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RESEARCH ARTICLE

**ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE IOM AND UNHCR IN COMBATING
ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION IN NIGER**

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Abstract

This study highlights the roles and responsibilities of the IOM and UNHCR in combating illegal immigration in Niger. Indeed, these two organizations, namely the IOM and UNHCR, work complementary but distinct roles. For example, the IOM manages migration flows more broadly, providing aid services, policy advice, and promoting safe and orderly migration, including assistance for voluntary return, while the UNHCR focuses on the protection of refugees, ensuring that their right to seek asylum is respected and combating forced return. Together, they work to ensure respect for international law and to find sustainable solutions, sharing the responsibility of protecting vulnerable populations while acknowledging that primary responsibility lies with the States. A qualitative method is used in data collection. The results obtained relate to the Protection of refugees, the fight against refoulement, and the search for solutions: furthermore, it is possible to note assistance to states in managing migratory flows, providing policy advice to governments on migration policies, offering specialized assistance to vulnerable migrants, and ensuring that migration is taken into account in the sustainable development goals and works towards inclusive and safe migration.

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Introduction:-

The European Union's common external policy regarding blocking migrants before they reach Europe, which was gripped by a migration crisis in 2015, is the result of several rounds of negotiations, partnership frameworks, summits, conferences, and bilateral and multilateral dialogues. These include, among others, the neighborhood policy with the Maghreb countries located on the migration route, the Euro-African Summit in Rabat, the Khartoum Dialogue, and many other frameworks such as meetings between the European Union and the African Union, and finally, bilateral partnership relations between countries on both sides of the Mediterranean. These partnerships have led to agreements aimed at modifying the legal framework of African countries to incorporate laws into their legal systems whose sole objective is the repression of migrants attempting to reach Europe. And that is why a whole diplomatic arsenal, accompanied by colossal financial resources, has been deployed to force certain countries of

origin, such as Senegal, Mauritania, Morocco, and Mali, to close their borders and push migrants to find other routes to reach Europe. Among these, Brachet (2009) and Bensaad (2004) highlighted the route from Niger to Libya, Algeria, and Morocco.

Since the 1990s, Niger, due to its geographical location, and particularly the Agadez region, situated at the intersection of the Agadez-Algeria and Agadez-Libya routes, has become a crucial transit point for migrants from West and Central Africa seeking to reach Libya and, for some, Europe. Aware of the closure of other routes and the destabilization of Libya following the assassination of President Muammar Gaddafi, Niger was identified at the Valletta Summit as a "guinea pig" country for the externalization of European policy in West Africa. Thus, as a major transit country for migrants heading to Europe through the Sahel and Libya, Niger has become a central player in the European Union's (EU) strategy of externalizing its borders. This cooperation enabled Niger to adopt Law 2015-036, which criminalizes the transport of migrants.

The implementation of this law in 2016 shaped the interventions of several security, humanitarian, and development actors. European organizations, such as EUCAP-Sahel, established for this purpose and present in Niger to strengthen the state in the fight against terrorism, which was escalating in the Liptako-Gourma and Lake Chad regions, shifted their focus to combating irregular migration. Similarly, organizations like the IOM and UNHCR seized the opportunity presented by emergency trust fund funding to tailor their humanitarian projects to a security-focused approach, developing projects related to voluntary assistance for migrants wishing to return to their countries of origin through the creation of transit centers. UNHCR, for its part, took advantage of the existing asylum law to conduct activities that would position it to benefit from the trust fund. In the following sections, we will present the context of the study, the research methodology, and the study's results.

Study Context:

First, it is important to emphasize that migration is the act of changing one's residence for a long or permanent period. It is one form of mobility. It encompasses two opposing concepts as follows: emigration is leaving the country of origin, while immigration is entering the country of destination. Thus, an emigrant is someone who leaves their country, an emigrant is someone who has left their country, an immigrant is someone who enters their host country, an immigrant is someone who has settled in their host country, and a migrant is someone who is currently migrating. Generally, we distinguish between two types of migration or human mobility, without resorting to current concepts such as internally displaced persons, returnees, deportees, and readmitted persons, among others. Economic migration refers to and concerns the act of leaving home to seek better living conditions by carrying out various lawful activities with the aim of having economic benefits that allow the individual to provide for their own needs and those of their family through sending money, transferring funds or materials necessary for the family's development.

