political situation of J&K remained uncertain till 1947. In 1947, Maharaja Hari Singh faced a dilemma regarding

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<sup>24</sup> Durga Das, *Sardar Patel's Correspondence* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Press, 1971).

<sup>25</sup> Sonia Gandhi, *Two Alone, Two Together: Letters between Indira Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, 1922-64* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2004), 517.

<sup>26</sup> P. N. Chopra, *Thematic Volumes on Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel: Kashmir and Hyderabad* (Delhi: Konark Publishers, 2002), 71.

<sup>27</sup> W. F. Webb, "Fortnightly Report from the Resident Officer of Kashmir to L. C. L. Griffin, Secretary to H. E. the Crown Representative", *Political Department*, no. F.6-C/46, New Delhi, June 15, 1946 (Islamabad: National Documentation Wing, Microfilm Holdings).

<sup>28</sup> Lord Birdwood, *Two Nations and Kashmir* (Srinagar: Gulshan Books, 2005), 81.

<sup>29</sup> Sheikh Abdullah, *Flames of the Chinar* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1993), 152.

<sup>30</sup> Christopher Snedden, *Understanding Kashmir and Kashmiris* (London: Hurst and Company, 2015), 101.

<sup>31</sup> Chaudhary Muhammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 52.

<sup>32</sup> Abdullah, *Flames of the Chinar*, 117.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 144

J&K's future. His reign was characterized by oppressive policies, especially toward Muslims and there were differences between Maharaja Hari Singh and Muslim leaders especially Sh. Abdullah and Ghulam Abbas.<sup>34</sup> The Maharaja's choice to join India, disregarding the Muslim majority and Pakistan's claims, led to the Kashmir dispute, which resulted in migration and unrest following the British withdrawal.<sup>35</sup> Before going into detail of the massacre, occurred in Jammu, there is a need to look into the causes and factors that were linked to Jammu massacre.

### **Jammu and Rawalpindi: Interconnected Massacres**

The 1947 violence in Jammu is linked to earlier unrest, notably the March 1947 violence in West Punjab. Pre and post-partition, Rawalpindi was a major metropolitan area in Punjab, with nine million Muslims and two million non-Muslims residing in Multan and Rawalpindi.<sup>36</sup> From March 4 to 6, 1947, riots erupted between Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus, fueled by tensions from the previous year's provincial elections. Following the collapse of Khizer Hayat Tiwana's Unionist government on March 2, mass agitation escalated into violence, starting in Lahore and quickly spreading to Rawalpindi, Multan and Attock.<sup>37</sup> More than 5,000 Sikhs and Hindus had been killed by the middle of March 1947 and 50,000 had fled. Armored trucks were deployed in response. The Rawalpindi killings fueled demands for Punjab's division and India's partition. By April, non-Muslims from western Punjab, including Rawalpindi, began migrating to Kashmir.<sup>38</sup> March violence, initiated by Muslims<sup>39</sup> in which about 2,263 people were killed in riots across areas like Raja Bazaar, Kalyan Das Mandar and Taxila.<sup>40</sup> The Rawalpindi violence led to mass abductions, forced conversions and high casualties, prompting Sikh and Hindu migration to Eastern Punjab. By April 1947, 80,000 refugees had reached Delhi and UP. The violence surpassed earlier unrest in Calcutta and Bihar, uniting Sikhs and Hindus against Muslims, with Sikh leaders urging emulation of Guru Gobind Singh's bravery. The Jat Sikh

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<sup>34</sup> N.S. Sarila, *The Shadow of the Great Game: The Untold Story of India's Partition* (New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers, 2005), 347.

<sup>35</sup> Sumantra Bose, *Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2003), 51.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 733.

<sup>37</sup> Illyas Chatta, "Terrible Fate: 'Ethnic Cleansing' of Jammu Muslims in 1947," *Journal of Pakistan Vision*, vol. 10, no. 1 (2009): 117-140.

<sup>38</sup> "Refugees Flock into Kashmir", *The Times* (London), March 14, 1947, 3.

<sup>39</sup> Sumera and Kashif, "History and Memory of the Partition of the Punjab", 736.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 740.

Singh Sabha gained prominence in West Punjab<sup>41</sup> and according to *The London Times*, Muslims were wiped out from the Punjab.<sup>42</sup> The Rawalpindi violence led to the eviction of Muslims from East Punjab to Pakistan. Following the migration of Sikhs to Patiala, Master Tara Singh and Akali leaders supported Congress's plan to divide Punjab.<sup>43</sup> The August 1947 Partition of India confirmed the warning of *Pakistan Times* (July 17, 1947), which predicted that an unfair partition would lead to civil war in India.<sup>44</sup> Within days of the partition, Punjab saw massive violence, with widespread massacres and killings resembling wartime conflict. By September 1947, *The London Times* reported 4 million migrants. By October, over 570,000 Muslims crossed into Pakistan, while 471,000 non-Muslims moved in the opposite direction. On October 1, around 80,000 Muslim refugees were in Delhi's Purana Qila, with more in other camps. In November, a British official observed a 10-mile-long column of Muslim evacuees in Mewat.<sup>45</sup> The communal disturbances in West Punjab from March 1947, including Rawalpindi, Amritsar, Ferozepur, Patiala and Jullundur, are closely connected to the violence in Jammu from August to November 1947.<sup>46</sup>

The fortnightly report of March 31, 1947 by Mr. Webb, the British Resident Officer in Kashmir, depicting the disturbances in J&K state due to the violence of Punjab. Webb mentions about several agitations at the incidents of North West Frontier Province (now onward NWFP) and the riots of Punjab which were highlighted by the local newspapers. He mentions about the burning of two villages 10 miles away from Kohala. As the result, the state authorities put restrictions on press and safety measures were adopted by dispatching troops to Kohala. The officers on leave were called back and Srinagar-Rawalpindi road was closed for security purposes. Webb mentions about Sh. Abdullah's effort to form peace committees in the State. He states about the arrival of 1000 refugees from NWFP and Punjab due to riots. The report also highlights an incident that was occurred between Muslim and Hindu students of Wales

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<sup>41</sup>Gyanendra Pandey, *Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism and History in India* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 24.

<sup>42</sup>*Ibid.*, 25.

<sup>43</sup>Pandey, *Remembering Partition*, 32.

<sup>44</sup>*Ibid.*, 34.

<sup>45</sup>*Ibid.*, 36

<sup>46</sup>Chatta, "Terrible Fate", 121.

