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RESEARCH ARTICLE

**TRACING THE ROOTS OF JAMMU MASSACRE AND ITS IMPACTS ON THE
PRINCELY STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR**

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Abstract

The Jammu massacre of October-November 1947 is a critically overlooked episode of South Asian Partition violence. Unlike the widely studied Punjab and Bengal massacres, this targeted killing of Muslims in Jammu remains neglected in official and nationalist accounts. Drawing on archival documents, British administrative files, newspapers and survivor testimonies, this paper argues that the massacre, which claimed nearly 200,000 Muslim lives and displaced around 300,000, was a state-sponsored ethnic cleansing campaign, not an isolated event. The Dogra regime's disarmament of Muslims alongside arming Sikh and Hindu militants fueled communal tensions, enabling large-scale atrocities. The paper situates the Jammu violence within the broader context of the Rawalpindi massacres and the geopolitical shifts of the time, revealing how ethnic engineering reshaped Jammu and Kashmir's political landscape. By challenging dominant narratives, this study highlights the massacre's strategic motives and its enduring impact on the Kashmir conflict, bringing marginalized experiences to the forefront.

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Introduction:-

The river of politics was on the rise,
With Indians and Pakistanis hunting
Indians trapped the big fish,
Hurting Pakistan deep enough
Pakistan could get Chitral only¹,
That too after betting with their life!

Shad Kashmiri²

Shad Kashmiri, who was a cartoonist for Khidmat and the spokesperson of the National Conference, developed a poem in late 1947 that depicted the political disagreements regarding Kashmir's destiny during the subcontinent's partition. The poem's reference to the "big fish" relates to the Valley of Kashmir, which became the primary focus of India's and Pakistan's policy over Jammu and Kashmir (from now onwards J&K), in the year 1947. The poem draws attention to the paradox that the experiences of individuals from different parts of the state are mainly left out

¹ Chitral was a small independent state bordering the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir and it recognized the suzerainty of the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir. However, as an independent state, Chitral chose to accede to Pakistan in 1947, following the Partition of the subcontinent.

of the broader story of the Kashmir Partition. The acts of violence that afflicted Jammu province is often overlooked by official and nationalist narratives that highlight India and Pakistan's territorial conflicts over the Kashmir Valley. This violence has often been neglected in Indian nationalist histories of 1947, which focus more on the state's political history than the people's lived experiences.²

The August, 1947 was a defining event in the history of subcontinent, marked by massive displacement of around eighteen million people and a death toll estimated between 200,000 and 1 million.³ The J&K state also experienced significant upheaval, including widespread violence, demographic shifts and economic disruptions. The Jammu region served as an important case study of the massacres caused by partition and the challenges of rehabilitation. Despite its current economic significance, the post-partition developments in J&K remain under-researched. This study aims to address gaps in understanding the violence, its causes along with its consequences and impacts on J&K. It also shifts the focus from general accounts to a more localized perspective on partition history, contributing to the underexplored post-partition experiences in Jammu region. The research aims to address the imbalance in academic attention, which has often overlooked the Jammu massacre and to provide valuable insights. The article seeks to address these silenced aspects of Partition history, particularly the communal violence in Jammu and challenge prevailing official narratives. It emphasizes the overlooked experiences and tragic consequences of the Partition on J&K, advocating for a re-examination of the region's historical injustices.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT:-

At the time of Indian Partition 1947, J&K being largest princely state, was divided into three provinces: Frontier Province (Ladakh and Gilgit-Baltistan), Kashmir Province (Srinagar, Anantnag, Muzaffarabad and Baramulla) and the Province of Jammu (Jammu, Mirpur, Udhampur, Reasi, Poonch and Kathua). These culturally distinct regions were unified in post-1846 period, under the Treaty of Amritsar, transferring Kashmir and neighboring territories to Gulab Singh Dogra for Rs. 7,500,000 Nanakshahi (Sikh Currency).⁴ Dogra rule was marked by bigotry, sectarianism and despotism; the Jammu region was regarded as their homeland, while Kashmir Valley was treated as purchased property. The administration, rooted in Hindu customs, marginalized Muslims, altering place names and denying basic freedoms like speech, press and political association.

As a result, a significant political movement began in 1930s.⁵ Initially, the Young Men's Muslim Association (1909) of Chaudhary Ghulam Abbas (from now onwards Ghulam Abbas) was the only spokesperson of Muslims of state. Later on, Reading Room Party (established in 1920s at Fateh Kadal) grew in size and became popular. Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah (from now onward Sh. Abdullah), a young Muslim graduate of Ali Garh Muslim University, was elected its Secretary in 1930 who united Muslims from its forum.⁶ The proper political organization, the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, was founded in 1932. Its first president was Sh. Abdullah,⁷ its vice president was Sheikh Abdul Majeed and its general secretary was Ghulam Abbas.⁸ Every one of them contributed significantly to this new political movement. Jawaharlal Nehru's meeting with Sh. Abdullah in 1937 was a turning point and the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference was renamed as the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference (from now onwards NC) in 1939⁹, allowing non-Muslims to join the organization.¹⁰ This resulted in disagreements between Sh. Abdullah and Ghulam Abbas and the latter left the party. After leaving the NC, Ghulam Abbas resurrected the Muslim Conference (from now onwards MC) in 1941.¹¹ These events marked a significant turning point in the state's history. The transformation led to a closer association between the NC and the Indian

² Prem Shankar Jha, *Kashmir 1947: The Origins of a Dispute* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003), 31.

³ Yasmin Khan, *The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan* (London: Yale University Press, 2017), 12.

⁴ C. U. Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and Neighboring Countries* (Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1929), 21.

⁵ Muhammad Yusuf Saraf, *Kashmiris Fight for Freedom* (Lahore: Feroz Sons Ltd., 2005), 71.

⁶ Najma Zahoor, "Political Activities in Jammu and Kashmir (1846-1946)", *International Journal of Trend in Scientific Research and Development*, vol. 4, no. 4 (2020): 1572-1576.

⁷ Arsheed Ahmad Ganie and M. Deivam, "The Era of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah in Jammu and Kashmir Politics," *Asia Pacific Journal of Research*, vol. 1, no. 37 (2016): 115-120.

⁸ Zahoor, "Political Activities in Jammu and Kashmir (1846-1946)", 1574.

⁹ Syed Taffazull Hussain, *Sheikh Abdullah-A Biography: The Crucial Period 1905-1939* (Indiana: Wordclay Publishers, 2009), 317.

¹⁰ Sheikh Abdullah, *Flames of the Chinar* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1993), 34.

¹¹ Zahoor, "Political Activities in Jammu and Kashmir (1846-1946)", 1574.

National Congress (from now onwards Congress), exposing it to the political fluctuations of the subcontinent, a development that had been anticipated and opposed by Ghulam Abbas.¹² This decision can be viewed as one of the key factors contributing to the ongoing Kashmir dispute.

The Congress had taken an aggressive stance over Kashmir, acknowledging the geopolitical importance of the territory. Mr. Webb, the British Resident Officer in Kashmir, observed in 1946 that Nehru had already developed his Kashmir policy.¹³ In his fortnightly report of July 31, 1946, Webb mentions about Nehru's visit to Kashmir which was not successful. Sh. Abdullah was in jail and agitations and disturbances led to chaos and disruption in the capital. State used strict measures to tackle the situation and Nehru had to leave Srinagar.¹⁴ Nehru's interest in Kashmir stemmed from its strategic significance, bordering the USSR, China, Afghanistan, Pakistan and securing India's vulnerable northwest. Its accession as a Muslim-majority region aligned with his vision of secular nationalism, countering communal divisions in India.¹⁵ Nehru urged Mountbatten that Kashmir's future was with India's Constituent Assembly thus warning of serious consequences if pushed toward Pakistan.¹⁶ Given the Kashmir's strategic importance, Nehru attempted to persuade Maharaja Hari Singh to join India.