It is important to note that this study focuses on clandestine, illegal, or irregular immigration, which is the illegal, illicit, or covert entry into a national territory of foreigners who have not completed the required formalities. This immigration is considered illegitimate because it differs from regular immigration due to the existence of legislation, treaties, legal precedents, or other sometimes strict regulations established by nation-states that are circumvented. Illegality is characterized by the fact that these foreign nationals do not possess the documents or meet the conditions required by law or treaties to authorize their entry, or by the continuation of their stay after their documents have expired. Depending on the legislation, it may also involve smugglers. Covertness is characterized by the fact that entry and stay are concealed, that is, carried out with a certain degree of discretion, sometimes out of sight. Irregularity is characterized by the failure to comply with the various rules in force, including laws, regulations, and procedures relating to the stay of a foreigner.

Within this sector, organizations like the IOM and UNHCR fight against irregular migration in Niger. The adoption of this law on the eve of the Valletta Summit, which criminalizes materially motivated assistance to emigration or illegal immigration, housing assistance, and the production of false documents, is a strong signal of Niger's commitment to waging a relentless battle against irregular migration, trafficking, and human trafficking—a commitment that aligns with the European Union's objectives. It is this position, so eagerly awaited by the EU, that Niger has leveraged to become a key partner in managing the thousands of Africans transiting through its territory to reach the Maghreb, some via Europe. The implementation of this law in 2016, under political pressure from the European Union through financial, military, and technical incentives, led to the adoption of various security and humanitarian measures over approximately eight years. Indeed, during this period, activities related to the fight

against irregular migration became a kind of windfall, even a lucrative one, for recipient countries, European countries and their agencies, as well as international NGOs such as the IOM, UNHCR, and national NGOs. In practice, some actors whose primary mission was focused on combating terrorism and providing humanitarian aid immediately transformed into veritable agents of repression, taking on various forms.

Therefore, in the absence of other actors involved in this entire process, we will rely on the IOM and UNHCR, which have been at the heart of migration in Niger since 2006 and whose activities have also evolved from humanitarian aid to a security-focused approach, in order to understand the hidden reasons for all these interventions and the sustainability of the results they achieved after the repeal of this law. Thus, adopting these questions from Florence Boyer (2019): How has the issue of migration become a revealer of policies and challenges related to security, development, and protection? How is this issue transforming mobility systems, as well as Niger's place and role in the Sahel-Saharan region? How is this grid-like structure of Nigerien territory gradually becoming a form of redefining the borders of the State of Niger? How do displaced persons cope with this increasingly entrenched border? How do international organizations like IOM and UNHCR negotiate their place in this security system, given their humanitarian mandates?

Methodology:-

In addition to documentary research and online consultations, a qualitative approach was used. Data saturation was employed in data collection. Specifically, the aim was to gather the opinions and experiences of individuals experiencing irregular migration, particularly in reception centers, through rigorous triangulation, which allowed for saturation to be reached during the first ten days of September 2025. Saturation refers to the point at which, in research, any new data adds no new elements to the understanding of the phenomenon under study.

Results:-

IOM's Role in Combating Irregular Migration:

It is important to note that IOM, established in 1951 and part of the United Nations system, is the leading intergovernmental organization in the field of migration. It has 175 Member States and 8 Observer States, and offices in 171 countries. IOM works to promote orderly and humane migration for the benefit of all. To this end, it assists migrants worldwide by developing effective responses to evolving migration dynamics and providing guidance on migration policies and practices. The Organization collaborates with governmental, intergovernmental, and non-governmental partners to strengthen the resilience of migrants, particularly those in vulnerable situations. It also works closely with governments to manage all forms of mobility and their impacts. The activities undertaken in this context include operations conducted in some of the world's most complex emergency situations. The IOM Constitution recognizes the link between migration and economic, social, and cultural development, as well as the right to freedom of movement.

Therefore, IOM's work is focused on the following three objectives:

- Saving lives and protecting migrants: To achieve this goal, IOM prioritizes the safety, dignity, and protection of people in the most challenging crisis situations.
- Finding solutions to displacement: To achieve this, IOM works to reduce the risks and impacts of climate change, environmental degradation, conflict, and instability faced by communities affected by or at risk of displacement.
- Facilitating regular migration pathways: To achieve this, IOM prioritizes approaches that involve all levels of government and society to safely connect people, goods, services, knowledge, and innovation. In addition, it primarily focuses on migrant assistance and voluntary return through programs and projects such as AVR, MRRM, SURNI, SUDENI, AGAMI, and its flagship border management program. IOM also returned nearly 15,000 migrants from Niger to their countries of origin, mainly in West and Central Africa. Two IOM projects funded by the EUF totaling €22 million—MRRM (€7 million) and SURNI (€15 million)—support the accommodation and provision of six centers, migrant outreach, rescue operations, support for state structures, and reintegration. The pilot phase was funded by Italy and the United Kingdom.