College of Jammu resulting the deaths of three students.<sup>47</sup>

The state of J&K, particularly Jammu, had strong historical ties with West Pakistan. The Jhelum Valley Road, by 1890, linking Rawalpindi to Srinagar, became a crucial all-weather route. By 1922, Jammu was connected by rail to Sialkot, Punjab, with trains linking to the broader Indian railway network, facilitating regional connectivity.<sup>48</sup> Visitors to J&K had three motorable routes: the 196-mile Jhelum Valley Road from Rawalpindi, the 71 mile route from Havelian via Abbottabad, Muzaffarabad and the Banihal Pass road, which covers 203 miles from Jammu to Srinagar.<sup>49</sup> Jammu's ties with West Punjab facilitated the migration of non-Muslims, who fled to Jammu and other regions amid violence, hoping to return once it ended.<sup>50</sup>

Hindu and Sikh migrants to Kashmir spread stories of violence, fueling demands for revenge. Refugee accounts of violence fueled animosities, leading to revenge plots and anti-Muslim pamphlets. The inflammatory literature and accounts of Muslim aggression led to a terror campaign against Jammu's Muslim population.<sup>51</sup> The Muslim community in Jammu suffered tremendously in September and October of 1947 as a result of the earlier upheavals in West Punjab, and they suffered from widespread disorder and anguish from mid-August to November of the same year.<sup>52</sup> Historians note that thousands of Muslims were killed in Jammu, following a campaign by Maharaja Hari Singh, supported by his army, anti-Muslim groups and RSS.<sup>53</sup>

### **Polarized Politics in Jammu**

The religious and administrative makeups of Jammu claims of a 200,000-persons massacre, with focus on its Muslims. Maharaja Hari Singh had been influenced toward India by leaders like Gandhi, Nehru and Patel feared losing power. In the meanwhile, a large number of Muslims in the Frontier Districts and Jammu favored Pakistan. In Poonch, a 1947 rebellion by pro-Pakistan

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<sup>47</sup>W. F. Webb, "Fortnightly Report from the Resident Officer of Kashmir to L. C. L. Griffin, Secretary to H. E. the Crown Representative", *Political Department*, no. F.6-C/47, New Delhi, March 31, 1947 (Islamabad: National Documentation Wing, Microfilm Holdings).

<sup>48</sup> Snedden, *Understanding Kashmir and Kashmiris*, 25.

<sup>49</sup> Snedden, *Understanding Kashmir and Kashmiris*, 34.

<sup>50</sup> Chatta, "Terrible Fate", 121.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., 122.

<sup>52</sup> *Inqilab* (Lahore), May 2, 1947, 3.

<sup>53</sup> Chatta, "Terrible Fate", 117-140.



Muslims led to the resistance movement against Hari Singh's rule. Muslims in Gilgit rebelled against the Maharaja Hari Singh, seeking to join Pakistan, with Pakistan soon taking administrative control. In contrast, Kashmir Valley's Muslims, influenced by Sh. Abdullah's secularism and ties to India, were less enthusiastic about Pakistan. Many leaned toward India or independence, with political activity centered in Srinagar, the state's summer capital. Jammu Province's political leanings were influenced by Hindu-majority districts like Jammu, Udhampur, and Kathua, which bordered India. Jammu District, home to the Maharaja and Dogra community, was key due to its population and proximity to Punjab, facilitating refugee movement after partition.<sup>54</sup> Kathua, bordering Pathankot in Punjab, was strategically important after partition, as Pathankot's inclusion in India provided an easy route to Jammu. This may have been influenced by nearby districts having Hindu majority. The majority of the Muslims of Jammu Province resided in the districts in the west of Jammu, such as Reasi, Poonch and Mirpur. They had close ties to Punjab and wanted to join Pakistan. In contrast, the Hindu-majority eastern districts, closely aligned with the pro-India elements. Moreover, Maharaja's disarming of Muslims arose tensions. The lack of leadership from pro-Pakistan figures like Ghulam Abbas allowed anti-Muslim groups to target Muslims in these areas.

## **Poonch Revolt**

In 1947, Maharaja Hari Singh sought Kashmir's accession to India, despite popular support for Pakistan. He repressed dissent, demobilized Muslim soldiers and dismissed Muslim police officers. There was a great deal of hostility after the Maharaja overthrew the Raja of Poonch in April 1947 and imposed high levies, which were collected by force.<sup>55</sup> Resistance began in Muslim-majority areas, especially Poonch, where reports of persecution and mass killings of Muslims emerged.<sup>56</sup> The well-armed people of Poonch, trained during WWII, revolted after being forced to surrender their weapons, which were given to Dogras and Sikhs. The Dogra troops

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<sup>54</sup> Christopher Snedden, "What happened to Muslims in Jammu? Local Identity, the Massacre of 1947 and the Roots of the Kashmir Problem", *Journal of South Asian Studies*, vol. 24, no. 2 (2001): 111-134.

<sup>55</sup> P. Dewan, *History of Kashmir* (New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2008), 147.

<sup>56</sup> *The Times* (London), September 8, 1947, 4.

210 suppressed the revolt violently, burning villages and committing abductions and rapes.<sup>57</sup>The  
211 people of Poonch, believed to support Pakistan, prompted the Maharaja Hari Singh to impose  
212 martial law to suppress pro-Pakistan sentiments.<sup>58</sup>The violence in Kashmir led to a mass Muslim  
213 exodus, fueling anger in Punjab and sparking *jihad* by 20,000 Pukhtoon tribesmen, who joined  
214 Muslim deserters to rally Poonch peasants. Poonch's Muslims were extremely comparable to  
215 those of the NWFP in terms of history, geography, family, ethnicity, economy and religion.<sup>59</sup>By  
216 October 1947, tribesmen had captured towns, massacred civilians and advanced toward  
217 Srinagar.<sup>60</sup> Rumors suggested Pakistan's army supported these raids.<sup>61</sup>The tribals and local  
218 resistance in Poonch and Mirpur led to a revolt against Dogra rule, declaring "Azad" Kashmir on  
219 October 24, 1947. Maharaja Hari Singh fled Srinagar two days later..<sup>62</sup> He sought Indian military  
220 aid, agreeing to accession on October 26, 1947, with the condition of a special Kashmir  
221 status.<sup>63</sup>The tribal invasion led to J&K's accession, similar to the Treaty of Amritsar, with  
222 decisions made by rulers, not the people.<sup>64</sup>The freedom fighters besieged Kotli and Poonch,  
223 carrying out brutal killings, particularly targeting prominent traders and encouraging  
224 looting.<sup>65</sup>Krishna Mehta recounts her time in Muzaffarabad during the tribal raids, where rebels  
225 confronted her husband, demanded he kneel, and shot at him when he identified as a  
226 Hindu.<sup>66</sup>Within two months, thousands of Hindus and Sikhs fled to Kashmir, with many dying in  
227 the mountains. In January 1951, 250 former Dogra workers and the remaining 900 refugees

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<sup>57</sup>Safeer Ahmad Bhat, "Jammu and Kashmir on the eve of Partition: A Study of Political Conditions," *South Asian Studies*, vol. 32, no. 2 (2020): 285-296.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid., 293.

<sup>59</sup>Bhat, "Jammu & Kashmir on the Eve of Partition", 293.

<sup>60</sup>S. R. Hussain, "Resolving the Kashmir Dispute: Blending Realism with Justice", *The Pakistan Development Review*, vol. 48, no. 4 (2009): 1007-1035.

<sup>61</sup>"Kashmir Rebels Attacked by Aircrafts", *The Times*, (London), October 31, 1947, 4.

<sup>62</sup>Hussain, "Resolving the Kashmir Dispute", 1007-1035.


<sup>63</sup>Dewan, *History of Kashmir*, 153.