In 1947, Hindu Maharajas and Congress president Kripalani visited Kashmir.¹⁷ The Hindu Maharajas of subcontinent and Kripalani sought to influence Maharaja Hari Singh's accession to India. Fortnightly report of January 15, 1946, written by British Resident Officer at Srinagar indicating about the visit of Nawab of Bhopal and his meeting with Maharaja Hari Singh and Pandit Kak, the Prime Minister of J&K in Jammu.¹⁸ Fearing his alignment with Pakistan, Nehru sent Gandhi due to the Maharaja Hari Singh's hostility.¹⁹ The fortnightly report of April 15, 1947 sent by W.F. Webb, the British Resident Officer to the Political Department New Delhi, mentioned about the visit of Gandhi. He wrote that Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad requested Gandhi to visit Kashmir while hearing about his visit to Punjab.²⁰ Gandhi's visit, though presented as apolitical, was politically timed, with meetings involving Patel, Mountbatten and Nehru revealing its political intent. Gandhi urged the Maharaja Hari Singh to avoid declaring independence.²¹

Kashmir's political shift followed the replacement of R.C. Kak by Mahajan, whose pro-India stance shaped the region's direction. Shahid Hamid noted that Gandhi's visit aimed to pressurise Maharaja Hari Singh for Indian accession and Kak's removal.²² After Mahajan's appointment, Kashmir strengthened ties with India, with officials frequently engaging with Nehru and Patel. Communication with the Muslim League and Jinnah was minimal. Patel was directly consulted on military appointments and efforts were made to connect the state to India through communication infrastructure.²³ Nehru prioritized releasing Sh. Abdullah, viewing him as crucial for Kashmir's alignment with India. On May 14, 1948, Indira Gandhi noted that Sh. Abdullah was confident of winning the

¹² Hussain, *Sheikh Abdullah-A Biography*, 310-331.

¹³ Alastair Lamb, *Birth of a Tragedy: Kashmir 1947* (Hertingfordbury: Roxford Books, 1994), 71.

¹⁴ W. F. Webb, "Fortnightly Report from the Resident Officer of Kashmir to L. C. L. Griffin, Secretary to H. E. the Crown Representative", *Political Department*, no. F.6-C/46, New Delhi, July 31, 1946 (Islamabad: National Documentation Wing, Microfilm Holdings).

¹⁵ S. Gopal, *Nehru: An Anthology* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1981), 112.

¹⁶ Alastair Lamb, *Kashmir a Disputed Legacy, 1846-1990* (Hertfordshire: Roxford Books, 1991), 44.

¹⁷ Joseph Korbel, *Danger in Kashmir* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1954), 81.

¹⁸ W. F. Webb, "Fortnightly Report from the Resident Officer of Kashmir to C.G. Herbert, Secretary to H. E. the Crown Representative", *Political Department*, no. F.6-C/46, New Delhi, January 15, 1946 (Islamabad: National Documentation Wing, Microfilm Holdings).

¹⁹ Ajit Bhattacharjea, *Kashmir: The Wounded Valley* (New Delhi: UBS Publishers Distributors, 1994), 109.

²⁰ W. F. Webb, "Fortnightly Report from the Resident Officer of Kashmir to L. C. L. Griffin, Secretary to H. E. the Crown Representative", *Political Department*, no. F.6-C/47, New Delhi, April 15, 1947 (Islamabad: National Documentation Wing, Microfilm Holdings).

²¹ Sanaullah Bhat, *Kashmir in Flames: An Untold Story of Kashmir's Political Affairs* (Srinagar: Ali Mohammad & Sons, 1981), 92.

²² Victoria Schofield, *Kashmir in Conflict: India Pakistan and the Unending War* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2003), 32.

²³ Durga Das, *Sardar Patel's Correspondence* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Press, 1971).

plebiscite.²⁴ On September 27, Nehru asked Patel to urge the Maharaja Hari Singh to release Sh. Abdullah and prioritize Kashmir's accession to India.²⁵ Mr. Webb in his fortnightly report of June 15, 1946, mentions about Sh. Abdullah's trial and Nehru's urging Maharaja Hari Singh to release Sh. Abdullah. He also mentions about Nehru's telegram to Maharaja Hari Singh telling him about his visit to Srinagar which was refused by Maharaja.²⁶

Sh. Abdullah was released on September 29, 1947 while MC leaders like Ghulam Abbas, guilty of lesser crimes, remained imprisoned.²⁷ Sh. Abdullah, out of touch with state developments, called for freedom before accession and upheld the people will at October 2, 1947 rally in Srinagar.²⁸ In 1947, he criticized the Two-Nation theory but remained ambiguous on Kashmir's future. He supported Nehru while subtly criticizing Jinnah, spending October in Delhi and disconnected from local sentiment. The Muslim League assumed Kashmir would join Pakistan, as implied by the acronym "Pakistan."²⁹ Jinnah was confident that Kashmir would fall into his lap like a ripe fruit.³⁰ The All India Muslim League's stance on Kashmir shifted from supporting independence to advocating for Pakistan's accession.

Jinnah urged Maharaja Hari Singh to take Kashmir's demography into account, but he remained unresponsive until July 11, 1947. Sh. Abdullah insisted on freedom before accession.³¹ The Muslim League's unresponsiveness to Kashmir was a mistake, as it failed to match Nehru's engagement with Sh. Abdullah, who opposed Pakistan's feudalism and sought *Naya Kashmir* manifesto.³² The political situation of J&K remained uncertain till 1947. In 1947, Maharaja Hari Singh faced a dilemma regarding J&K's future. His reign was characterized by oppressive policies, especially toward Muslims and there were differences between Maharaja Hari Singh and Muslim leaders especially Sh. Abdullah and Ghulam Abbas.³³ The Maharaja's choice to join India, disregarding the Muslim majority and Pakistan's claims, led to the Kashmir dispute, which resulted in migration and unrest following the British withdrawal.³⁴ Before going into detail of the massacre, occurred in Jammu, there is a need to look into the causes and factors that were linked to Jammu massacre.

Jammu and Rawalpindi: Interconnected Massacres:-

The 1947 violence in Jammu is linked to earlier unrest, notably the March 1947 violence in West Punjab. Pre and post-partition, Rawalpindi was a major metropolitan area in Punjab, with nine million Muslims and two million non-Muslims residing in Multan and Rawalpindi.³⁵ From March 4 to 6, 1947, riots erupted between Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus, fueled by tensions from the previous year's provincial elections. Following the collapse of Khizer Hayat Tiwana's Unionist government on March 2, mass agitation escalated into violence, starting in Lahore and quickly spreading to Rawalpindi, Multan and Attock.³⁶ More than five thousands Sikhs and Hindus were killed by the middle of March 1947 and fifty thousands had fled. Armored trucks were deployed in response. The Rawalpindi massacre fueled demands for Punjab's division and India's partition. By April, non-Muslims from western Punjab, including Rawalpindi, began migrating to Kashmir.³⁷ March violence was initiated by Muslims³⁸ in which about

²⁴ Sonia Gandhi, *Two Alone, Two Together: Letters between Indira Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, 1922-64* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2004), 517.

²⁵ P. N. Chopra, *Thematic Volumes on Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel: Kashmir and Hyderabad* (Delhi: Konark Publishers, 2002), 71.

²⁶ W. F. Webb, "Fortnightly Report from the Resident Officer of Kashmir to L. C. L. Griffin, Secretary to H. E. the Crown Representative", *Political Department*, no. F.6-C/46, New Delhi, June 15, 1946 (Islamabad: National Documentation Wing, Microfilm Holdings).

²⁷ Lord Birdwood, *Two Nations and Kashmir* (Srinagar: Gulshan Books, 2005), 81.

²⁸ Sheikh Abdullah, *Flames of the Chinar* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1993), 152.

²⁹ Christopher Snedden, *Understanding Kashmir and Kashmiris* (London: Hurst and Company, 2015), 101.

³⁰ Chaudhary Muhammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 52.

³¹ Abdullah, *Flames of the Chinar*, 117.

³² *Ibid.*, 144.

³³ N.S. Sarila, *The Shadow of the Great Game: The Untold Story of India's Partition* (New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers, 2005), 347.