The Migrant Response and Resource Mechanism (MRRM) project was one of the first approved for the Sahel and Lake Chad window in January 2016. It represents the implementation of a "comprehensive approach" proposed by the IOM in June 2015, which led to the EU-IOM Joint Initiative for Protection and Reintegration, funded with €638 million under the EU Fund and implemented in 27 African countries, including Niger.

UNHCR's Role in Combating Irregular Migration: The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), also known as the UN Refugee Agency, based in Geneva, is a program of the United Nations. Its original purpose is to protect refugees, find durable solutions to help them rebuild their lives, and ensure the implementation of the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. At the end of 2020, more than 82.4 million people worldwide were forced to flee their homes. Among them were almost 26.4 million refugees, more than half of whom were under 18. However, UNHCR's assistance policy was coupled with a policy of migrant control. This second, more unofficial aspect of UNHCR policy gained increasing importance from the 1990s onward, with UNHCR thus participating in the development of the European Union's (EU) immigration policy, which it supports in a complex and ambiguous manner. Thus, UNHCR significantly increased its presence in Morocco in 2004, the year of Hague Program, which institutionalized in the EU the "externalization of asylum" policies initiated in the late 1990s.

More specifically, the role of UNHCR (the United Nations Refugee Program) aims to:

- Protect refugees: Focuses specifically on refugees, ensuring that their fundamental rights, such as the right to seek asylum, are respected.
- Combat refoulement: Ensures that people are not forcibly returned to countries where their life or safety is threatened, which is a violation of the principle of non-refoulement.
- Find solutions: Works with governments and NGOs to find durable solutions for refugees, such as resettlement.

The practical activities of these NGOs in the fight against illegal migration:

During the investigation, we witnessed the arrival of Nigerien migrants deported from Algeria on September 17, 2025, at 2:30 p.m. These migrants—men, women, and children—visibly tired and exhausted, got out of the vehicles, their hearts heavy with despair. Some headed towards the profiling committee to line up, while others went to the restaurant and water fountains in search of water and sandwiches while waiting for the profiling process to begin so they could receive their meal tickets. During the interviews, even though they unanimously requested anonymity or asked not to disclose their villages of origin, these survivors of the ordeal are Hausa, and more specifically from the Zinder region. I approached the committee to learn more. For several years, this committee has coordinated the repatriation of Nigerien nationals expelled from Algeria and sometimes Libya. On December 17th, 573 of them—503 men, 36 women, and 34 boys, including young children—arrived at the transit center for Nigerien deportees in the Salkat neighborhood. Upon their arrival, the screening committee received the envelopes accompanying these migrants and conducted further screening to check for stowaways and, most importantly, to provide them with meal vouchers.

To be honest, I witnessed another life, another world, and a different perspective on the brothers, sisters, unaccompanied children, and minors whose dreams were shattered in Algeria. Their possessions—phones, money, clothes, and more—were confiscated by the police and then transported back to Niger in large trucks, like animals. This situation should concern the authorities because these young people have nothing left to return home. The profiling committee is composed of representatives from the town hall, the regional directorate of civil status and refugees, the representative of the permanent secretariat, etc. Its role is to register those expelled from Algeria by establishing their full names, date and place of birth, country of origin, length of stay in that country, and other contact information. The committee then asks each migrant for their region, department, municipality, and village. It is after this identification that the committee provides these newcomers with meal tickets. Restaurants. At the beginning of the operation, the state provided meals in the center and transportation for these Nigerien migrants for a period of about 10 years, starting in 2011. The IOM also provided them with non-food kits such as buckets, mats, toothpaste, sheets, ointment, etc.