<sup>64</sup>W.W. Baker. *Kashmir: Happy Valley, Valley of Death* (USA: Defenders Publications, 1994), 23.

<sup>65</sup>"Reinforcement for State Troops: City Panic", *The Times*, (London), October 28, 1947, 4.

<sup>66</sup>Krishna Mehta, *Kashmir 1947: A Survivor's Story* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2005), 7.

returned to Amritsar.<sup>67</sup> Sardar Inderjit Singh remembers being lost after his father urged him to flee during firing. Additionally, Colonel D.O. Dykes and his spouse were the target of Muslim rebels.<sup>68</sup> The uprising in Poonch region and violence in Jammu, led to ethnic cleansing, displacement, and abductions. Kashmir Valley, despite a Muslim majority, remained untouched,



<sup>67</sup> "Civil and Military Gazette", (Lahore), January 16, 1951, 5.

<sup>68</sup> Ian Talbot and Darshan Singh Tatla, *Epicenter of Violence: Partition, Voices and Memories from Amritsar* (Delhi: Permanent Black, 2006), 33.

<sup>69</sup> Dewan, *History of Kashmir*, 148.

<sup>70</sup> Snedden, "What happened to Muslims in Jammu?", 112.

Map 2: Post-Partition Jammu and Kashmir<sup>71</sup>



## A Systematic Extermination of Muslims to Alter the Demographics of Jammu

The events that unfolded in Jammu district between October and November 1947 are far from a myth or a product of imagination. The massacre documented by renowned scholars Alastair Lamb, Victoria Schofield and Christopher Snedden, is supported by Mahatma Gandhi's statements. Gandhi praised Sh. Abdullah for handling the situation, uniting Hindus and Sikhs and despite the violence, urging for reconciliation.<sup>72</sup>

<sup>71</sup>Snedden, "What happened to Muslims in Jammu?", 112.

<sup>72</sup>A.G. Noorani, "Why Jammu Erupts," *Frontline*, September 25, 2008.

Survivor Amanullah Khan Naqshbandi recounted how Muslims were deceived into boarding convoys for Pakistan. On November 5, 1947, the first convoy was massacred. The second convoy, including Naqshbandi and his family, was ambushed after a wrong turn, resulting in the loss of 17 family members.<sup>73</sup> Muslims in Jammu were not the only victims; attackers also crossed into Pakistan, killing 1,700 people. Pakistan had about 100,000 refugees in Sialkot. Alastair Lamb criticized Jammu & Kashmir for these acts, noting that Pakistan failed to use them effectively in the Kashmir dispute.<sup>74</sup> The efforts to alter J&K's demographic composition, currently pursued by the RSS-BJP government, are believed to have started with the Jammu massacre.<sup>75</sup> In 1947, J&K's area was 84,471 square miles, with a population of 4million, 77% Muslim, 20% Hindu and 3% Sikh.<sup>76</sup> After the 1947 massacre and migration, Muslims, originally 61% of the population in 1941, became a minority.<sup>77</sup>

The Hindu Dogra Princely State sought to alter Jammu's demographics by expelling its Muslim population. This is evident in the 1961 Indian Census, which recorded a sharp decline in Jammu's Muslim population, from 37% (158,630) in 1941 to 10% (51,690) in 1961. Kathua district witnessed a nearly 50% decrease and 123 villages were entirely depopulated.<sup>78</sup> Evidence of state-led demographic alteration is reflected in a reported conversation with Mehr Chand Mahajan, J&K's Prime Minister. When asked about achieving parity post-power transfer, Mahajan referenced Muslim bodies in the Ramnagar reserve, implying that the population ratio could similarly be altered.<sup>79</sup>

### **State-Sanctioned Massacre**

The Maharaja Hari Singh provided the firearms to Sikhs and Hindus and disarmed the Muslims in Jammu in the second half of August 1947. Muslims from Poonch region and Mirpur, who

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<sup>73</sup> "Amanullah Khan's Heart Wrenching Account of the Jammu Massacre of 1947", November 6, 2019.

<sup>74</sup> Alastair Lamb, *Birth of a Tragedy: Kashmir 1947* (Hertingfordbury: Roxford Books, 1994), 69.

<sup>75</sup> Saeed Naqvi, "The Killing Fields of Jammu: How Muslims Become a Minority in the Region", (July 10, 2016).

<sup>76</sup> Saira Kazmee, Azhar Ahmad, Muhammad Umer Hayat, Asim Muneeb Kha and Beenish Ambereen, "Systematic Changes in Demographic Composition of Jammu And Kashmir by India and Its Implications for the Resolution of Kashmir Conflict," *Ilkogretim Online*, vol. 20, no. 5 (2021): 2568-2577.

<sup>77</sup> Saeed Naqvi, "The Killing Fields of Jammu: How Muslims Become a Minority in the Region", (July 10, 2016),

<sup>78</sup> M. H. Kamili, *Census of India 1961* (Srinagar: Office of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner, 1968), 42.

<sup>79</sup> Anuradha Bhasin Jamwal, "Prejudice in Paradise", *Communalism Combat*, vol. 11 (January, 2005): 104.

opposed Maharaja Hari Singh's pro-Indian views, collected weapons from NWFP, the province of Pakistan, in the middle of 1947. In order to defend their families and demand that J&K be granted accession to Pakistan, former skilled WWII soldiers organized an uprising that resulted in the creation of the Azad State of J&K on October 24, 1947.<sup>80</sup> In response of the Poonch revolt, Pukhtoon tribes entered Kashmir on October 22, 1947. Fearing loss of control, Maharaja Hari Singh sought Indian help on October 26, agreeing to accede to India.<sup>81</sup> The Indian Army intervened on October 27,<sup>82</sup> pushing back the freedom fighters and Azad Army to regain control of J&K. In May 1948, Pakistan joined the conflict to aid the Azad Army, escalating into a full-scale war. The conflict ended with UN-brokered ceasefire on January 1, 1949.<sup>83</sup> J&K was split between the newly formed states of India and Pakistan after 1947, leading to significant demographic and administrative changes on both sides.

### **Unparalleled Carnage: Jammu Massacre Surpasses Punjab in Brutality**

The 1947 Jammu massacre was more tragic than the Punjab violence. In the period between mid-August and mid-November, 10.2 million people moved, with 4.4 million Hindus and Sikhs moving to India and 5.8 million Muslims heading to Pakistan.<sup>84</sup> Many people were murdered, kidnapped, or perished from various circumstances during the great migration in 1947. According to one estimate, at least 100,000 Muslims died from severe injuries, while 237,000 Muslims were either slaughtered or forced to leave Jammu. Horace Alexander in *The Spectator* stated about 200,000 Muslims were killed, with tacit approval from state authorities.<sup>85</sup> Although it is less than the number of deaths in Punjab, the estimated 200,000 people who died in Jammu during the 1947 unrest is a considerable number in relation to the local population. Between 200,000 and about 100,000 inhabitants of Jammu are thought to have massacred as a result of

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<sup>80</sup>Jamwal, "Prejudice in Paradise", 104.