³⁴ Sumantra Bose, *Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2003), 51.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 733.

³⁶ Ilyas Chatta, "Terrible Fate: 'Ethnic Cleansing' of Jammu Muslims in 1947," *Journal of Pakistan Vision*, vol. 10, no. 1 (2009): 117-140.

³⁷ "Refugees Flock into Kashmir", *The Times* (London), March 14, 1947, 3.

2,263 people were killed in riots across areas like Raja Bazar, Kalyan Das Mandar and Taxila.³⁹ The Rawalpindi violence led to mass abductions, forced conversions and high casualties, prompting Sikh and Hindu migration to Eastern Punjab. By April 1947, eighty thousands refugees had reached Delhi and UP.

The violence surpassed earlier unrest in Calcutta and Bihar, uniting Sikhs and Hindus against Muslims, with Sikh leaders urging emulation of Guru Gobind Singh's bravery. The Jat Sikh Singh Sabha gained prominence in west Punjab⁴⁰ and according to *The London Times*; Muslims were wiped out from the Punjab.⁴¹ The Rawalpindi violence led to the eviction of Muslims from East Punjab to Pakistan. Following the migration of Sikhs to Patiala, Master Tara Singh and Akali leaders supported Congress's plan to divide Punjab.⁴² The August 1947 Partition of India confirmed the warning of *Pakistan Times* (July 17, 1947), which predicted that an unfair partition would lead to civil war in India.⁴³ Within days of the Partition, Punjab saw massive violence, with widespread massacres and killings resembling wartime conflict. By September 1947, *The London Times* reported four million migrants. By October, over 570,000 Muslims crossed into Pakistan, while 471,000 non-Muslims moved in the opposite direction. On October 1, around 80,000 Muslim refugees were in Delhi's Purana Qila, with more in other camps. In November, a British official observed a 10-mile-long column of Muslim evacuees in Mewat.⁴⁴ The communal disturbances in west Punjab from March 1947, including Rawalpindi, Amritsar, Ferozepur, Patiala and Jullundur are closely connected to the violence in Jammu from August to November 1947.⁴⁵

The fortnightly report of March 31, 1947 by Mr. Webb (the British Resident Officer in Kashmir) depicts the disturbances in J&K state due to the violence in Punjab. Webb mentions about several agitations at the incidents in North West Frontier Province (from now onwards NWFP) and the riots in Punjab which were highlighted by the local newspapers. He comments about the burning of two villages ten miles away from Kohala. As a result, the state authorities put restrictions on press and safety measures were adopted by dispatching troops to Kohala. The officers on leave were called back and Srinagar-Rawalpindi road was closed for security purposes. Webb mentions about Sh. Abdullah's effort to form peace committees in the State. He states about the arrival of one thousand refugees from NWFP and Punjab due to riots. The report also highlights an incident that was occurred between Muslim and Hindu students of Wales College of Jammu causing the death of three students.⁴⁶

The state of J&K, particularly Jammu, had strong historical ties with West Pakistan. The Jhelum Valley Road, linking Rawalpindi to Srinagar, became a crucial all-weather route by 1890. By 1922, Jammu was connected by rail to Sialkot, Punjab, with trains linking to the broader Indian railway network facilitating regional connectivity.⁴⁷ Visitors to J&K had three motorable routes: the 196-mile Jhelum Valley Road from Rawalpindi, the 71 mile route from Havelian via Abbottabad to Muzaffarabad and the Banihal Pass road, which covers 203 miles from Jammu to Srinagar.⁴⁸ Jammu's ties with West Punjab facilitated the migration of non-Muslims, who fled to Jammu and other regions amid violence, hoping to return once violence ended.⁴⁹

Hindu and Sikh migrants to Kashmir spread stories of violence, fueling demands for revenge. Refugee accounts of violence fueled animosities, leading to revenge plots and anti-Muslim pamphlets. The inflammatory literature and accounts of Muslim aggression led to a terror campaign against Jammu's Muslim population.⁵⁰ The Muslim

³⁸ Sumera and Kashif, "History and Memory of the Partition of the Punjab", 736.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 740.

⁴⁰ Gyanendra Pandey, *Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism and History in India* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 24.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 25.

⁴² Pandey, *Remembering Partition*, 32.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 34.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 36

⁴⁵ Chatta, "Terrible Fate", 121.

⁴⁶ W. F. Webb, "Fortnightly Report from the Resident Officer of Kashmir to L. C. L. Griffin, Secretary to H. E. the Crown Representative", *Political Department*, no. F.6-C/47, New Delhi, March 31, 1947 (Islamabad: National Documentation Wing, Microfilm Holdings).

⁴⁷ Snedden, *Understanding Kashmir and Kashmiris*, 25.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 34.

⁴⁹ Chatta, "Terrible Fate", 121.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 122.

community in Jammu suffered tremendously in September and October of 1947, as a result of the earlier upheavals in West Punjab and they suffered from widespread disorder and anguish from mid-August to November of the same year.⁵¹ Historians note that thousands of Muslims were killed in Jammu, following a campaign by Maharaja Hari Singh, supported by his army, anti-Muslim groups and RSS.⁵²

Polarized Politics in Jammu:-

The religious and administrative makeups of Jammu claims 200,000-Muslims massacre. Maharaja Hari Singh was subjective toward India by leaders like Gandhi, Nehru and Patel feared losing power. In the meanwhile, a large number of Muslims in the frontier districts and Jammu favored Pakistan. In Poonch, a 1947 revolt by pro-Pakistan Muslims led to the resistance movement against Hari Singh's rule. Muslims in Gilgit rebelled against the Maharaja, seeking to join Pakistan, with Pakistan soon taking administrative control. In contrast, Kashmir Valley's Muslims, influenced by Sh. Abdullah's secularism and ties to India, were less enthusiastic about Pakistan. Many leaned towards India or independence, with political activity centered in Srinagar, the state's summer capital. Jammu Province's political leanings were influenced by Hindu-majority districts like Jammu, Udhampur and Kathua, which bordered India. Jammu District, home to the Maharaja and Dogra community, was key region due to its population and proximity to Punjab, facilitating refugee movement after partition.⁵³ Kathua, bordering Pathankot in Punjab, was strategically important after partition, as Pathankot's inclusion to India provided an easy route to Jammu. This might have been influenced by nearby districts having Hindu majority. The majority of the Muslims of Jammu Province resided in the districts in the west of Jammu, such as Reasi, Poonch and Mirpur. They had close ties with west Punjab and wanted to join Pakistan. In contrast, the Hindu-majority eastern districts closely aligned with the pro-India elements. Moreover, Maharaja's disarming of Muslims spread tensions. The inefficient leadership from pro-Pakistan figures like Ghulam Abbas allowed anti-Muslim groups to target Muslims in these areas.

Poonch Revolt:

In 1947, Maharaja Hari Singh sought Kashmir's accession to India, despite popular support for Pakistan. He repressed dissent, demobilized Muslim soldiers and dismissed Muslim police officers. There was a great deal of hostility after the Maharaja overthrew the Raja of Poonch in April, 1947 and imposed high levies which were collected by force.⁵⁴ Resistance began in Muslim-majority areas, especially Poonch, where reports of persecution and mass killings of Muslims emerged.⁵⁵ The well-armed people of Poonch, trained during WWII, revolted after being forced to surrender their weapons, which were given to Dogras and Sikhs. The Dogra troops suppressed the revolt violently, burning villages and committing abductions and rapes.⁵⁶ The people of Poonch, believed to support Pakistan, prompted Maharaja Hari Singh to impose martial law to suppress pro-Pakistan sentiments.⁵⁷ The violence in Kashmir led to a mass Muslim migration, fueling anger in Punjab and sparking jihad by 20,000 Pashtun tribesmen, who joined Muslim to rally Poonch peasants. Poonch's Muslims were extremely comparable to those of the NWFP in terms of history, geography, family, ethnicity, economy and religion.⁵⁸ By October 1947, tribesmen had captured towns, massacred civilians and advanced towards Srinagar.⁵⁹ Rumors circulated that Pakistan's army supported these raids.⁶⁰ The tribals and local resistance in Poonch and Mirpur led to a revolt against Dogra rule, declaring Azad Kashmir on October 24, 1947. Maharaja Hari Singh fled from Srinagar two days later.⁶¹ He sought Indian military aid, agreeing to accession on October 26, 1947, with the condition of a special Kashmir status.⁶² The tribal invasion led to J&K's accession, similar to the Treaty of Amritsar, with decisions made by rulers, not the

⁵¹ *Inqilab* (Lahore), May 2, 1947, 3.