In terms of testimonies, we can note that Faiza Aliou expressed herself in these terms: “I just returned from Woharam (Algeria). I spent three years there. I work as a cleaner and earn 30,000 CFA francs per month. This was the first time I had left, and it was the people who had returned who encouraged me to leave because they came back with money. Given the poverty I was in, I sold my ox to leave. I was arrested when we took the bus to go to work; the police stopped us.” In the vehicle, they made all the Black people get out and put them in their vehicle. The police wouldn't let us leave to get our luggage, which is at home, or even to see our relatives. They take money and cell phones but don't imprison people. Then, during our stay with them, while waiting for the day of our return, they give us food and water. However, the living conditions in their detention camp are poor because there is no freedom and people are crammed together like animals. We returned without a single franc. We are going to try to reach some of our relatives who are in the city while we wait for our relatives in the village to send us money to go home.

Go home? I don't know, I'll see later when I've rested. Today, where I am, I have nothing and I have to call my family to send money and go home.

And Aicha Amadou, 25, added: "I just returned from Woharam. I was only there for five months, and I was with my husband. My husband was first arrested at the market, and he didn't even call to tell me he was there. Then the police came and arrested us too. The reason for our trip was to find work. Back home, the land isn't productive; you can farm and get nothing. Besides, the fields are barren and fragmented, and we have children. So what are we supposed to do, if not go to Algeria and come back with money like everyone else? When the police arrested us, they took my money and my cell phone. Now, what we're going to do depends on my husband, but I don't think it's possible to go back home because we have nothing. It's truly shameful to hear that we came back with nothing." It's better to stay in Agadez and look for another jobs in the meantime because even transportation to get to Adaydayta and back to the city is lacking. We came back empty-handed." As for Issa Seydou, 33 years old, he recounts: "I was there for eight months and I work as a bricklayer. It wasn't my first time going to Algeria. I earn 150,000 CFA francs a month. I left from the Agadez bus station in a Hilux.

The reasons for leaving are quite simple. Here in Niger, outside of the rainy season, there are no other activities. And this agriculture doesn't provide a living because of the fragmentation of the land, the infertility of the soil, and the population pressure, because at 33, I have two wives and eight children. The day of my arrest, very early in the morning, I was leaving for work when the police immediately set up camp in front of my house." She took me to the deportation center, and then she brought us here. The police imprison and beat people, especially those who go to the gold mining sites. While I was there, I sent money to my family. I'm going to call them to send me the transportation costs, and then I'm going home. Deportation is a tradition, and that's why as soon as we earn something, we send it to our families." Our interview with the permanent secretary of the management system for the camps for deportees in Niger, dated September 1, 2025, reveals that:

"In terms of support, only sub-Saharan migrants benefit from it; Nigerien migrants do not, hence a form of segregation and discrimination. The same treatment could be given to them to develop micro-projects and stay in their own countries." But we still see flows of migrants, pushbacks and expulsions, and migrants getting lost and dying during their journey. Algeria pushed people back without consultation, as does Libya. Niger has become a dumping ground for migrants deemed undesirable by them."The remarks of a member of the migration observatory on September 15, 2025, highlight this analysis: "How can we understand that institutions like the IOM and even the State negotiate the handling of migrants pushed back to Niger, on Nigerien soil, taking in foreign nationals?"They put them in centers, feed them and provide everything they need, transport them in luxury vehicles or by plane, and finally, give them integration allowances, leaving Nigeriens to be left behind."

The Main Security Actors in Charge of Law Enforcement:-

Law 2015-036 also paved the way for a proliferation of security and humanitarian actors in northern Niger. In addition to national forces, international NGOs, UN agencies (IOM, UNHCR, UNODC), and European security cooperation mechanisms (such as EUCAP Sahel) have established a presence. Each of these actors operates according to its own logic: humanitarian for some, security-related for others, and even diplomatic or economic. This plurality of actors has created a fragmented security landscape, with challenges related to coordination, but also conflicts of legitimacy. Niger has thus found itself caught in a web of strategies, often developed outside the country and sometimes disconnected from the needs of local populations. Finally, the intertwining of security aid and development assistance has reinforced Niger's dependence on its foreign partners, particularly European ones. In exchange for funding, the state has had to adapt its security priorities, at the risk of seeing its political room for maneuver reduced. Documentary analysis of project fact sheets and the approaches of certain authors highlights the following actors and their missions:

The European Union: it participated in the development of the national internal security strategy and its action plan in 2017 and 2018, and the national strategy to combat irregular migration with the assistance of a Viennese think tank (International Centre for Migration Policy Development). EUCAP-Sahel: Present in Niger since 2012, initially mandated to combat terrorism, it deploys European police forces and security experts to enhance the capabilities of the defense and security forces, including the national police, the national guard, and the gendarmerie. In 2015, its mandate expanded to include combating irregular migration with the opening of an office in Agadez. Until the end of its mandate, one of its main missions was to support the defense and security forces in order to better control migration flows, combat irregular migration, and fight criminal activity. Its final mandate involved launching more

operational training programs for on-the-ground support and monitoring, in which European police officers assist their Nigerien counterparts. From 2012 to 2018, it trained 13,000 security personnel in the areas of travel document forgery, investigative techniques, and providing advisory support to forensic science. It comprises 130 security experts from 15 EU Member States and approximately 70 Nigerien staff. Its budget was €8.7 million in 2012 and €64 million for the two-year period of its fourth mandate.

ECI: Joint Investigation Team: combating criminal networks, irregular immigration, trafficking, and migrant smuggling. It includes French, Spanish, and 12 Nigerien police officers. It works along the criminal justice chain, from data collection to intelligence analysis on terrorist and migration threats. It has made 266 arrests and implicated 69 criminal networks. This project is managed by FIIAPP, a Spanish public institution.

AJUSEN: budget support and training. With a budget of €80 million, it supports the 2016-2020 budget for strengthening state institutions in the areas of security, border control, justice, and public finance. €10 million is allocated to training programs for the Nigerien judiciary and eight different security forces in border management.

AFD: The French Development Agency often plays a role in governance, policing, and border initiatives in the region.

CIVIPOL: A partly private French company owned by French arms manufacturers Thales, Airbus, and Safran. It has influenced EU policy to secure training activities for the security forces: police, gendarmerie, national guard, intelligence services, and customs.

GAR-SI: Rapid Action-Surveillance and Intervention Group. Since its creation in 2019, it has conducted patrols along the borders of Burkina Faso and Mali. They seized weapons and explosives but arrested no smugglers or migrants.

FRONFEX: This force is composed of European security forces, some of which, such as Spain, Germany, and the European Union, have liaison officers in Niger. Its direct interlocutor is the Directorate of Territorial Security.

GIZ: The German Agency for International Cooperation, it has built 11 French posts. Border guards at the Nigerian border were equipped with motorcycles and computers. The organization developed border security training modules and delivered equipment to the forensic police. Its funders include the German Federal Foreign Office and the European Union. This support has amounted to approximately €90 million since 2017. The G5 Sahel, initially funded with €363 million, was created in 2017 by heads of state in Paris with a budget of €250 million. It comprises the armed forces of five countries: Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Chad, and Niger. Its mission was initially to combat terrorism, but its focus has shifted to combating migrant smuggling by blocking departures and transit routes to Libya. The FIIAPP is a Spanish public institution working to reform the public sector. But its mandate has expanded to include the provision of equipment such as drones, IMS-Catcher telephone interception equipment, and data analysis to complement the Niamey telephone monitoring center.

CIAUD: International Committee for Emergency Aid and Development. It intervenes in the context of monitoring migration flows at borders, and the identification and assistance of minors and unaccompanied children is funded by national and international NGOs.

Nigerien Red Cross: Humanitarian assistance and protection of migrant populations in transit in Agadez-Arlit and Dirkou. However, for a better understanding of the roles played by these different actors during their deployment in the territory, it is necessary to describe the intervention mechanism put in place in relation to the meager results they have achieved.

Intervention Mechanisms:-

The implementation of Law 2015-036 was based on a repressive apparatus deliberately designed to blanket Niger in an attempt to halt all forms of movement related to irregular migration, both within the country and at its borders. Based on the work of Laura Lambert (2020) and Rhoumour Ahmet Tchilouta (2023), this apparatus is aligned with the national defense forces but directed by external security forces according to their own agenda.