<sup>81</sup>Hatice Çelik, "Kashmir after August 5<sup>th</sup> Decision and its Implications for South Asia," *RUDN Journal of World History*, vol. 12, no. 2 (2020): 99-111.

<sup>82</sup>There is contradiction in the date of signing the accession papers and on the arrival of Indian army in Srinagar as highlighted and mentioned in the work of Alastair Lamb and Victoria Schofield.

<sup>83</sup> Izzat Raazia and Saqib Ur Rehman, "Kashmir Conflict and the Question of Self-Determination," *Journal of Development and Social Sciences*, vol. 2, no. 4 (2021): 111-119.

<sup>84</sup>Joseph Schechtman, *The Refugee in the World: Displacement and Integration* (New York: A. S. Barnes and Co., 1963), 108.

<sup>85</sup>Saira Kazmee, Azhar Ahmad, Muhammad Umer Hayat, Asim Muneeb Khan and Beenish Ambereen, "Systematic Changes in Demographic Composition of Jammu And Kashmir by India and Its Implications for the Resolution of Kashmir Conflict," *Ilkogretim Online*, vol. 20, no. 5 (2021): 2568-2577.

300 religious violence and migration; Nehru officially mentioned 20,000 to 30,000 deaths in  
301 Punjab.<sup>86</sup>

## 302 **Voices from the Margins: Jammu Muslim Survivor' Stories of Resilience**

303 In October-November 1947, the Dogra army, RSS and Akalis carried out a brutal killing spree  
304 against Muslims in Jammu, with Sikhs parading the streets with swords.<sup>87</sup> In her book, Victoria  
305 Schofield quotes Ian Stephens, editor of *The Statesman*, who described how, from August, a  
306 brutal campaign wiped out nearly 500,000 Muslims in the region. About 200,000 disappeared,  
307 likely killed, died from disease, or succumbed to exposure, while the rest fled to West Punjab.<sup>88</sup>

308 As refugees from western Pakistan arrived in Jammu, the Muslim population faced  
309 growing danger. By late 1947, around 160,000 refugees had fled, mostly from Rawalpindi and  
310 nearby areas.<sup>89</sup> About one million Sikh and Hindu refugees from west Punjab particularly from  
311 Sialkot, which is intimately associated with Jammu, came to Jammu as violence increased  
312 following the announcement of the Punjab boundary award. Many had cultural ties to the Dogra  
313 people of both regions. By mid-September, Jammu hosted 65,000 refugees from western  
314 Punjab.<sup>90</sup> The British Resident Officer in J&K mentions in his fortnightly report of April 30, 1947  
315 about the arrival of Massive Hindu and Sikh refugees in J&K. He reported to the British Political  
316 Department at New Delhi about the communal tension (between Hindus and Muslims) erupted in  
317 Jammu due to the tensions on NWFP and Punjab border.<sup>91</sup>

318 The arrival of refugees heightened communal tensions, with refugees sharing distressing  
319 accounts of Muslim atrocities, widely reported by the press and state media.<sup>92</sup> A Hindu  
320 newspaper in Jammu incited communal hatred, claiming a Dogra could kill 200 Muslims. This

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<sup>86</sup> Schechtman, *The Refugee in the World*, 108.

<sup>87</sup> Sankara Narayana, "The Untold Story of Jammu Massacre," *Clarion India*, February 18, 2023.

<sup>88</sup> Victoria Schofield, *Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War* (London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2003), 43.

<sup>89</sup> "Tribal Hazards in the Border Territory", *The Times*, (London), January 26, 1948, 5.

<sup>90</sup> J. K. Rady, "Mass Killings of Muslims in Jammu Province", *Nawa-i-Waqt* (Lahore), October 29, 1947, 3.

<sup>91</sup> W. F. Webb, "Fortnightly Report from the Resident Officer of Kashmir to L. C. L. Griffin, Secretary to H. E. the Crown Representative", *Political Department*, no. F.6-C/47, New Delhi, April 30, 1947 (Islamabad: National Documentation Wing, Microfilm Holdings).

<sup>92</sup> J. K. Rady, "Mass Killings of Muslims in Jammu Province", *Nawa-i-Waqt*, (Lahore), 29 October, 1947, 3.

rhetoric fueled violence and the exodus of Muslims. In October, Dogra refugees, aided by state officials with armed with ammunition and joined by Sikh deserters and Akalis, started attacking Muslims.<sup>93</sup> The fortnightly report of February 28, 1947 of British Resident Officer, Mr. Webb mentions about several meetings of Akali Dal in Jammu and their urge for massive enrollment of Sikh volunteers to strengthen the organization.<sup>94</sup> On January 12, 1948, According to the Daily Telegraph, in order to establish Sikh territory, make up for losses in Pakistan and establish the groundwork for a future Khalistan, refugees migrated from west Punjab seized those properties which were possessed by Muslims, before starting the October killings.<sup>95</sup> The fortnightly report of May 31, 1947 by Mr. Webb is indicating about the communal unrest of Jammu owing to the tensions in the Punjab.<sup>96</sup> The 1947 Muslim massacre in Jammu, fueled by state-sponsored demographic changes, exposed the region's divisions. In 1941, eastern Jammu had 619,000 non-Muslims and 411,000 Muslims. North of the Chenab River, Muslims were the majority, making the region prone to violence during crises, as noted by Leo Kuper.<sup>97</sup>

**Table 1: Composition of Population in Jammu and Kashmir, 1941<sup>98</sup>**

Districts	Strength	Hindus %	Muslims %
Udhampur	2.94217 Lacs	56	-
Mirpur	3.86655 Lacs	-	81
Kathua	1.77672 Lacs	74	-
Jammu	4.31362 Lacs	58	36
Reasi	2.57903 Lacs	-	68
Pooch Jagir	4.21828 Lacs	-	10

In September 1947, Jammu witnessed severe destruction targeting Muslims in areas like Ustad da Mohalla and Pathanan da Mohalla. Hundreds of Gujars were killed and Raipur village

<sup>93</sup> "The Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence for the week ending of August, 1947", 612, NIHCR.

<sup>94</sup> W. F. Webb, "Fortnightly Report from the Resident Officer of Kashmir to L. C. L. Griffin, Secretary to H. E. the Crown Representative", *Political Department*, no. F.6-C/47, New Delhi, February, 28, 1947 (Islamabad: National Documentation Wing, Microfilm Holdings).

<sup>95</sup> *Daily Telegraph* (London), January 12, 1948.

<sup>96</sup> W. F. Webb, "Fortnightly Report from the Resident Officer of Kashmir to L. C. L. Griffin, Secretary to H. E. the Crown Representative", *Political Department*, no. F.6-C/47, New Delhi, May 31, 1947 (Islamabad: National Documentation Wing, Microfilm Holdings).

<sup>97</sup> *Pakistan Times* (Lahore), September 19, 1947.

<sup>98</sup> "Elimination of Muslims from Jammu", Part II, *The Times* (London), 10 August 1948, 5.