⁵² Chatta, "Terrible Fate", 117-140.

⁵³ Christopher Snedden, "What Happened to Muslims in Jammu? Local Identity, the Massacre of 1947 and the Roots of the Kashmir Problem", *Journal of South Asian Studies*, vol. 24, no. 2 (2001): 111-134.

⁵⁴ P. Dewan, *History of Kashmir* (New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2008), 147.

⁵⁵ *The Times* (London), September 8, 1947, 4.

⁵⁶ Safer Ahmad Bhat, "Jammu and Kashmir on the Eve of Partition: A Study of Political Conditions," *South Asian Studies*, vol. 32, no. 2 (2020): 285-296.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 293.

⁵⁸ Bhat, "Jammu & Kashmir on the Eve of Partition", 293.

⁵⁹ S. R. Hussain, "Resolving the Kashmir Dispute: Blending Realism with Justice", *The Pakistan Development Review*, vol. 48, no. 4 (2009): 1007-1035.


⁶⁰ "Kashmir Rebels Attacked by Aircrafts", *The Times* (London), October 31, 1947, 4.

⁶¹ Hussain, "Resolving the Kashmir Dispute", 1007-1035.

⁶² Dewan, *History of Kashmir*, 153.

people.⁶³ The freedom fighters besieged Kotli and Poonch, carrying out brutal killings, particularly targeting prominent traders and encouraging looting.⁶⁴ Krishna Mehta recounts her time in Muzaffarabad during the tribal raids, where rebels confronted her husband and shot him dead when he was identified as a Hindu.⁶⁵ Within two months, thousands of Hindus and Sikhs fled to Kashmir, with many dying in the mountains. In January 1951, 250 former Dogra workers and the remaining 900 refugees returned to Amritsar.⁶⁶ Additionally, Colonel D.O. Dykes and his spouse, both were targeted by Muslim rebels.⁶⁷ The uprising in Poonch region and violence in Jammu, led to ethnic cleansing, displacement and abductions. Kashmir Valley, despite a Muslim majority, remained untouched, with people advocating for *ittehad*.⁶⁸

Map 1: Pre-Partition Jammu and Kashmir⁶⁹



⁶³ W.W. Baker, *Kashmir: Happy Valley, Valley of Death* (USA: Defenders Publications, 1994), 23.

⁶⁴ "Reinforcement for State Troops: City Panic", *The Times* (London), October 28, 1947, 4.

⁶⁵ Krishna Mehta, *Kashmir 1947: A Survivor's Story* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2005), 7.

⁶⁶ "Civil and Military Gazette", (Lahore), January 16, 1951, 5.

⁶⁷ Ian Talbot and Darshan Singh Tatla, *Epicer of Violence: Partition, Voices and Memories from Amritsar* (Delhi: Permanent Black, 2006), 33.

⁶⁸ Dewan, *History of Kashmir*, 148.

⁶⁹ Snedden, "What happened to Muslims in Jammu?", 112.

Map 2: Post-Partition Jammu and Kashmir⁷⁰



A Systematic Extermination of Muslims to Alter the Demographics of Jammu:

The events unfolded in Jammu district between October and November 1947 are far from a myth or a product of imagination. The massacre documented by renowned scholars Alastair Lamb, Victoria Schofield and Christopher Snedden, is also supported by Mahatma Gandhi's statements. Gandhi praised Sh. Abdullah for handling the situation, uniting Hindus and Sikhs, despite the violence and urging for reconciliation.⁷¹

Survivor Amanullah Khan Naqshbandi recounted how Muslims were deceived into boarding convoys for Pakistan. On November 5, 1947, the first convoy was massacred. The second convoy, including Naqshbandi and his family, was ambushed after a wrong turn, resulting in the loss of 17 family members.⁷² Muslims in Jammu were not the only victims; attackers also crossed into Pakistan, killing 1,700 people. Pakistan had about 100,000 refugees in Sialkot. Alastair Lamb criticized the authorities regarding the mishaps in the Jammu & Kashmir, noting that Pakistan failed to use them effectively in the Kashmir dispute.⁷³ The efforts to alter J&K's demographic composition, currently pursued by the RSS-BJP government, are believed to have started with the Jammu massacre.⁷⁴ In 1947, J&K's area was 84,471 square miles, with a population of 4 million comprising of 77% Muslims, 20% Hindus and 3% Sikhs.⁷⁵ After the 1947 massacre and migration, Muslims, originally 61% of the population in 1941, became a minority.

The Hindu Dogra Princely State sought to alter Jammu's demographics by expelling its Muslim population. This is evident in the 1961 Indian Census, which recorded a sharp decline in Jammu's Muslim population, from 37%

⁷⁰ Snedden, "What happened to Muslims in Jammu?", 112.

⁷¹ A.G. Noorani, "Why Jammu Erupts," *Frontline*, September 25, 2008.

⁷² "Amanullah Khan's Heart-Wrenching Account of the Jammu Massacre of 1947", November 6, 2019.

⁷³ Alastair Lamb, *Birth of a Tragedy: Kashmir 1947* (Hertingfordbury: Roxford Books, 1994), 69.

⁷⁴ Saeed Naqvi, "The Killing Fields of Jammu: How Muslims Become a Minority in the Region", (July 10, 2016).

⁷⁵ Saira Kazmee, Azhar Ahmad, Muhammad Umer Hayat, Asim Muneeb Khan and Beenish Ambereen, "Systematic Changes in Demographic Composition of Jammu And Kashmir by India and Its Implications for the Resolution of Kashmir Conflict," *Ilkogretim Online*, vol. 20, no. 5 (2021): 2568-2577.

(158,630) in 1941 to 10% (51,690) in 1961. Kathua district witnessed a nearly 50% decrease and 123 villages were entirely depopulated. Evidence of state-led demographic alteration is reflected in a reported conversation with Mehr Chand Mahajan, J&K's Prime Minister. When asked about achieving parity post-power transfer, Mahajan referenced Muslim bodies in the Ramnagar reserve, implying that the population ratio could similarly be altered.⁷⁶

State-Sanctioned Massacre:

The Maharaja Hari Singh provided the firearms to Sikhs and Hindus and disarmed the Muslims in Jammu in the second half of August, 1947. Muslims from Poonch region and Mirpur, who opposed Maharaja Hari Singh's pro-Indian views, collected weapons in the middle of 1947 from NWFP, the province of Pakistan. In order to defend their families and demand that J&K be granted accession to Pakistan, former skilled WWII soldiers organized an uprising that resulted in the creation of the Azad State of J&K on October 24, 1947. In response of the Poonch revolt, Pashtun tribes entered Kashmir on October 22, 1947. Fearing loss of control, Maharaja Hari Singh sought Indian help on October 26, agreeing to accede to India. The Indian Army intervened on October 27, pushing back the freedom fighters and Azad Army to regain control of J&K. In May 1948, Pakistan joined the conflict to aid the Azad Army, escalating into a full-scale war. The conflict ended with UN-brokered ceasefire on January 1, 1949. J&K was split between the newly formed states of India and Pakistan after 1947, leading to significant demographic and administrative changes on both sides of Kashmir.

