

1 **INDIA IN GLOBAL CLIMATE NEGOTIATIONS: INSIGHTS FROM BELÉM(COP30)**

2

3 **Abstract**

4 This research paper provides a comprehensive analysis of India's evolving role in global climate  
5 negotiations, particularly in the context of the 30th Conference of the Parties (COP 30) to the  
6 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). It traces India's  
7 historical trajectory from its initial defensive stance during the Kyoto Protocol era to its current  
8 position as a pivotal actor in international climate diplomacy. The paper highlights India's core  
9 negotiating principles, including Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR), climate  
10 justice, and historical responsibility, which have shaped its advocacy for equitable climate  
11 action. The analysis of COP 30 outcomes reveals significant alignments with India's traditional  
12 priorities, including enhanced adaptation finance and the establishment of a Just Transition  
13 mechanism. However, challenges remain, particularly regarding the need for substantial  
14 commitments on loss and damage financing, a clear operational timeline, technical functions, and  
15 defined finance for the just mechanism transition. Ultimately, this paper underscores India's  
16 influential role in shaping global climate governance and its implications for achieving effective  
17 and equitable climate action.

18 **Keywords:** India, climate negotiations, climate justice, COP30, adaptation finance, Just  
19 Transition, loss and damage

20 **Introduction**

21 Climate change has emerged as one of the most pressing challenges of the 21st century, requiring  
22 unprecedented levels of international cooperation and coordinated action. As the world's most  
23 populous nation, the third-largest emitter of greenhouse gases, and a country highly vulnerable to  
24 climate impacts, India's role in international climate negotiations carries significant weight for  
25 both the Global South and the broader international community (Deepika, 2025).

26 India's engagement with global climate politics has undergone a remarkable transformation over  
27 the past three decades. From its initial position as a defensive voice on the fringes of climate  
28 policy during the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, India has evolved into an active shaper of  
29 international climate efforts (Mohan, 2022). This transition reflects not only India's changing  
30 economic status and growing global influence but also the country's recognition of the urgent  
31 need to address climate change while protecting its developmental imperatives (Jha, 2022).

32 The importance of India in global climate negotiations cannot be overstated. India is home to a  
33 substantial percentage of the world's population that is vulnerable to climate change effects,  
34 including extreme weather events, water scarcity, agricultural disruptions, and sea-level rise  
35 (Deepika, 2025). Simultaneously, as a rapidly developing economy, India faces the dual  
36 challenge of lifting millions out of poverty while transitioning to a low-carbon development  
37 pathway. This unique position makes India's climate actions influential for global emissions  
38 trajectories, food security, and geopolitical dynamics, particularly in the Global South (Deepika,  
39 2025).

40 India's climate diplomacy has been characterized by its consistent advocacy for principles of  
41 equity, climate justice, Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR), and historical  
42 responsibility (Zhang et al., 2023; Jha, 2022). These principles have formed the bedrock of  
43 India's negotiating positions across multiple Conference of the Parties (CoP) sessions under the  
44 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). India has played a key  
45 role in building coalitions with developing countries to secure commitments from developed  
46 nations on emission reductions, climate finance, and technology transfers (Sengupta, 2019).

## 47 **Methodology**

48 This study employs a qualitative approach, integrating secondary data from reports of the United  
49 Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the World Resources  
50 Institute on COP30, peer-reviewed scholarly articles from 2015 to 2025, to identify the pivotal  
51 outcomes of CoP30 and analyse them through India's negotiation lens.

## 52 **Literature Review**

53 India's participation in global climate negotiations has evolved through distinct phases, each  
54 characterized by different strategic approaches, negotiating positions, and levels of engagement.  
55 Understanding this historical trajectory is essential for contextualizing India's current role and  
56 anticipating its future positions in climate diplomacy.

### 57 **1. The Kyoto Protocol Era (1997-2005)**

58 The first period of India's climate diplomacy, spanning the 1980s through the adoption of the  
59 Kyoto Protocol in 1997 and its entry into force in 2005, was marked by India's role as a  
60 champion of the developing world. During this regime creation phase, India played an  
61 instrumental role in building coalitions with developing countries to draw clear commitments  
62 from developed countries on emission reductions, finance, and technology transfers (Sengupta,  
63 2019).