338 was burned, illustrating ethnic cleansing through killings and forced displacement.<sup>99</sup> Half of  
339 Jammu's Muslim population had left by mid-September 1947 and by November, many  
340 Jammu refugees had fled to Sialkot, Gujrat and Jhelum.<sup>100</sup> The state troops, aided by state  
341 officials, armed local groups like the RSS to attack Muslims. G.K. Reddy of Kashmir Times  
342 reported witnessing armed mobs, supported by troops, killing Muslims.<sup>101</sup> Authorities replaced  
343 Muslim soldiers with Hindus, disarmed Muslim personnel and the Maharaja of Patiala sent  
344 weapons and Sikh Brigade troops to J&K.<sup>102</sup>

345 Many of the victims witnessed the presence of Patiala brigade in J&K since October  
346 1947. Muhammad Yusuf<sup>103</sup> Saraf's memoirs state that by October 10, 1947, around 2,000  
347 Muslims were forced to migrate to Sialkot, with the state administration sealing the border. Mian  
348 Iftikharuddin, the Punjab rehabilitation minister, requested Brigadier Collier to visit Jammu to  
349 assess the situation, but he was denied access by Brigadier Rawat. Meanwhile, training centers  
350 for Hindus to use firearms were established in Jammu, including at Vaid Mandir, Ragunath  
351 Mandir, Talab Rani, Pucca Danga, and Gurdwara Pucci Dhakki, all run by retired Hindu military  
352 officers.<sup>104</sup> Ex-soldiers were armed with 303 rifles and 50 rounds of ammunition as the massacre  
353 began in Samba and Kathua, following similar tactics across locations, suggesting a coordinated  
354 effort. The state appeared to be working to create a Jammu region having Hind majority. The  
355 Maharaja Hari Singh, as witnessed by Akbar Ali Haidri and Wazir Ali, initiated violence in Deva  
356 Vatala, killing three Gujjars. Dogra troops conducted random firing near the border to drive  
357 Muslims into Jammu city, while women were abducted, properties looted and roads filled with  
358 dead bodies.<sup>105</sup> Muslims in Muhalla Ustad escaped due to Colonel Pir Muhammad Khan's  
359 intervention. Dogra soldiers, supported by Patiala forces, set up posts across key areas in Jammu.  
360 Muslims attempting to flee were killed. Despite resistance led by Captain Mian Nasiruddin and  
361 Ch. Muhammad Sharif in Urdu Bazar, military forces attacked 300 refugees, killing all males  
362 and abducting women. Within days, Muhallas Dalpatian, Mastgarh, Talab Khatikaan and Bazar

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<sup>99</sup>*Pakistan Times* (Lahore), September 19, 1947.

<sup>100</sup>*Nawa-i-Waqt* (Lahore), November 20, 1947, 6.

<sup>101</sup>*Nawa-i-Waqt* (Lahore), October 29, 1947, 2.

<sup>102</sup>Thana Shakargarh, "Sialkot District Police Record", FIR no. 179, November 28, 1947.

<sup>103</sup>Muhammad Yusuf Saraf was the writer and Chief Justice of Azad Jammu and Kashmir High Court.

<sup>104</sup>Muhammad Yusuf Saraf, "The Jammu Massacre" in *Memory Lane to Jammu* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2004), 161.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*, 162.

Qasabaan were cleared of Muslims. The house of Sardar Akram was raided and many men, women and children were killed.<sup>106</sup> On October 14, 1947, the RSS and Akalis attacked villages in Bishna, Jammu, killing Muslims, looting and burning homes. District Inspector Mian Said Ali arrested 30 Hindu dacoits and sought protection amid Sanghi attacks. On October 17, ASP Pandit Kailash Nath Bhakri, accompanied by a photographer, took Said Ali to the border, where he saw Muslim homes burning. Despite informing the IGP, no action was taken. Similar attacks occurred on October 19, in Muhalla Ustad, on October 20 in Akhnoor and on October 23 in Miran Sahib.<sup>107</sup> On October 21, 1947, the Maharaja Hari Singh and Prime Minister, Mahajan oversaw the execution of the genocide plan in Rajpura, providing arms and ammunition. Mahajan praised extremists for their actions. State forces and Sanghis (RSS) attacked convoys of Muslims at Khasyal, Chhati Khoi, Mahi Chak, Nagri Runb and Samba, killing thousands. Women and children from these convoys and various regions were either killed or abducted.<sup>108</sup> An estimated 25,000 women were abducted, including Ch. Hamidullah Khan's daughter, who remained untraced despite his efforts.<sup>109</sup> On October 22, the military fired on Muslims, causing some to flee to Jammu. Mian Abdur Rashid and officers Raja Sobat Ali Khan and Thakur Natha Singh were killed. On October 25, during Eid-ul-Azha, Hindu and Sikh gangs continued violence and Atta Muhammad of Mastgarh slaughtered his three daughters to protect their honor.<sup>110</sup>

Muslim police and military officers were disarmed and confined to Police Lines. Around 200 Muslims in Baba Jeevan Shah's Khanqah were killed or abducted. On October 28, the Maharaja Hari Singh ordered Muslims to surrender arms. Despite reassurances, violence persisted. By November 3, Patiala reinforcements arrived and on November 5, Muslims were gathered for transport to Pakistan. However, at Satwari Cantonment, those attempting to escape were killed.<sup>111</sup> The trucks were looted and many fleeing Muslims were killed. Only 900 reached Sialkot, including Gulam Mustafa, whose family was killed. Ch. Gulam Abbas Khan's daughter

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<sup>106</sup>Ibid., 163-164.

<sup>107</sup>Saraf, *Memory Lane to Jammu*, 165-166.

<sup>108</sup>Abdul Rehman and Saba Ghulam Nabi, "Diplomacy to Lawfare: Analyzing Legal Claims in Jammu and Kashmir," *Pakistan Social Sciences Review*, vol. 7, no. 4 (2023): 231-249..

<sup>109</sup>Saraf, *Memory Lane to Jammu*, 170.

<sup>110</sup>Ibid., 173.

<sup>111</sup>Ibid., 174-175.

was abducted but later found in India through Sh. Abdullah's efforts.<sup>112</sup> Survivors were sheltered in Zafarwal, while most of a subsequent convoy of 25 trucks was killed. Many women were abducted and some jumped into the canal to preserve their honor. Dr. Abdul Karim, a survivor, shared eyewitness accounts of the convoy's fate.<sup>113</sup> When Sikh Brigade soldiers invaded border villages on November 28, 1947, Dogra troops drove out the Muslims of Dulat Chak, forcing them to evacuate across the Ujh river-bed.<sup>114</sup> These events were covered by the Times of London with the headline "Elimination of Muslims from Jammu", emphasizing that the Dogra Maharaja Hari Singh was directly in charge of the armed forces responsible for the Muslim ethnic cleansing.<sup>115</sup> Pakistan sent busses for transportation in early November 1947 when Muslims in Jammu sought shelter in camps following the closing of the Sialkot-Jammu railway line. However, the convoy was ambushed by Dogra troops, RSS members and armed Sikhs on the Jammu-Sialkot road, resulting in numerous fatalities, abductions and only a few survivors reaching Sialkot.<sup>116</sup> A refugee recalled Dogra troops attacking 30 evacuee trucks at Satwari, in Jammu killing men and abducting women, while officials declared Muslims had no place in J&K.<sup>117</sup>

The 1947 Muslim ethnic cleansing in Jammu is highlighted in the oral testimony of Sialkot. In Nawa Kot, Dogra forces killed Zafar Butt's family and in Ram Pura Mohalla, Khalid Ali Gujar's siblings perished. Kawaja Tahir, who is currently in Sialkot, lost both his parents and his brother. Hameed Ullah, a leader of the Muslim Conference, saw his daughter kidnapped. Zarar Hussain described the forced relocation of his family to Sialkot, while Sarmad Mahmud escaped to a camp for refugees. Hussein Gujar's account of fleeing Nawa Kot in October 1947 remains particularly poignant.<sup>118</sup> At 18, Hussein survived a Dogra troop attack on his home in Nawakot that killed his parents, sister and brothers. Returning the next morning, he found his family dead and their home looted. He fled to Sialkot, carrying only a handbag.<sup>119</sup>

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<sup>112</sup>Ibid., 176-177.