Unparalleled Carnage: Jammu Massacre Surpasses Punjab in Brutality:-

The 1947 Jammu massacre was more tragic than the Punjab violence. In the period between August and November, 10.2 million people moved, with 4.4 million Hindus and Sikhs moved to India and 5.8 million Muslims headed to Pakistan. Many people were murdered, kidnapped or perished from various circumstances during the migration in 1947. According to an estimate, at least 100,000 Muslims died from severe injuries, while 237,000 Muslims were either slaughtered or forced to leave Jammu. Horace Alexander in *The Spectator* stated about 200,000 Muslims with tacit approval from state authorities were killed. Although it is less than the number of deaths in Punjab, the estimated 200,000 people who died in Jammu during the 1947 unrest is a considerable number in relation to the local population. Between 200,000 and about 100,000 inhabitants of Jammu are thought to have been massacred as a result of religious violence and migration; Nehru officially mentioned 20,000 to 30,000 deaths in Punjab.⁸⁰

Voices from the Margins: Jammu Muslim Survivor' Stories of Resilience:-

In October-November 1947, the Dogra army, RSS and Akalis carried out a brutal killing spree against Muslims in Jammu, with Sikhs parading the streets with swords.⁷⁷ In her book, Victoria Schofield quotes Ian Stephens, editor of *The Statesman*, who described how, from August, a brutal campaign wiped out nearly 500,000 Muslims in the region. About 200,000 disappeared, likely killed, died from disease or succumbed to exposure, while the rest fled to West Punjab.⁷⁸

As refugees from western Pakistan arrived in Jammu, the Muslim population faced growing danger. By late 1947, around 160,000 refugees had fled, mostly from Rawalpindi and nearby areas.⁷⁹ About one million Sikh and Hindu refugees from west Punjab particularly from Sialkot, which is intimately associated with Jammu, came to Jammu as violence increased following the announcement of the Punjab boundary award. Many had cultural ties to the Dogra people of both regions. By mid-September, Jammu hosted 65,000 refugees from western Punjab.⁸⁰ The British Resident Officer in J&K mentions in his fortnightly report of April 30, 1947 about the arrival of massive Hindu and Sikh refugees in J&K. He reported to the British Political Department at New Delhi about the communal tension (between Hindus and Muslims) erupted in Jammu due to the tensions on NWFP and Punjab border.⁸¹

⁷⁶ Anuradha Bhasin Jamwal, "Prejudice in Paradise", *Communalism Combat*, vol. 11 (January, 2005): 104.

⁷⁷ Sankara Narayana, "The Untold Story of Jammu Massacre," *Clarion India*, February 18, 2023.

⁷⁸ Victoria Schofield, *Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War* (London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2003), 43.

⁷⁹ "Tribal Hazards in the Border Territory", *The Times* (London), January 26, 1948, 5.

⁸⁰ J. K. Rady, "Mass Killings of Muslims in Jammu Province", *Nawa-i-Waqt* (Lahore), October 29, 1947, 3.

⁸¹ W. F. Webb, "Fortnightly Report from the Resident Officer of Kashmir to L. C. L. Griffin, Secretary to H. E. the Crown Representative", *Political Department*, no. F.6-C/47, New Delhi, April 30, 1947 (Islamabad: National Documentation Wing, Microfilm Holdings).

The arrival of refugees heightened communal tensions, with refugees sharing distressing accounts of Muslim atrocities, widely reported by the press and state media.⁸² A Hindu newspaper in Jammu incited communal hatred, claiming a Dogra could kill 200 Muslims. This rhetoric fueled violence and the exodus of Muslims. In October, Dogra refugees, aided by state officials with armed and ammunition joined by Sikh deserters and Akalis, started attacking Muslims.⁸³ The fortnightly report of February 28, 1947 of British Resident Officer, Mr. Webb mentions about several meetings of Akali Dal in Jammu and their urge for massive enrollment of Sikh volunteers to strengthen the organization.⁸⁴ On January 12, 1948, According to the Daily Telegraph, in order to establish Sikh territory, make up for losses in Pakistan and establish the groundwork for a future Khalistan, refugees migrated from west Punjab seized those properties which were possessed by Muslims, before starting the October killings.⁸⁵ The fortnightly report of May 31, 1947 by Mr. Webb is indicating about the communal unrest of Jammu owing to the tensions in the Punjab.⁸⁶ The 1947 Muslim massacre in Jammu, fueled by state-sponsored demographic changes, exposed the region's divisions. In 1941, eastern Jammu had 619,000 non-Muslims and 411,000 Muslims. North of the Chenab River, Muslims were the majority, making the region prone to violence during crises, as noted by Leo Kuper.⁸⁷

Table 1: Composition of Population in Jammu and Kashmir, 1941⁸⁸

Districts	Strength	Hindus %	Muslims %
Udhampur	2.94217 Lacs	56	-
Mirpur	3.86655 Lacs	-	81
Kathua	1.77672 Lacs	74	-
Jammu	4.31362 Lacs	58	36
Reasi	2.57903 Lacs	-	68
Pooch Jagir	4.21828 Lacs	-	10

In September 1947, Jammu witnessed severe destruction targeting Muslims in areas like Ustad da Mohalla and Pathanan da Mohalla. Hundreds of Gujars were killed and Raipur village was burnt, illustrating ethnic cleansing through killings and forced displacements.⁸⁹ Half of Jammu's Muslim population had left by mid-September 1947 and by November; many Jammu refugees had fled to West Punjab.⁹⁰ The state troops, aided by state officials, equipped local groups like the RSS to attack Muslims. G.K. Reddy of Kashmir Times reported witnessing armed mobs, supported by troops, killing Muslims.⁹¹ Authorities replaced Muslim soldiers with Hindus, disarmed Muslim personnel and the Maharaja of Patiala sent weapons and Sikh Brigade troops to J&K.⁹²

Many of the victims witnessed the presence of Patiala brigade in J&K since October 1947. Muhammad Yusuf Saraf's memoirs⁹³ state that by October 10, 1947, around 2,000 Muslims were forced to migrate to Sialkot, with the

⁸² J. K. Rady, "Mass Killings of Muslims in Jammu Province", *Nawa-i-Waqt* (Lahore), 29 October, 1947, 3.

⁸³ "The Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence for the Week Ending of August, 1947", 612, Islamabad: NIHCR.

⁸⁴ W. F. Webb, "Fortnightly Report from the Resident Officer of Kashmir to L. C. L. Griffin, Secretary to H. E. the Crown Representative", *Political Department*, no. F.6-C/47, New Delhi, February, 28, 1947 (Islamabad: National Documentation Wing, Microfilm Holdings).

⁸⁵ *Daily Telegraph* (London), January 12, 1948.

⁸⁶ W. F. Webb, "Fortnightly Report from the Resident Officer of Kashmir to L. C. L. Griffin, Secretary to H. E. the Crown Representative", *Political Department*, no. F.6-C/47, New Delhi, May 31, 1947 (Islamabad: National Documentation Wing, Microfilm Holdings).

⁸⁷ *Pakistan Times* (Lahore), September 19, 1947.

⁸⁸ "Elimination of Muslims from Jammu", Part II, *The Times* (London), August 10, 1948, 5.

⁸⁹ *Pakistan Times* (Lahore), September 19, 1947.

⁹⁰ *Nawa-i-Waqt* (Lahore), November 20, 1947, 6.

⁹¹ *Nawa-i-Waqt* (Lahore), October 29, 1947, 2.

⁹² Thana Shakargarh, "Sialkot District Police Record", FIR no. 179, November 28, 1947.