64 India's position during this period was that developed countries should bear the bulk of climate  
65 responsibility due to their historical emissions, and that any mitigation framework should be  
66 based on per capita allocation principles (Mohan, 2017). This position reflected India's  
67 fundamental stance that developing nations should only undertake voluntary commitments if  
68 they received adequate finance and technology transfers from industrialized nations (Mohan,  
69 2017).

70 The Kyoto Protocol ultimately exempted India from legally binding emission reduction  
71 commitments, an outcome that India viewed as essential for protecting its socio-economic  
72 development priorities (Mohan, 2017). During this period, India also pushed for developed  
73 countries to take greater responsibility for climate action. Interestingly, while initially skeptical  
74 of market-based mechanisms, India reversed its position on the Clean Development Mechanism  
75 (CDM) in 2002, subsequently engaging actively with the mechanism for project funding and  
76 eventually hosting the second-largest number of CDM projects globally (Mohan, 2017).

### 77 **2. The Transition Period: Copenhagen to Cancun (2009-2010)**

78 The second phase of India's climate diplomacy, from 2005 to 2010, was characterized by  
79 transition and contestation. This period saw India demonstrate increased flexibility while  
80 simultaneously opposing moves to dilute the concept of differentiated responsibility (Sengupta,  
81 2019). India began putting forth voluntary commitments, signaling a shift from its earlier  
82 defensive posture while maintaining its core principles.

83 During this period, India showed willingness to undertake domestic climate action as a result of  
84 its changing economic status (Jha, 2022). This shift reflected India's recognition that its growing  
85 emissions and economic power necessitated a more proactive stance, even as it continued to  
86 advocate for the developmental needs of the Global South. The transition period demonstrated  
87 India's ability to balance its traditional advocacy for developing country interests with pragmatic  
88 engagement in the evolving climate regime.

### 89 **3. The Paris Agreement and Beyond (2015-Present)**

90 The third and most recent phase, from 2011 to 2015 and continuing through the Paris Agreement  
91 era, has been marked by significant compromise and strategic repositioning. India adapted to  
92 changing negotiation contours that pushed for more symmetrical treatment of developing and  
93 developed countries in matters of differentiation (Sengupta, 2019).

94 The months leading to the Paris Agreement in 2015 witnessed a notable shift in the tone and  
95 substance of India's approach to climate negotiations. Following the election of a new  
96 government in 2014, India embarked on a series of steps that recast the country as a progressive  
97 element in negotiations, moving from "obdurate negotiator" to "part of the solution" (Lavasa,  
98 2019). India's actions included the declaration of ambitious mitigation targets and successful  
99 public diplomacy measures (Lavasa, 2019).

100 At the Paris negotiations, India and other like-minded developing countries successfully  
101 negotiated to preserve their room for development and underscore the differentiation in  
102 responsibilities based on historical emissions (Lavasa, 2019). The Paris Agreement, as a result,  
103 reflects the delicate balance of positions between developing and developed nations, with India  
104 playing a crucial role in achieving this balance (Lavasa, 2019).

105 The post-Paris period has seen India continue to evolve its climate diplomacy. India has  
106 transitioned from a protest voice emphasizing CBDR, equity, and historical responsibility for  
107 developed nations, to actively shaping global efforts (Mohan, 2017). This evolution reflects a  
108 broader foreign policy shift towards global leadership and responsibility, with India accepting  
109 voluntary commitments and eventually submitting Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs)  
110 for clean energy, carbon intensity reduction, and carbon sinks (Mohan, 2017).

## 111 **India's Key Positions and Principles in Climate Negotiations**

112 India's engagement in global climate negotiations has been consistently guided by a set of core  
113 principles that reflect its developmental priorities, historical perspective, and vision for equitable  
114 climate action. These principles have remained remarkably consistent even as India's negotiating  
115 strategies have evolved over time.

### 116 **1. Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR)**

117 The principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) has been the cornerstone  
118 of India's climate diplomacy since the early days of international climate negotiations. India has  
119 played a key role in establishing and defending this principle, which recognizes that while all  
120 countries share responsibility for addressing climate change, developed countries bear greater  
121 responsibility due to their historical emissions and greater capacity to act (Jha, 2022), (Sengupta,  
122 2019).