<sup>113</sup>Ibid., 179.

<sup>114</sup>Thana Shakargarh, "Sialkot District Police Record", FIR no. 179, November 28, 1947.

<sup>115</sup>"Elimination of Muslims from Jammu", Part II, *The Times* (London), August 10, 1948, 5.

<sup>116</sup>*Pakistan Times* (Lahore), September 19, 1947

<sup>117</sup>Chatta, "Terrible Fate", 127.

<sup>118</sup>"Interview with Zafar Butt", Sialkot, November 16, 2024.

<sup>119</sup>"Interview with Khalid Ali Gujar", November 20, 2024.

412 **Sheikh Abdullah's "Emergency Government" Response to the Crisis in Jammu**

413 Before Sh. Muhammad Abdullah's arrival, there were no facilities for wounded Muslims. Dr.  
414 Abdul Karim, with Dr. Rehmatullah Rad, established a hospital at Sardar Muhammad Akram  
415 Khan's Haveli in Talab Khatikaan, with Muhammad Ismail, Fazl-ur-Rehman and Ali  
416 Muhammad serving as compounders.<sup>120</sup> Dr. Rehmatullah Rad received bandages and medicines  
417 from Dr. Pratap Singh. On November 4, Muslims tried to contact Sh. Abdullah or Bakhshi  
418 Gulam Muhammad, but their message was blocked. On November 6, they resisted leaving  
419 Jammu for Pakistan.<sup>121</sup> G.K. Reddy, a journalist exiled from Kashmir, criticized the Dogra  
420 administration for burning villages and using modern weapons around refugee camps. Sh.  
421 Abdullah oversaw the Emergency Administration following Kashmir's October 30, 1947,  
422 annexation to India, but Mahajan maintained control. Tensions arose when 60 to 70 Muslim  
423 soldiers were killed after Colonel Baldev Singh's withdrawal, with Abdullah condemning the  
424 killings and Mahajan labeling the soldiers as rebels.<sup>122</sup>

425 Sh. Abdullah, concerned about Muslims in Jammu, instructed Niaz Ahmad (then Chief  
426 Secretary) and other officials to go there for administrative duties. However, they refused, citing  
427 the absence of Muslim soldiers and distrust of Dogra troops for their safety against armed Hindu  
428 and Sikh gangs.<sup>123</sup> Sh. Abdullah ensured the safe passage of a 30-truck convoy of refugees in  
429 November 1947, despite the loss of seven women and some luggage. His placement of trusted  
430 individuals at district headquarters protected the majority of the 200,000-300,000 migrants. Upon  
431 learning of the situation, Abdullah visited Jammu, witnessing the suffering and taking action.  
432 The administration, led by Dogras and Kashmiri Pandits, was hostile to him due to his support  
433 for India's accession. Jammu's Muslim population, influenced by the Pakistan Movement,  
434 contrasted with the loyal Dogras, who supported Gandhi's principles.<sup>124</sup> Abdullah called for an  
435 end to violence against Muslims in Jammu, warning that it threatened the safety of 100,000 non-  
436 Muslims in Kashmir Valley. He ensured the safety of refugees, condemned the killings of  
437 innocent Muslims, and criticized the Dogra Rajputs for targeting defenseless civilians.

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<sup>120</sup>Saraf, *Memory Lane to Jammu*, 183.

<sup>121</sup> Saraf, *Memory Lane to Jammu*, 184.

<sup>122</sup>Ibid., 185-186.

<sup>123</sup>Ibid., 187.

<sup>124</sup>Ibid., 188-189.

438 Abdullah's actions were supported by Nehru, who pressurized Mahajan for handling the  
439 situation.<sup>125</sup>

440 In November 1947, after the massacre, orphans and unclaimed Muslims were married off  
441 within the state through Begum Abdullah's efforts, with Maharani Tara Devi providing dowries.  
442 Colonel Adalat Khan, who witnessed the dire situation in Jammu, was deeply moved by the  
443 atrocities. Sh. Abdullah, after leaving his deputy Bakhshi Gulam Muhammad to restore order,  
444 saw significant progress as Bakhshi managed to recover abducted girls and reunite families.  
445 Abdullah returned to Srinagar by mid-November and concerned about Jammu, Bhadarwah and  
446 Kishtwar, tried to enlist Muslim officers, but they refused out of fear. Colonel Adalat eventually  
447 agreed to go. In April 1951, Abdullah publicly condemned Maharaja Hari Singh, labeling him  
448 responsible for the massacres and unfit to rule J&K.<sup>126</sup>

#### 449 **Unpacking the Muslim Conference's Responsibility in Jammu during the Violence**

450 The MC leadership in Jammu failed during the crisis, prioritizing personal safety over organizing  
451 resistance. While Muslims in Bhadarwah successfully resisted Hindu and Sikh attacks, the MC  
452 leadership did not mobilize arms or organize similar efforts in other districts. In four districts,  
453 Muslims were a significant minority (549,869 compared to 641,285 non-Muslims). The  
454 leadership's failure to act, compounded by the imprisonment of key leaders and the departure of  
455 others to Pakistan, led to the collapse of the MC. Consequently, many Muslims sought refuge in  
456 Jammu, especially in areas like Muhalla Ustad.<sup>127</sup>

457 The Muslims of Jammu, with a martial background, were skilled soldiers, but the  
458 leadership of the MC, failed to effectively manage the crisis. While figures like Sardar  
459 Muhammad Ibrahim Khan gathered arms for Jammu's defense, they were not delivered in time.  
460 Key Muslim officers (who were not part of MC), including Captain Mian Nasiruddin, Dr. Abdul  
461 Karim and Dr. Rehmatullah Rad, took charge of refugee camps and coordinated with Sh.  
462 Abdullah's administration to ensure the safe migration of Jammu Muslims to Pakistan. Bakhshi

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<sup>125</sup>Ibid., 190.

<sup>126</sup>Saraf, *Memory Lane to Jammu*, 196-197.

<sup>127</sup>Ibid., 191-192.