⁹³ Muhammad Yusuf Saraf was the writer and Chief Justice of Azad Jammu and Kashmir High Court.

state administration sealing the border. Mian Iftikharuddin, the Punjab Rehabilitation Minister, requested Brigadier Collier to visit Jammu to assess the situation, but he was denied access by Brigadier Rawat. Meanwhile, training centers for Hindus to use firearms were established in Jammu, including those at Vaid Mandir, Ragunath Mandir, Talab Rani, Pucca Danga and Gurdwara Pucci Dhakki, all run by retired Hindu military officers.⁹⁴ Ex-soldiers were armed with 303 rifles and 50 rounds of ammunition as the massacre began in Samba and Kathua, following similar tactics across other areas, indicating a coordinated effort. The state appeared to be working to create a Jammu region having Hind majority. The Maharaja Hari Singh, as witnessed by Akbar Ali Haidri and Wazir Ali, initiated violence in Deva Vatala, killing three Gujjars. Dogra troops conducted random firing near the border to drive Muslims into Jammu city, while women were abducted, properties looted and roads filled with dead bodies.⁹⁵ Muslims in Muhalla Ustad escaped due to Colonel Pir Muhammad Khan's intervention. Dogra soldiers, supported by Patiala forces, set up posts across key areas in Jammu. Muslims attempting to flee were killed. Despite resistance led by Captain Mian Nasiruddin and Ch. Muhammad Sharif in Urdu Bazar, military forces attacked 300 refugees, killing all males and abducting women. Within days, Muhallas Dalpatian, Mastgarh, Talab Khatikaan and Bazar Qasabaan were cleared of Muslims.

The house of Sardar Akram was raided and many men, women and children were killed.⁹⁶ On October 14, 1947, the RSS and Akalis attacked villages in Bishna, Jammu, killing Muslims, looting and burning homes. District Inspector Mian Said Ali arrested 30 Hindu dacoits and sought protection amid Sanghi attacks. On October 17, ASP Pandit Kailash Nath Bhakri, accompanied by a photographer, took Said Ali to the border, where he saw Muslim homes burning. Despite informing the IGP, no action was taken. Similar attacks occurred on October 19 in Muhalla Ustad, on October 20 in Akhnour and on October 23 in Miran Sahib.⁹⁷ On October 21, 1947, the Maharaja Hari Singh and Prime Minister, Mahajan oversaw the execution of the genocide plan in Rajpura, providing arms and ammunition. Mahajan praised extremists for their actions. State forces and Sanghis (RSS) attacked convoys of Muslims at Khasyal, Chhati Khoi, Mahi Chak, Nagri Runb and Samba, killing thousands. Women and children from these convoys and various regions were either killed or abducted.⁹⁸ An estimated 25,000 women were abducted, including Ch. Hamidullah Khan's daughter, who remained untraced despite his efforts.⁹⁹ On October 22, the military fired on Muslims, causing some to flee to Jammu. Mian Abdur Rashid and officers Raja Sobat Ali Khan and Thakur Natha Singh were killed. On October 25, during Eid-ul-Azha, Hindu and Sikh gangs continued violence and Atta Muhammad of Mastgarh slaughtered his three daughters to protect their honor.¹⁰⁰

Muslim police and military officers were disarmed and confined to police lines. Around 200 Muslims in Baba Jeevan Shah's Khanqah were killed or abducted. On October 28, the Maharaja Hari Singh ordered Muslims to surrender arms. Despite reassurances, violence persisted. By November 3, Patiala reinforcements arrived and on November 5, Muslims were gathered for transport to Pakistan. However, at Satwari Cantonment, those attempting to escape were killed and the trucks were looted.¹⁰¹ Only 900 reached Sialkot, including Gulam Mustafa, whose family was killed.

Ch. Gulam Abbas Khan's daughter was abducted but later found in India through Sh. Abdullah's efforts.¹⁰² Survivors were sheltered in Zafarwal, while most of a subsequent convoy of 25 trucks was killed. Many women were abducted and some jumped into canals to preserve their honor. Dr. Abdul Karim, a survivor, shared eyewitness accounts of the convoy's fate.¹⁰³ When Sikh Brigade soldiers invaded border villages on November 28, 1947, Dogra troops drove out the Muslims of Dulat Chak, forcing them to evacuate across the Ujh river-bed.¹⁰⁴ These events

⁹⁴ Muhammad Yusuf Saraf, "The Jammu Massacre" in *Memory Lane to Jammu* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2004), 161.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 162.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 163-164.

⁹⁷ Saraf, *Memory Lane to Jammu*, 165-166.

⁹⁸ Abdul Rehman and Saba Ghulam Nabi, "Diplomacy to Lawfare: Analyzing Legal Claims in Jammu and Kashmir," *Pakistan Social Sciences Review*, vol. 7, no. 4 (2023): 231-249.

⁹⁹ Saraf, *Memory Lane to Jammu*, 170.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 173.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 174-175.

¹⁰² Ibid., 176-177.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 179.

¹⁰⁴ Thana Shakargarh, "Sialkot District Police Record", FIR no. 179, November 28, 1947.

were covered by the Times of London with the headline “Elimination of Muslims from Jammu”, emphasizing that the Dogra Maharaja Hari was directly in charge of the armed forces responsible for the Muslim ethnic cleansing.¹⁰⁵ Pakistan sent busses for transportation in early November 1947 when Muslims in Jammu sought shelter in camps following the closing of the Sialkot-Jammu railway line. However, the convoy was ambushed by Dogra troops, RSS and armed Sikhs on the Jammu-Sialkot road, resulting in numerous fatalities, abductions and only a few survivors reaching Sialkot.¹⁰⁶ A refugee recalled Dogra troops attacking 30 evacuee trucks at Satwari, in Jammu killing men and abducting women, while officials declared Muslims had no place in J&K.¹⁰⁷

The 1947’s Muslims ethnic cleansing in Jammu is highlighted in the oral testimony of Sialkot. In NawaKot, Dogra forces killed Zafar Butt’s family and in Ram Pura Mohalla, Khalid Ali Gujar’s siblings perished. Kawaja Tahir, who is currently in Sialkot, lost both his parents and his brother. Hameed Ullah, a leader of the Muslim Conference, saw his daughter kidnapped. Zarar Hussain described the forced relocation of his family to Sialkot, while Sarmad Mahmud escaped to a camp for refugees. Hussein Gujar’s account of fleeing Nawa Kot in October 1947 remains particularly poignant.¹⁰⁸ At the age of 18, Hussein survived a Dogra troop attack on his home in Nawa kot that killed his parents, sister and brothers. Returning the next morning, he found his family dead and their home looted. He fled to Sialkot, carrying only a handbag.¹⁰⁹

Sheikh Abdullah’s “Emergency Government” Response to the Crisis in Jammu:-

Before Sh. Muhammad Abdullah’s arrival, there were no facilities for wounded Muslims. Dr. Abdul Karim, with Dr. Rehmatullah Rad, established a hospital at Sardar Muhammad Akram Khan’s Haveli in TalabKhatikaan, with Muhammad Ismail, Fazl-ur-Rehman and Ali Muhammad serving as compounders.¹¹⁰ Dr. Rehmatullah Rad received bandages and medicines from Dr. Pratap Singh. On November 4, Muslims tried to contact Sh. Abdullah or Bakhshi Gulam Muhammad, but their message was blocked. On November 6, they resisted leaving Jammu for Pakistan.¹¹¹ G.K. Reddy, a journalist exiled from Kashmir, criticized the Dogra administration for burning villages and using modern weapons around refugee camps. Sh. Abdullah oversaw the emergency administration following Kashmir’s October 30, 1947, annexation to India, but Mahajan maintained control. Tensions arose when 60 to 70 Muslim soldiers were killed after Colonel Baldev Singh’s withdrawal, with Abdullah condemning the killings and Mahajan labeling the soldiers as rebels.¹¹²

Sh. Abdullah, concerned about Muslims in Jammu, instructed Niaz Ahmad (the then Chief Secretary) and other officials to go there for administrative duties. However, they refused, citing the absence of Muslim soldiers and distrust of Dogra troops for their safety against armed Hindu and Sikh gangs.¹¹³ Sh. Abdullah ensured the safe passage of a 30-truck convoy of refugees in November 1947, despite the loss of seven women and some luggage. His placement of trusted individuals at district headquarters protected the majority of the 200,000-300,000 migrants. Upon learning of the situation, Abdullah visited Jammu, witnessing the suffering and taking action. The administration, led by Dogras and Kashmiri Pandits, was hostile to him due to his support for India’s accession. Jammu’s Muslim population, influenced by the Pakistan Movement, contrasted with the loyal Dogras, who supported Gandhi’s principles.¹¹⁴ Abdullah called for an end to violence against Muslims in Jammu, warning that it threatened the safety of 100,000 non-Muslims in Kashmir Valley. He ensured the safety of refugees, condemned the killings of innocent Muslims and criticized the Dogra Rajputs for targeting defenseless civilians. Abdullah’s actions were supported by Nehru, who criticised Mahajan for mis-handling the situation.¹¹⁵

In November 1947, after the massacre, orphans and unclaimed Muslims were married within the state through Begum Abdullah’s efforts, with Maharani Tara Devi providing dowries. Colonel Adalat Khan, who witnessed the

¹⁰⁵ “Elimination of Muslims from Jammu”, Part II, *The Times* (London), August 10, 1948, 5.