Even though we don't know the operational or command structure to understand the level of dysfunction, it functions according to the following pattern:

The Directorate of Territorial Surveillance (DST): it works in collaboration with the joint investigation team composed of Spanish, French, and Nigerien police officers in the regions of Agadez, Niamey, Tahoua, and Zinder, led by the International and Ibero-American Foundation for Administration and Public Policies (FIIAPP). These interventions aim to combat "irregular migration and human trafficking." However, their missions extend to: "the collection and analysis of data on land and air traffic of people entering and leaving the city of Agadez, as well as entry and exit at border crossings." The police force is equipped with mobile border control companies (CMCF) deployed by EUCAP-SAHEL and the IOM. Three of these companies are currently operational in the Maradi,

Konni, and Téra regions, with their primary mission being border management and security. Plans are underway to establish additional units in the Diffa and Zinder regions. No such unit is planned for Agadez, as the ECI (Emergency Community Intervention) and the IOM's mobile border post prototype already exist in Arlit for migrants transiting to Algeria. The gendarmerie has been entrusted with the GAR-SI-Sahel Rapid Action Group, a sub-regional program involving the G5 Sahel countries and implemented by FILAPP. This program aims to provide the G5 Sahel gendarmerie forces with a coordination tool for combating irregular migration and human trafficking, as well as to strengthen their operational capacities for effective territorial control. Implementation is ensured by the Swiss NGO COGINTA with funding from the FFUA.

The National Guard has been equipped with a multi-purpose squadron, whose mandate has been expanded to include combating human trafficking in remote areas of the country. The EP-GNN (National Guard Training Center) will also draw on EUCAP Sahel's expertise in this area and will serve as a liaison between the National Guard and other actors, notably the CMCF (National Security Councils) and GAR-SI Sahel (Regional Security and Intervention Groups). These GAR-SI are equipped with the EP-GNN multi-purpose squadron, which is implemented by COGINTA. Finally, joint commands; eight (8) joint command posts composed of the National Guard, the police, the gendarmerie, and customs are deployed in the eight (8) regions and established by CIVIPOL in collaboration with EUCAP-SAHEL. It is also important to note that the experience of mobile border control companies initiated by the United States was adopted by EUCAP-SAHEL in the following way: The model of Mobile Border Control Companies (MBCCs), introduced in 2016 by the US military, inspired EUCAP to create other units. The first unit, funded by the United States and overseen by the US and the FBI, comprises 250 police officers in the Maradi crossroads of trade and migration on the border with Nigeria.

During the first eight months of 2018, the unit handed over 110 people to the judicial authorities, including for attempting to enter the country irregularly. Inspired by this initiative, EUCAP Sahel Niger supported the creation of a second mobile unit of 252 police officers, which was to be deployed in October 2019 in another border town with Nigeria, Birni-N'Konni. It will be trained and equipped by EUCAP with the participation of several European security forces and Frontex, and financed by Germany (€6 million) and the Netherlands (€4 million). A third unit is planned for Zinder. In short, the combination of all these interventions following the implementation of Law 2015-036 has had both positive and negative effects on the living conditions of migrants through the arrests of smugglers or anyone suspected of being so, on the free movement of people and their property, including Nigerien nationals, on the number of people rescued by IOM missions in collaboration with civil protection, on the number of refugees and asylum seekers, those deported from Libya and Algeria, and on the number of migrants entering and leaving Nigerien territory.

Critical Analysis:

These incessant pushbacks raise questions about the effectiveness of the implementation of the free movement agreements between Niger and Algeria, and about the African Union's capacity to make integration a lever for development. These pushback practices, coupled with the policy of externalizing European borders to southern neighboring countries, particularly Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya, and supported by massive funding, hinder free movement between sub-Saharan Africa and the Maghreb countries, which in recent years have become the guardians or guinea pigs of the European Union. Otherwise, how can we understand that despite the growing and real labor needs of these perpetually developing countries, they are turning their backs on rhetoric about integration for a united Africa, on humanism, and on the ratification of international human rights instruments, while continually arresting and detaining human beings who aspire to life and the realization of their dreams?

Conclusion:-

Ultimately, it must be acknowledged that the IOM and UNHCR have played a crucial role in the fight against irregular migration in Niger. Indeed, the externalization of European policies in Africa regarding the fight against irregular migration has dealt a severe blow to Niger, particularly in the Agadez region and especially the urban commune. The widespread presence of security forces throughout Niger has had a considerable impact on the region. Among the key and influential actors in the implementation of Law 2015-036 are large international structures such as EUCAP-Sahel, ECI, GAR-SI, IOM, UNHCR and European subcontracting companies such as CIVIPOL FIIAP COGINTA which are financed by the EU FFU, the UN and countries such as the United States, Japan, for the implementation of a security system deliberately conceived from the outside whose objectives are to control the territory of Niger, to absolve the State of its sovereign functions in order to immobilize and contain all movements of migrants towards the north of Agadez.

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