463 Gulam Muhammad publicly condemned the killings and played a crucial role in recovering  
464 abducted women.<sup>128</sup>

## 465 **Carnage and Chaos: Assessing the Extent and Intensity of the Violence**

466 The violence against Muslims in Jammu during September-October 1947 may be classified as  
467 genocide. With the help of Hindus and Sikhs, the Dogra Hindu Maharaja's government was  
468 instrumental in the systematic murder of more than 237,000 Muslims out of 800,000 who were  
469 trying to escape.<sup>129</sup> Scholars such as Ian Copland and Shail Mayaram have compared these  
470 events to similar campaigns of "ethnic cleansing" in other princely states like Bharatpur and  
471 Alwar.<sup>130</sup> Despite evidence, historians like Christopher Snedden question the full scale of the  
472 Jammu massacre. Snedden, for example, critiques the reliability of a 10 August 1948 Times  
473 report, which claimed up to 200,000 murders.<sup>131</sup> Archival evidence, including records from the  
474 Times of London and the United Nations, supports the accuracy of the 1948 report on the  
475 massacre. Lord Mountbatten, the final British Viceroy, also brought up the matter at a 1948 East  
476 India Association meeting, criticizing the Maharaja's actions.<sup>132</sup> Oral and documentary testimony  
477 confirms the reality that the violence in Jammu against Kashmiri Muslims was an act of ethnic  
478 cleansing. This narrative, however, has often been overshadowed by the Punjab violence or  
479 integrated into the broader Kashmir conflict.<sup>133</sup> Jammu's situation was marked by a state-led  
480 effort to establish a Hindu majority, resulting in the violent expulsion of Muslims. By the 1981  
481 Census, Jammu had turned into a Hindu majority region.<sup>134</sup> Here is the table showing  
482 demographic composition of various communities of Jammu region in the census of 1981.<sup>135</sup>

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<sup>128</sup>Ibid., 193-194.

<sup>129</sup>"Elimination of Muslims from Jammu", *The Times*, (London), 10 August 1948, 5.

<sup>130</sup> Ian Copland, "The Further Shores of Partition: Ethnic Cleansing in Rajasthan, 1947", *Past and Present*, vol. 160, (1998): 203-239.

<sup>131</sup> Gyanendra Pandey, "Community and Violence: Recalling Partition", *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 32, no. 32 (1997), 2037-2045.

<sup>132</sup> Snedden, "What happened to Muslims in Jammu?", 111-134.

<sup>133</sup> Mountbatten's address to the East India Association London, "Maharaja verses the People: Genesis of the Kashmiri Dispute", *The Civil and Military Gazette*, 10 September 1951, 3-4.

<sup>134</sup> Paul Brass, "The Partition of India and Retributive Genocide in the Punjab, 1946-1947", *Journal of Genocide Research*, vol. 5, no. 1 (2003): 71-101.

<sup>135</sup> In 1951, census was not held in Jammu and Kashmir.

**Table 2: Communal Composition of Jammu, 1981<sup>136</sup>**

Sr.no.	Communities	Population Ratio
1.	Muslims	33.81%
2.	Hindus	62.06%
3.	Sikhs	3.67%
4.	Buddhists	0.11%
5.	Others	0.35%

In 1947 Jammu Province's communal violence caused the death toll of an estimated 200,000 Muslims, with Hindus and Sikhs targeting them after a Muslim rebellion in Poonch.<sup>137</sup> The Times of London story from October 10, 1948, which stated that more than a quarter of a million Muslims were slaughtered in Jammu, was cited by the High Court of Azad J&K.<sup>138</sup> The report claimed that hired gangsters, with passive or active state troop involvement, massacred over 250,000 Muslims in Jammu. Ian Stephens reported in 1963 that between August and November 1947, up to 200,000 Muslims were killed in a systematic massacre, with another 200,000 missing. An Azad Kashmir Government publication from 1948 also described widespread violence, including killings, looting and abductions, estimating 200,000 Muslims killed and 27,000 women abducted.<sup>139</sup> The number of fatalities is still unknown, but many Jammu Muslims thought there was a post-partition plot. In 1965, Sardar Mohammad Ibrahim Khan asserted that in July 1947, a secret gathering of rajas and maharajas occurred close to Srinagar.<sup>140</sup> With the help of the RSS, a plot was hatched to slaughter Muslims, beginning at Poonch where opposition was anticipated. The operation, aided by the Dogra Army, aimed to eliminate Muslims in Jammu City and nearby districts.<sup>141</sup> In 1952, Pakistan's Kashmir Affairs Minister, M.A. Gurmani referenced a Times article asserting that Dogra state forces, under the leadership of the Maharaja Hari Singh, with support from the Sikhs and Hindus, ruthlessly

<sup>136</sup> Victoria Schofield, *Kashmir in Crossfire*, cited in Bilal Ahmad Khan's "Demography of Jammu and Kashmir in Historical Perspective," *Asian Review of Social Sciences*, vol. 7, no. 3 (2018): 143-153.

<sup>137</sup> Christopher Snedden, *The Untold Story of the People of Azad Kashmir* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 48-49.

<sup>138</sup> Snedden, "What happened to Muslims in Jammu?" 111-134.

<sup>139</sup> Ian Stephens, *Pakistan* (London: Earnest Benn Ltd., 1964), 200.

<sup>140</sup> Sardar M. Ibrahim Khan, *The Kashmir Saga* (Lahore: Ripon Printing Press, 1965), 7.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid.

506 murdered 237,000 Muslims in Jammu.<sup>142</sup> Some Muslims believed the Maharaja Hari Singh was  
507 involved in massacring Muslims and pushing survivors into Pakistan. A 1948 report suggested  
508 he was advised by other Maharajas and Indian troops found Patiala gunners in Srinagar, hinting  
509 at the Maharaja of Patiala's involvement.<sup>143</sup> The fortnightly report of December 15, 1946 of  
510 British Resident Officer at Srinagar, Mr. W. F. Webb mentions about the meeting of Maharaja of  
511 Patiala with Maharaja of J&K in Jammu.<sup>144</sup>

## 512 **Trauma and Transformation: The Lasting Impacts of Massacre on Jammu and Kashmir**

513 Many Muslims fled Jammu Province to escape violence, with estimates varying. In 1948,  
514 Muhammad Hafizullah estimated that around 200,000 Muslims migrated to  
515 Pakistan.<sup>145</sup> Pakistan's Kashmir Affairs Minister, M.A. Gurmani, claimed that the Indian army  
516 and the Maharaja Hari Singh's forces had displaced around 600,000 Muslim refugees, most  
517 likely referring to the whole J&K region. More than 300,000 Kashmiri refugees had reached  
518 border cities like Gujrat, Sialkot and Jhelum by the end of November 1947; of these, more than  
519 200,000 had settled in Sialkot. Many resided in deserted homes or overcrowded camps. The  
520 camps had horrific conditions, with disease and poor living standards. Refugees, angered by  
521 massacres by state forces, joined the Kashmiri Liberation Movement.<sup>146</sup> Violence persisted along  
522 the Sialkot-Jammu border, with Dogra troops and armed groups attacking. By October 1947,  
523 over 17,000 Muslims had been killed.<sup>147</sup> Despite efforts by Pakistan to assist, Kashmiri refugees  
524 faced delays in resettlement and were given only temporary property rights. They were excluded  
525 from permanent resettlement schemes and their legal status remained uncertain. Similarly,  
526 refugees from Sialkot in India were denied permanent residency, with the partition's aftermath  
527 affecting their lives for years.<sup>148</sup> Moreover, change in demographic composition in Jammu

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<sup>142</sup>M. A. Gurmani, *Kashmir: A Survey* (Kashmir: Public Relations Directorate, Ministry of Kashmir, Government of Pakistan, 1952), 17.