¹⁰⁶ *Pakistan Times* (Lahore), September 19, 1947

¹⁰⁷ Chatta, “Terrible Fate”, 127.

¹⁰⁸ “Interview with Zafar Butt”, Sialkot, November 16, 2024.

¹⁰⁹ “Interview with Khalid Ali Gujar”, November 20, 2024.

¹¹⁰ Saraf, *Memory Lane to Jammu*, 183.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 184.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 185-186.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 187.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 188-189.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 190.

dire situation in Jammu, was deeply moved by the atrocities. Sh. Abdullah, after leaving his deputy Bakhshi Gulam Muhammad to restore order, saw significant progress as Bakhshi managed to recover abducted girls and reunite families. Abdullah returned to Srinagar by mid-November and was concerned about Jammu, Bhadarwah and Kishtwar, tried to enlist Muslim officers, but they refused out of fear. Colonel Adalat eventually agreed to go. In April 1951, Abdullah publicly condemned Maharaja Hari Singh, labeling him responsible for the massacre and unfit to rule J&K.¹¹⁶

Unpacking the Muslim Conference's Responsibility in Jammu during the Violence:-

The MC leadership in Jammu failed during the crisis, prioritizing personal safety over organizing resistance. Contrastingly, Muslims in Bhadarwah successfully resisted Hindu and Sikh attacks, the MC leadership did not mobilize arms or organize similar efforts in other districts. In four districts, Muslims were a significant minority (549,869 compared to 641,285 non-Muslims). The leadership's failure to act, compounded by the imprisonment of key leaders and the departure of others to Pakistan, led to the collapse of the MC. Consequently, many Muslims sought refuge in Jammu, especially in areas like Muhalla Ustad.¹¹⁷

The Muslims of Jammu, with a martial background, were skilled soldiers, but the leadership of the MC, failed to effectively manage the crisis. While figures like Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan gathered arms for Jammu's defense, they were not delivered in time. Key Muslim officers (who were not part of MC), including Captain Mian Nasiruddin, Dr. Abdul Karim and Dr. Rehmatullah Rad, took charge of refugee camps and coordinated with Sh. Abdullah's administration to ensure safe migration of Jammu Muslims to Pakistan. Bakhshi Gulam Muhammad publicly condemned the killings and played a crucial role in recovering abducted women.¹¹⁸

Carnage and Chaos: Assessing the Extent and Intensity of the Violence:-

The violence against Muslims in Jammu during September-October 1947 may be classified as genocide. With the help of Hindus and Sikhs, the Dogra Hindu Maharaja's government was instrumental in the systematic murder of more than 237,000 Muslims out of 800,000 who were trying to escape.¹¹⁹ Scholars such as Ian Copland and Shail Mayaram have compared these events to similar campaigns of ethnic cleansing in other princely states like Bharatpur and Alwar.¹²⁰ Despite evidence, historians like Christopher Snedden question the full scale of the Jammu massacre. Snedden, for example, criticises the reliability of a 10 August, 1948 *Times* report, which claimed up to 200,000 murders.¹²¹ Archival evidence, including records from the *Times of London* and the United Nations, supports the accuracy of the 1948 report on the massacre. Lord Mountbatten, the last British Viceroy, also brought up the matter at a 1948 East India Association meeting, criticizing the Maharaja's actions.¹²² Oral and documentary testimony confirms the reality that the violence in Jammu against Muslims was an act of ethnic cleansing. This narrative, however, has often been overshadowed by the Punjab violence or integrated into the broader Kashmir conflict.¹²³ Jammu's situation was marked by a state-led effort to establish a Hindu majority region, resulting in the violent expulsion of Muslims. By the 1981 Census, Jammu had turned into a Hindu majority region.¹²⁴ Here is the table showing demographic composition of various communities of Jammu region in the census of 1981.¹²⁵

¹¹⁶ Saraf, *Memory Lane to Jammu*, 196-197.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 191-192.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 193-194.

¹¹⁹ "Elimination of Muslims from Jammu", *The Times* (London), August 10, 1948, 5.

¹²⁰ Ian Copland, "The Further Shores of Partition: Ethnic Cleansing in Rajasthan, 1947", *Past and Present*, vol. 160, (1998): 203-239.

¹²¹ Gyanendra Pandey, "Community and Violence: Recalling Partition", *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 32, no. 32 (1997), 2037-2045.

¹²² Snedden, "What Happened to Muslims in Jammu?", 111-134.

¹²³ Mountbatten's address to the East India Association London, "Maharaja verses the People: Genesis of the Kashmiri Dispute", *The Civil and Military Gazette*, September 10, 1951, 3-4.

¹²⁴ Paul Brass, "The Partition of India and Retributive Genocide in the Punjab, 1946-1947", *Journal of Genocide Research*, vol. 5, no. 1 (2003): 71-101.

¹²⁵ In 1951, census was not held in Jammu and Kashmir.

Table 2: Communal Composition of Jammu, 1981¹²⁶

Sr.no.	Communities	Population Ratio
1.	Muslims	33.81%
2.	Hindus	62.06%
3.	Sikhs	3.67%
4.	Buddhists	0.11%
5.	Others	0.35%

In 1947, Jammu Province’s communal violence caused the death toll of an estimated 200,000 Muslims, with Hindus and Sikhs targeting them after a Muslim rebellion in Poonch.¹²⁷ The *Times of London* story from October 10, 1948, stated that more than a quarter of a million Muslims were slaughtered in Jammu.¹²⁸ The report claimed that hired gangsters, with passive or active state troop involvement, massacred over 250,000 Muslims in Jammu. Ian Stephens reported in 1963 that between August and November 1947, up to 200,000 Muslims were killed in a systematic massacre, with another 200,000 missing. An Azad Kashmir Government publication from 1948, also described widespread violence, including killings, looting and abductions, estimating 200,000 Muslims were killed and 27,000 women abducted.¹²⁹ The number of fatalities is still unknown, but many Jammu Muslims thought there was a post-partition plot.

In 1965, Sardar Mohammad Ibrahim Khan asserted that in July 1947, a secret gathering of rajas and maharajas occurred close to Srinagar.¹³⁰ With the help of the RSS, a plot was hatched to slaughter Muslims, beginning at Poonch where opposition was anticipated. The operation, aided by the Dogra Army, aimed to eliminate Muslims in Jammu City and nearby districts.¹³¹ In 1952, Pakistan’s Kashmir Affairs Minister, M.A. Gurmani referenced a *Times* article asserting that Dogra state forces, under the leadership of the Maharaja Hari Singh, with support from the Sikhs and Hindus, ruthlessly murdered 237,000 Muslims in Jammu.¹³² Some Muslims believed the Maharaja was involved in massacring Muslims and pushing survivors into Pakistan. A 1948 report suggested that he was advised by other Maharajas and Indian troops found Patiala gunners in Srinagar, hinting at the Maharaja of Patiala’s involvement.¹³³ The fortnightly report of December 15, 1946 of British Resident Officer at Srinagar, Mr. W. F. Webb mentions about the meeting of Maharaja of Patiala with Maharaja of J&K in Jammu.¹³⁴

Trauma and Transformation: The Lasting Impacts of Massacre on Jammu and Kashmir:-

Many Muslims fled from Jammu Province to escape violence, with estimates varying. In 1948, Muhammad Hafizullah estimated that around 200,000 Muslims migrated to Pakistan.¹³⁵ Pakistan’s Kashmir Affairs Minister, M.A. Gurmani, claimed that the Indian army and the Maharaja Hari Singh’s forces had displaced around 600,000 Muslim refugees, most likely referring to the whole J&K region. More than 300,000 Kashmiri refugees had reached border cities like Gujrat, Sialkot and Jhelum by the end of November 1947; of these, more than 200,000 had settled

¹²⁶ Victoria Schofield, *Kashmir in Crossfire*, cited in Bilal Ahmad Khan’s “Demography of Jammu and Kashmir in Historical Perspective,” *Asian Review of Social Sciences*, vol. 7, no. 3 (2018): 143-153.