123 India's negotiations at the United Nations Conference on Climate Change have been firmly based  
124 on "equity," "historical responsibility," and the "polluter pays" agenda (Zhang et al., 2023). The  
125 country has maintained this position even as negotiation dynamics have shifted toward more  
126 symmetrical treatment of developed and developing countries. India has shown flexibility in  
127 accepting voluntary commitments while steadfastly opposing moves to dilute the concept of  
128 differentiated responsibility (Sengupta, 2019).

129 The CBDR principle is not merely a negotiating tactic for India but reflects a fundamental  
130 understanding of climate justice. India has consistently pleaded that equity is an "inalienable and  
131 absolute right" within the UNFCCC framework. This principled stance has positioned India as a  
132 leading voice for developing countries in climate negotiations, even as it has demonstrated  
133 pragmatism in other aspects of its climate diplomacy.

## 134 **2. Climate Justice and Equity**

135 Closely related to CBDR, the concepts of climate justice and equity have been central to India's  
136 climate diplomacy. India has been a staunch advocate for climate justice within international  
137 relations, highlighting the tensions between economic development and environmental  
138 sustainability in its domestic and international climate strategies (Deepika, 2025).

139 India's emphasis on climate justice reflects its position that climate action must be equitable and  
140 must not compromise the developmental aspirations of countries that have contributed least to  
141 the problem. The country has argued that mobilizing climate finance for meeting the needs and  
142 priorities of developing countries must be founded on the principle of climate justice (Saryal,  
143 2025). This position underscores India's view that climate action cannot be divorced from  
144 broader questions of global equity and development justice.

145 The principle of equity extends to India's positions on various aspects of climate negotiations,  
146 including mitigation commitments, adaptation support, and financial mechanisms. India has  
147 consistently argued that equity must be the foundation for allocating responsibilities and  
148 resources in the global climate regime, ensuring that those who have contributed most to the  
149 problem and have the greatest capacity to act bear the primary burden of climate action.

## 150 **3. Historical Responsibility and the Polluter Pays Principle**

151 India's climate diplomacy has been fundamentally shaped by the principle of historical  
152 responsibility, which holds that developed countries should bear primary responsibility for  
153 climate action due to their historical emissions. This principle is closely linked to the "polluter  
154 pays" agenda that has been central to India's negotiating positions (Zhang et al., 2023).

155 The historical responsibility principle has several important implications for India's negotiating  
156 positions. First, it justifies India's demand that developed countries take the lead in emission

157 reductions and provide financial and technological support to developing countries. Second, it  
158 supports India's argument that developing countries should have greater flexibility in their  
159 climate commitments to allow for continued economic development and poverty alleviation.  
160 Third, it underpins India's position that any global climate framework must differentiate between  
161 the responsibilities of developed and developing countries.

162 India has maintained its stance on historical responsibility even as negotiation dynamics have  
163 evolved. At the Paris negotiations, India and other like-minded developing countries successfully  
164 negotiated to preserve their room for development and underscore the differentiation in  
165 responsibilities based on historical emissions (Lavasa, 2019). This achievement demonstrates  
166 India's continued commitment to the principle of historical responsibility and its ability to  
167 translate this principle into concrete negotiating outcomes.

168 The polluter pays principle, closely related to historical responsibility, has also been a consistent  
169 element of India's climate diplomacy. This principle holds that those who have caused  
170 environmental damage should bear the costs of addressing it. India has argued that this principle  
171 should guide the allocation of climate finance and the distribution of mitigation responsibilities  
172 in the global climate regime (Zhang et al., 2023).

## 173 **An Assessment of COP30 Outcomes Through India's Negotiation 174 Principles**

175 COP 30 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was held  
176 in Belem, Brazil, from 10 November to 21 November 2025. is designated as the Global Mutirão: Uniting humanity in a global mobilization against climate change. This significant event  
177 coincides with the tenth anniversary of the Paris Agreement. The Environment Minister of India  
178 has characterised this conference as the "COP of Implementation" and "COP of Delivery on  
179 Promises". In the following analysis, I have examined the global mutirão declaration through the  
180 lens of India's negotiation principles, specifically focusing on the concepts of Common but  
181 Differentiated Responsibilities, Equity, and Climate Justice.