<sup>143</sup> Snedden, "What happened to Muslims in Jammu?" 111-134.

<sup>144</sup>W. F. Webb, "Fortnightly Report from the Resident Officer of Kashmir to L. C. L. Griffin, Secretary to H. E. the Crown Representative", *Political Department*, no. F.6-C/46, New Delhi, January 15, 1946 (Islamabad: National Documentation Wing, Microfilm Holdings).

<sup>145</sup>M. Hafizullah, *Towards Azad Kashmir* (Lahore: Bazm-e-Frogh-e-Adab, 1948), 119.

<sup>146</sup> "Civil and Military Gazette" (Lahore), November 30, 1949, 5.

<sup>147</sup> "Kashmir Rebels Attacked by Aircrafts", *The Times* (London), October 31, 1947, 4.

<sup>148</sup> Luv Puri, "Bill Seeking Citizenship for West Pakistan refugees Rejected", *The Hindu* (New Delhi), February 9, 2007.



affected the Kashmir conflict in long run. As the legacy of Violence, mistrust, hostility and continued. This inter-community tensions and political instability contributed to the ongoing Kashmir conflict. Approximately 2,37,000 Muslims were killed and over 300,000 individuals were forced to migrate to West Punjab and Pakistan-administered Kashmir, causing psychological anguish, suffering and separation of families between India-administered and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Due to ongoing hostilities, a wave of radicalization took hold in Kashmir in the 1980s, which caused Kashmiri Pandits to evacuate the state. In a nutshell communal conflicts that influenced the social and political climate of contemporary Kashmir began with the Jammu massacre.

## **Conclusion**

The Jammu massacre of 1947, though a crucial event in the history of J&K, has been largely neglected in mainstream historical narratives, often overshadowed by the violence in Punjab and Bengal. This systematic campaign of violence against Muslims was not an isolated incident but a manifestation of long-standing political and religious tensions within the region, exacerbated by the discriminatory policies of the Dogra regime which marginalized Muslims and political maneuvering by figures like Sheikh Abdullah and Jawaharlal Nehru. The massacre was exacerbated by the policies of the Dogra regime, carried out by state forces in collaboration with militant Hindu and Sikh groups, the violence included mass killings, forced displacements, looting, and abductions, with the strategic objective of altering Jammu's demographic composition. The massacre was not an isolated event but interconnected with broader regional violence, particularly the Rawalpindi riots. The arrival of Sikh and Hindu refugees into Jammu region intensified communal tensions, leading to coordinated attacks by state forces, the RSS and Akali Dal groups, involving targeted killings, looting and abductions. Statements from M.C. Mahajan, the Prime Minister of J&K, reinforce the strategic intent behind the violence. The

552 failure of the MC to organize resistance is critiqued, while limited relief efforts by Sh.  
553 Abdullah's administration and some individuals and members of Sh. Abdullah's administration  
554 including Mahajan, attempted to aid the victims. The massacre was largely initiated by the west  
555 Punjab refugees and constrained by the Dogra administration, which had little interest in halting  
556 the aggression. The absence of a strong, unified response further highlights the political  
557 fragmentation and the difficulty in resisting state power. The massacre, described as surpassing  
558 Punjab's Partition violence in brutality, remains subject to debate over the exact death toll, yet its  
559 impact relative to the local population is undeniable. While the scale of Jammu massacre is  
560 debated, its impact on the Muslim population of Jammu is undeniable. The systematic disarming  
561 of Muslim soldiers and police officers while arming Hindu and Sikh groups facilitated the  
562 violence and further entrenched the communal divide. The state-led attempt to alter the  
563 demographic structure of Jammu, evidenced by a significant drop in the Muslim population  
564 recorded in the Indian Census of 1961 and of J&K's census of 1981, points to a deliberate policy  
565 of ethnic cleansing, overshadowing the communal violence narrative typically associated with  
566 Partition. The long-term consequences include mass displacement, dire refugee conditions,  
567 psychological trauma, political instability and fragmented families across the borders. It  
568 reinforced inter-community tensions and played a significant role in the subsequent  
569 radicalization of Kashmir's politics that reflected in the shape of freedom struggle of 1980s. The  
570 official historical narratives, exposing deliberate archival omissions and emphasizing the  
571 importance of personal accounts in reconstructing a more accurate historical record. Ultimately,  
572 the Jammu massacre is presented as a neglected yet pivotal episode of mass violence with  
573 enduring ramifications for the region. Despite its significance, the massacre has been either  
574 erased or minimized in official historical accounts, a reflection of state control over the narrative.

575 Furthermore, it could not get global attention contrary to the Punjab and Bengal violence. This  
576 selective memory prevents a thorough understanding of the past and its continued implications  
577 for the region's political and social dynamics. The correspondence between British Resident  
578 Officer at Srinagar and the Political Department at New Delhi, reveals that the British were  
579 totally conscious about the communal unrest and deteriorating situation of Jammu region. If the  
580 Resident at Srinagar was attentive about the situation of Jammu, then it is a big question mark on  
581 the state administration's role which was also aware of the situation.

582 In nutshell, the Jammu massacre's marginalization in the broader context of Partition  
583 violence exposes the broader patterns of historical omission and state manipulation. It also  
584 highlights the inefficiency of MC leaders to handle the situation. The deliberate exclusion of this  
585 event from mainstream narratives not only distorts the historical record but also perpetuates a  
586 one-sided view of the region's partition. The Jammu massacre holds significance for three key  
587 reasons: Firstly, it played a pivotal role in triggering the Kashmir conflict, which continues to  
588 shape India-Pakistan relations. Secondly, it has received little attention in history narratives  
589 because it was eclipsed by the more well-known communal violence that occurred in Punjab at  
590 the same time. Even Mahatma Gandhi acknowledged the extent of the killings in Kashmir.  
591 Thirdly, the profound suffering of the victims, who lost their families, were displaced and forced  
592 to migrate to Pakistan, has been inadequately addressed in the literature, particularly regarding  
593 their miseries and sufferings during the whole episode of violence. Future research can examine  
594 state archives to clarify state involvement and demographic changes during the 1947 Jammu  
595 massacre. Oral histories and survivor testimonies are crucial for reconstructing lived experiences  
596 and challenging dominant narratives. Further investigation is needed into the links between the  
597 Jammu violence and the Rawalpindi riots to contextualize regional tensions. The roles of the

refugees, RSS, Akali Dal and state authorities require scrutiny, as does the Muslim Conference's failure to mount effective resistance. Finally, further research can assess the massacre's long-term psychological, social and political impacts, particularly its role in shaping the Kashmir conflict and demographic shifts.

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