THE INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL CONNECTIONS AND EXECUTIVE RISK PREFERENCES ON TAX AVOIDANCE: THE MODERATING ROLE OF AUDIT COMMITTEE MEETINGS

Corporate tax compliance is a crucial element in maintaining national fiscal stability, yet tax avoidance in Indonesia remains relatively high. This study aims to analyze the effect of Political Connections and Executive Risk Preferences on Tax Avoidance, while examining the moderating role of Audit Committee Meeting Frequency. Drawing from Agency Theory and Upper Echelon Theory, this research focuses on energy sector companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). Hypothesis testing was conducted using Panel Data Regression. The main regression results reveal that neither Political Connections nor Executive Risk Preferences have a direct significant impact on Tax Avoidance. Furthermore, Audit Committee Meeting Frequency does not moderate the relationship between Political Connections and Tax Avoidance.However,Audit Committee Meeting Frequency significantly moderates the effect of Executive Risk Preferences on Tax Avoidance, indicating that more intensive supervisory oversight dampens executive risk-taking behaviors regarding tax avoidance strategies. Quantile regression results further highlight heterogeneous effects, showing that political connections are more pronounced among low tax avoidance firms, whereas the moderating role of audit committees on executive risk preferences is more prominent in high tax avoidance firms.