¹²⁷ Christopher Snedden, *The Untold Story of the People of Azad Kashmir* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 48-49.

¹²⁸ Snedden, “What happened to Muslims in Jammu?”, 111-134.

¹²⁹ Ian Stephens, *Pakistan* (London: Earnest Benn Ltd., 1964), 200.

¹³⁰ Sardar M. Ibrahim Khan, *The Kashmir Saga* (Lahore: Ripon Printing Press, 1965), 7.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² M. A. Gurmani, *Kashmir: A Survey* (Kashmir: Public Relations Directorate, Ministry of Kashmir, Government of Pakistan, 1952), 17.

¹³³ Snedden, “What happened to Muslims in Jammu?”, 111-134.

¹³⁴ W. F. Webb, “Fortnightly Report from the Resident Officer of Kashmir to L. C. L. Griffin, Secretary to H. E. the Crown Representative”, *Political Department*, no. F.6-C/46, New Delhi, January 15, 1946 (Islamabad: National Documentation Wing, Microfilm Holdings).

¹³⁵ M. Hafizullah, *Towards Azad Kashmir* (Lahore: Bazm-e-Frogh-e-Adab, 1948), 119.

in Sialkot. Many resided in deserted homes or overcrowded camps. The camps had horrific conditions, with disease and poor living standards. Refugees, angered by massacres by state forces, joined the Kashmiri Liberation Movement.¹³⁶ Violence persisted along the Sialkot-Jammu border, with Dogra troops and armed groups attacking. By October 1947, over 17,000 Muslims were killed.¹³⁷ Despite efforts by Pakistan to assist, Kashmiri refugees faced delays in resettlement and were given only temporary property rights. They were excluded from permanent resettlement schemes and their legal status remained uncertain. Similarly, refugees from Sialkot in India were denied permanent residency, with the partition's aftermath affecting their lives for years.¹³⁸ Moreover, change in demographic composition in Jammu affected the Kashmir conflict in long run. As the legacy of violence, mistrust and hostility continued. This inter-community tensions and political instability contributed to the ongoing Kashmir conflict. Approximately 2,37,000 Muslims were killed and over 300,000 individuals were forced to migrate to west Punjab and Pakistan-administered Kashmir, causing psychological anguish, sufferings and separation of families between India-administered and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Due to ongoing hostilities, a wave of radicalization took hold in Kashmir in the 1980s, which caused Kashmiri Pandits to evacuate the state. In a nutshell communal conflicts that influenced the social and political climate of contemporary Kashmir began with the Jammu massacre.

Conclusion:-

The Jammu massacre of 1947, though a crucial event in the history of J&K, has been largely neglected in mainstream historical narratives, often overshadowed by the violence in Punjab and Bengal. This systematic campaign of violence against Muslims was not an isolated incident but a manifestation of long-standing political and religious tensions within the region, exacerbated by the discriminatory policies of the Dogra regime which marginalized Muslims and political maneuvering by figures like Sheikh Abdullah and Jawaharlal Nehru. The massacre was exacerbated by the policies of the Dogra regime, carried out by state forces in collaboration with militant Hindu and Sikh groups, the violence included mass killings, forced displacements, looting and abductions, with the strategic objective of altering Jammu's demographic composition. The massacre was not an isolated event but interconnected with broader regional violence, particularly the Rawalpindi riots. The arrival of Sikh and Hindu refugees into Jammu region intensified communal tensions, leading to coordinated attacks by state forces, the RSS and Akali Dal groups, involving targeted killings, looting and abductions. Statements from MC Mahajan, the Prime Minister of J&K, reinforce the strategic intent behind the violence.

The failure of the MC leadership to organize resistance is critiqued, while limited relief efforts by Sh. Abdullah's administration including Mahajan, attempted to aid the victims. The massacre was largely initiated by the west Punjab refugees and constrained by the Dogra administration that had little interest in halting the aggression. The absence of a strong, unified response further highlights the political fragmentation and the difficulty in resisting state power. The massacre, described as surpassing Punjab's Partition violence in brutality, remains subject to debate over the exact death toll, yet its impact relative to the local population is undeniable. While the scale of Jammu massacre is debated, its impact on the Muslim population of Jammu is undeniable. The systematic disarming of Muslim soldiers and police officers while arming Hindu and Sikh groups facilitated the violence and further entrenched the communal divide. The state-led attempt to alter the demographic structure of Jammu, evidenced by a significant drop in the Muslim population recorded in the Indian Census of 1961 and of J&K's census of 1981, indicates to a deliberate policy of ethnic cleansing, overshadowing the communal violence narrative typically associated with Partition.

The long-term consequences include mass displacement, dire refugee conditions, psychological trauma, political instability and fragmented families across the borders. It reinforced inter-community tensions and played a significant role in the subsequent radicalization of Kashmir's politics that reflected in the shape of freedom struggle of 1980s. The official historical narratives expose deliberate archival omissions and emphasizing the importance of personal accounts in reconstructing a more accurate historical record. Ultimately, the Jammu massacre is presented as a neglected yet pivotal episode of mass violence with enduring ramifications for the region. Despite its significance, the massacre has been either erased or minimized in official historical accounts, a reflection of state control over the narrative. Furthermore, it could not get global attention contrary to the Punjab and Bengal violence. This selective memory prevents a thorough understanding of the past and its continued implications for the region's

¹³⁶ "Civil and Military Gazette", (Lahore), November 30, 1949, 5.

¹³⁷ "Kashmir Rebels Attacked by Aircrafts", *The Times* (London), October 31, 1947, 4.

¹³⁸ Luv Puri, "Bill Seeking Citizenship for West Pakistan refugees Rejected", *The Hindu* (New Delhi), February 9, 2007.

political and social dynamics. The correspondence between British Resident Officer at Srinagar and the Political Department at New Delhi reveals that the British were totally conscious about the communal unrest and deteriorating situation of Jammu region. If the Resident at Srinagar was attentive about the situation of Jammu, then it is a big question mark on the state administration's role which was also aware of the situation.

In nutshell, the Jammu massacre's marginalization in the broader context of Partition violence exposes the broader patterns of historical omission and state manipulation. It also highlights the inefficiency of MC leaders to handle the situation. The deliberate exclusion of this event from mainstream narratives not only distorts the historical record but also perpetuates a one-sided view of the region's partition. The Jammu massacre holds significance for three key reasons: Firstly, it played a pivotal role in triggering the Kashmir conflict, which continues to shape India-Pakistan relations. Secondly, it has received little attention in historical narratives because it was eclipsed by the more well-known communal violence that erupted in Punjab at the same time. Even Mahatma Gandhi acknowledged the extent of the killings in Kashmir. Thirdly, the profound suffering of the victims, who lost their families, were displaced and forced to migrate to Pakistan, has been inadequately addressed in the literature, particularly regarding their miseries and sufferings during the whole episode of violence. Future research may examine state archives to clarify state involvement and demographic changes during the 1947 Jammu massacre. Oral histories and survivor testimonies are crucial for reconstructing lived experiences and challenging dominant narratives. Further investigation is needed into the links between the Jammu violence and the Rawalpindi riots to contextualize regional tensions. The role of the refugees, RSS, Akali Dal and state authorities require scrutiny, as does the Muslim Conference's failure to mount effective resistance. Finally, further research can assess the massacre's long-term psychological, social and political impacts, particularly its role in shaping the Kashmir conflict and demographic shifts.

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