### 183 **1. Equity and CBDR**

184 The "Global Mutirão" (collective efforts) initiative, as outlined in the declaration, aligns with the  
185 principles of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) and equity by explicitly  
186 integrating them into the framework for accelerating climate action and international  
187 cooperation. COP-30's emphasis on differentiated responsibilities, the protection of development  
188 space, and the need for finance and implementation aligns closely with India's traditional stance.  
189 India's public response framed COP-30 as delivering recognition of the disproportionate burden  
190 on vulnerable populations and as an incremental victory for climate justice. This alignment  
191 reinforces India's sustained role as a spokesperson for developing countries.

### 192 **2. Finance: Adaptation, Mitigation Support, and Loss & Damage**

193 India has long demanded scaled finance for adaptation and technology transfer. COP-30's call to  
194 substantially ramp up adaptation finance (tripling by 2035) and its pragmatic approaches to  
195 implementation respond to India's priorities on adaptation and support for vulnerable

196 populations. India explicitly welcomed these provisions and pushed for developed countries to  
197 deliver on finance pledges.

198 However, notable gaps remain. Analysts observed limited new, predictable, large-scale  
199 commitments for loss & damage and disappointment over the absence of immediate, substantial  
200 mitigation finance roadmaps. For India, these gaps reflect continued structural tensions: India  
201 insists on finance delivery before endorsing tighter mitigation obligations for developing  
202 countries. COP-30 moves adaptation finance forward but did not fully resolve India's long-  
203 standing demand for "trillions not billions" in guaranteed public finance.

### 204 **3. Mitigation Ambition and NDCs**

205 India's post-2014 diplomacy has included voluntary mitigation commitments and ambitious  
206 sectoral initiatives (e.g., renewables expansion). Yet India consistently resists externally imposed  
207 near-term net-zero timetables or binding targets that could constrain development. COP-30's  
208 focus on implementation and the Belém mission to boost ambition is politically palatable to India  
209 so long as implementation pathways respect development needs and finance flows. The final  
210 package did not impose immediate, legally binding mitigation escalators—thus aligning with  
211 India's preference for voluntary, nationally determined approaches. But the political pressure to  
212 "enable ambition" signals rising expectations that India will continue to raise its mitigation  
213 ambition—creating a strategic challenge.

### 214 **4. Just Transition Mechanism**

215 The establishment of a Just Transition mechanism at COP-30 is a notable convergence with  
216 India's domestic and international priorities. India has invoked just transition rhetorically—  
217 linking clean energy expansion with jobs, industrial policy, and energy access. The COP-30  
218 decision creates scope for India to shape global norms on industrial decarbonization that account  
219 for social protection, technology transfer, and finance—thus turning an area of potential  
220 contestation into a platform for India to assert leadership while protecting development space.  
221 India explicitly welcomed the mechanism.

### 222 **5. Loss & Damage and Implementation**

223 India has long advocated recognition and resources for countries disproportionately affected by  
224 climate impacts. COP-30 strengthened adaptation and implementation workstreams, but  
225 observers criticized the meeting for limited progress on predictable, large-scale loss & damage  
226 financing. India's acceptance of incremental implementation mechanisms aligns with its  
227 preference for practical, finance-backed measures. However, the slow pace on loss & damage  
228 funding remains a point of common concern for India and other developing countries.

## 229 **Conclusion**

230 COP-30's outcomes largely align with India's historical emphasis on equity, CBDR, and the  
231 primacy of finance and implementation. The conference advanced adaptation finance ambition,  
232 created a Just Transition mechanism, and launched implementation-oriented missions—things  
233 that India welcomed and which reflect long-standing demands. Yet COP-30 did not close the  
234 critical finance gap—especially for loss & damage, and while it established a Just transition  
235 mechanism, its finance was left open for the next Conference of the Parties.

236 India's engagement in climate negotiations has evolved significantly, positioning the nation as a  
237 pivotal player within the global climate governance framework. The insights gathered from the  
238 Conference of the Parties 30 (COP 30) underscore India's commitment to principles such as  
239 equity, Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR), and climate justice, which have  
240 consistently guided its diplomatic efforts. The outcomes of COP 30, including the emphasis on  
241 adaptation finance and the establishment of a Just Transition mechanism, align closely with  
242 India's historical advocacy and developmental priorities. However, challenges remain,  
243 particularly concerning the financing of loss and damage and the pressure for binding mitigation  
244 commitments. As India continues to navigate these complexities, its role will be crucial in  
245 shaping future climate action, particularly for the Global South, while balancing its  
246 developmental aspirations with the urgent need for effective climate responses.

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